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Wifely Counsel and Civic Leadership in The Canterbury Tales 
Abby Rosebrock  
 
This dissertation identifies wifely counsel as a major theme in The Canterbury Tales. My 
analysis of The Tale of Melibee, The Clerk's Tale, The Wife of Bath's Prologue, and The 
Wife of Bath's Tale reveals a pattern of women instructing, transforming, and 
collaborating with their husbands to accomplish important work for both the household 
and the public sphere. Wife-counselors in the Tales do not merely provide advice; in 
moments that modern critics too often overlook, these women also supersede their 
husbands in leadership roles to mediate conflicts and dispense justice. By reading the 
tales in my study as narratives of wifely counsel, I show how greater critical attention to 
plots and characters illuminates underexplored arguments about gender, marriage, and 
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 When the marquis of Saluzzo marries the poorest maid in the land, she rises 
from poverty to fill a void in political leadership, resolving disputes among her 
husband’s subjects and restoring peace and justice to the region.  
When a patriarch learns that home invaders have brutally attacked his wife and 
daughter, his wife coaches him through bouts of rage and despair and faces down her 
assailants to negotiate a truce.  
When King Arthur’s knight goes hawking and rapes a maiden who happens to 
cross his path, Queen Guinevere and women all over Britain mobilize to rehabilitate the 
criminal, forcing him to relinquish his sense of sexual and economic entitlement. 
Each of these stories—The Clerk’s Tale, The Tale of Melibee, and The Wife of 
Bath’s Tale, respectively—depicts flawed patriarchal leadership as a threat to public 
safety and wifely counsel as the remedy. The women in these tales not only expose their 
husbands to new ideas, train them to be more accountable, and model public-minded 
attitudes; in moments scholars often overlook, they also stand in for their husbands to 
resolve conflicts and mete out justice, emerging as stronger, more rational leaders. All 
three of these stories end with a husband acknowledging his wife's unparalleled virtue 
and wisdom; The Tale of Melibee and The Wife of Bath's Tale, along with The Wife of 
Bath's Prologue, conclude with a husband explicitly conceding all authority and 
decision-making powers to his wife (ClT 1044-1057, Mel 1870-1873, WBP 813-822, 
WBT 1230-1238). Although wifely counsel is a common trope in medieval writing, its 
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treatment in these texts is radically imaginative, variegated, and public-minded. In The 
Canterbury Tales, wifely counsel is not strictly a literary convention or a private 
domestic event. More often than not, it is a civic vocation, indispensable to public 
welfare.  
The sheer frequency and variety of passages in the Tales that relate wifehood to 
counsel—even and perhaps especially in tales that flirt with antifeminism—demonstrate 
the topic's centrality to Chaucer's ideas about gender, ethics, and politics. Yet no critics 
have undertaken a systematic study of Chaucerian wifely counsel. To redress this gap in 
the scholarship, my dissertation investigates wifely counsel as a civic vocation in The 
Canterbury Tales. By drawing attention to Chaucer's interest in married women's 
contributions to their households as well as to public life, my research also forges a 
convergence between scholarship on political counsel in late medieval writing and 
research on gender and marriage in Chaucer.  
Many scholars have undertaken relevant studies of counsel since 1993, when 
Geraldine Barnes called for greater attention to the role of counsel in Middle English 
literature. But the historicist bent of research on counsel literature tends to exclude or 
underestimate the political impact of “wommennes conseils,” which sometimes take 
place in informal settings (NPT 3256). Studies of the mirrors-for-princes genre, or 
philosophical advice literature for rulers, often focus narrowly on depictions of counsel 
in its most explicit, dialogic form (Scanlon, 1994; Brown, 2001; Rayner, 2008; Rigby, 
2009). Peter Brown's overview of Chaucer and the mirrors-for-princes genre reflects a 
critical tendency to understand this topic through the lens of the Ricardian court, a 
circumscribed political model involving a male monarch and—occasionally—women as 
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merciful intercessors on behalf of the downtrodden or persecuted (69-72). Although 
Brown acknowledges resonances of the mirrors-for-princes genre in a variety of 
Chaucerian texts, including some tales about women and marriage, he understands the 
genre as primarily a means of commenting on and critiquing “courtly, or at least 
aristocratic, settings” (72).1 
Brown's reliance on Rigby's hypothesis that Chaucer was influenced by De 
regimine principum, a seminal medieval mirror for princes by Giles of Rome, creates 
the impression that Chaucer had a more traditional take on the genre than the Tales 
actually bear out.2 The poet of The Canterbury Tales does not focus solely on a cycle of 
influence between the court, its direct influencers, and its subjects. His counsel tales 
embrace a variety of generic conventions to investigate political problems that extend 
far beyond the court and the aristocracy. The texts in my study take on broad social, 
ethical, and philosophical concerns and are especially invested in issues of gender, 
public safety, and public welfare. Chaucer's counsel tales ask radical questions about 
how the actions of men and women from a variety of backgrounds, operating in a wide 
range of social contexts, can either endanger or revitalize public life.  
I propose approaching the Tales with a broad understanding of counsel as any 
rhetorical act or performance intended to advise, instruct, or educate another person. My 
                                                            
1 In Geoffrey Chacuer (Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics, 2011), Brown opens his  
discussion by citing Rigby's work on Chaucer and Giles of Rome (69).   
 
2  Sarah Rees Jones argues that De regimine principum reflects conventional  
gender binaries (246). Jones, “Public and Private Space and Gender in Medieval 
Europe,” The Oxford Handbook of Women and Gender in Medieval Europe, eds. Judith 




study incorporates Barnes' notion of “the Wise Counsellor” as a conceptual category 
akin in scope to that of the “Fool-trickster.” Barnes argues that the counselor-figure is 
crucial to a wide array of genres, including “medieval epic, romance, and overtly 
didactic narrative,” and that counselors can play a number of different advisory roles in 
a number of formal and informal contexts: “the counsellor's office may be political, 
paedagogical [sic], or moral: to interpret or expatiate upon religious, judicial, and 
intellectual authority, to offer practical advice, to devise strategy, or to advise against 
unwise or ill-considered action” (ix). This expanded definition of counsel 
accommodates the considerable range of pedagogical work that wives accomplish in the 
Tales as well as suggests the need for scholars to look beyond court to find scenes of 
counsel in diverse settings.  
The Canterbury Tales certainly grapple with stereotypical complaints about 
wives and wifely counsel. An explicit argument for wifely counsel in The Merchant's 
Tale—“Do alwey so as wommen wol thee rede” (1361)—emerges in a deeply ironic 
light, and The Nun's Priest's Tale blames a narrative of mock-epic catastrophe on the 
protagonist's choice to “[take] his conseil of his wyf, with sorwe” (3252-3255). As a 
purveyor of evil counsel, the sultaness in The Man of Law's Tale necessarily 
complicates any discussion on Chaucer's interest in the counsel of married or widowed 
women. But all three of these tales take pains to undercut their own misogynistic 
implications.3 They also announce the counsel of women and wives as a major theme, 
                                                            
3 On January's culpability in The Merchant's Tale, see Wentersdorf (“Imagery,  
Structure, and Theme in Chaucer’s Merchant’s Tale,” Geoffrey Chaucer’s The 
Canterbury Tales: A Casebook, ed. Lee Patterson [New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007], 115-136) 132 and MerchT 1700-1711 in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. 
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and the first two of them remind us explicitly that this theme is a nexus of intertextual 
debate, both within and beyond the Tales (MerchT 1685-1687, NPT 3256-3262).  
Although Chaucer's female counselors often work outside of institutional 
structures, their counsel tends to be formally complex and philosophically rigorous. 
Even wife-counselors who operate mainly inside their homes invoke sophisticated legal, 
contractual, and scholarly rhetoric. Compare, for example, the courtier Justinus in The 
Merchant's Tale, who “wolde noon aucoritee allegge” because “he wolde his longe tale 
abregge” (1657-1658), to Prudence, whose uncompromising citationality pervades the 
most of The Tale of Melibee, or to the Wife of Bath, whose irreverent but thoughtful 
remarks on issues of intellectual authority come up in nearly every scholarly discussion 
of her prologue. The women's counsel is not necessarily better or worse than that of 
Justinus, but it is more self-conscious, ambitious, and bibliographically rich.    
Moreover, all of the wife-counselors in my study accomplish considerable work 
in the public sphere in addition to their households. Together, The Tale of Melibee, The 
Clerk's Tale, The Wife of Bath's Prologue, and The Wife of Bath's Tale deconstruct a 
gender binary that Sarah Rees Jones identifies as a hallmark of the mirrors-for-princes 
genre and that seems to have misdirected scholarly attention from the topic of wifely 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Benson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). Regarding The Nun's Priest's Tale, Diamond 
(“Chaucer’s Women and Women’s Chaucer,” The Authority of Experience [Amherst: 
The University of Massachussetts Press, 1977] argues that “the poem is about, in one 
aspect, the workings of the male ego and its need for feminine approval” (68). As for 
the sultaness, the Man of Law says little to nothing about her marriage, and her role in 
the text is more motherly than wifely. Schibanoff argues that the poem distinguishes her 
from most wives in the Tales by emphasizing her “desire for conventionally male 
power” (“World’s Apart,” Chaucer’s Cultural Geography, ed. Kathryn L. Lynch [New 
York: Routledge, 2002] 265). The Man of Law also stresses her cultural otherness, so 
that, in the context of the Tales, the sultaness represents the exception rather than the 




counsel: that is, a normative understanding of women as more or less “anchored to the 
home” and of men as “those who traveled abroad” to “produce more sophisticated types 
of wealth” (246). The bachelors and husbands in these texts may have a penchant for 
mobility or travel, but their independent excursions from the household are rarely 
economically productive, and they often result in corruption or neglect. Far from being 
“anchored to the home,” the women in Chaucer’s tales of wifely counsel tend to 
navigate public life more successfully and ethically than their husbands do.  
Archival research confirms a strong historical basis for reading wife-counselors 
as vital contributors to civic discourse. Ramsey’s groundbreaking 2012 article, “The 
Voices of Counsel: Women and Civic Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,” argues that 
medievalists have too long overlooked “the idea of civic discourse […] outside of 
classical rhetorical contexts” and have too hastily assumed that “civic discourse […] 
silenced and marginalized women” (472). His analysis of women's rhetoric in epistolary 
sources reveals a “socially constructed set of expectations for women’s participation in 
government at the highest levels” in late medieval Europe (474). But Ramsey’s work, 
with its focus on letter-writing, pertains mainly to historical, literate noblewomen. By 
contrast, Chaucer’s fictional representations of wifely counsel span a virtually 
comprehensive socioeconomic spectrum—from Griselda, “povrest of hem alle,” to 
Queen Guinevere herself (ClT 205). The Clerk's Tale and The Wife of Bath's Tale are 
especially interested in how issues of social class can shape women's counsel and affect 
the way it is received. 
 Studies by Pakkala-Weckström (2001, 2005), Schieberle (2009), and Vines 
(2011) acknowledge representations of women as skilled rhetoricians in the Tales and 
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other literary texts of the era, but these studies do not thoroughly address marital status 
as a critical problem for Chaucer. The political access that marriage can provide is a 
recurring dilemma in the Tales, especially where wifely counsel is concerned: married 
women can parlay marital status into opportunities for civic participation and public 
service, but they can also find themselves trapped in unsatisfying or abusive situations. 
On the other hand, scholarship on marriage practices (Nelson, 2002; Hume, 2012; 
O’Byrne, 2012), masculinity and manhood (Beidler, 1998; Pugh, 2006; Crocker, 2007), 
sexuality (Miller, 2005; Cartlidge, 2006), and desire (Scala, 2009; Pitcher, 2012) in 
Chaucer’s work tends to emphasize gender rivalries and differences, obscuring the 
Tales’ interest in marriage as an arena for problem-solving.  
My dissertation contends that Chaucer’s tales of wifely counsel emphasize the 
ethical and civic accomplishments of characters who collaborate with, instruct, 
transform, and stand in for their husbands. Each chapter traces the conceptual 
relationship between gender, marital status, political access, and political efficacy in a 
Canterbury text, as well as the relationship between female “sovereynetee” or 
“governance” in marriage and female authority in more public contexts (WBT 1038, 
1231). My analysis reveals a pattern of women in the Tales who use diverse forms of 
counsel to navigate the hazards of marriage, manipulate patriarchal resistance, and 
ultimately improve public welfare. 
Chapter One, “The Counsel of Dame Prudence in The Tale of Melibee,” poses a 
new way to read this dense, philosophical tale, which has long confounded scholars as 
one of the most difficult texts in Chaucer’s opus. In my reading, the tale is not merely a 
sober intertextual allegory about prudence but a story about a wife named Dame 
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Prudence. Concurrently, wifely counsel is not just a trope of advice literature but an 
engine of action in the tale. I argue for a pragmatic approach to reading The Tale of 
Melibee that emphasizes narrative events: Dame Prudence diffuses Melibee’s anger, 
convinces him not to attack the men who assaulted her, and restores peace to both 
household and community. By starting with this tale, I establish Prudence as a paragon 
of traditional counsel and a staple of Chaucer’s investigation. Later chapters frequently 
invoke The Tale of Melibee to show how other wives in the Tales variously incorporate, 
reject, and innovate upon the classical rhetorical techniques that make Prudence's 
counsel so effective. 
Chapter Two, “Wonderful Counselor: Persuasive Strategies and Ethical Reform 
in The Clerk’s Tale,” interprets Chaucer’s version of the Griselda story as a tale of 
wifely counsel under extreme duress. My analysis focuses on rarely discussed details in 
the text that bear out Griselda’s ability to counsel and mediate, including a striking 
passage about her success as a political figure in Saluzzo (ClT 407-441; Heffernan 332). 
This passage serves both to establish Griselda as a skilled traditional counselor in her 
own right and to inflect the rest of her performance in the tale—namely, her obedience 
to Walter—with a valence of counsel. Though critics tend to associate Griselda 
primarily with obedience as such, the central theme of Petrarch’s and Boccaccio’s 
versions, Chaucer’s interest in Griselda’s service to the “commune profit” suggests that 
her strange professions of devotion are a rhetorical strategy to reform the marquis (431).  
Although each counselor in my study uses performative strategies to model 
skills or virtues for her husband, Griselda’s counsel to Walter is the most performative 
and the least explicit of all. Aside from her memorable plea and warning on behalf of 
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Walter's second wife—that he “ne prikke with no tormentynge / This tendre mayden, as 
ye han doon mo”—Griselda's main strategy for educating the marquis is her consistent 
fulfillment of their marriage contract (1037-1039). My reading of Griselda's 
performance responds to the longstanding controversy over her rhetorical role in the 
tale: I argue that Griselda does not exemplify an ethic of subservience for an audience 
of “noble wyves, ful of heigh prudence,” but rather an ethic of accountability and 
contractual fidelity for irresponsible rulers like her husband (1183). I also trace Walter's 
trajectory over the course of the tale to reveal how he gradually acquires a greater sense 
of accountability to his household and his subjects as Griselda's performance unfolds. 
Although Griselda's strategies differ drastically from those of Prudence and the Wife of 
Bath, her husband's transformation demonstrates the iconoclastic power of her counsel 
and suggests that she may have more in common with the Wife of Bath than the Clerk's 
envoy implies (ClT 1170-1212). 
Chapter Three, “‘Muchel Care and Wo:’ The Making of a Counselor in The Wife 
of Bath’s Prologue,” examines the relationship between wifely counsel and marital 
antagonism in Chaucer’s portrait of Alison of Bath. In marked contrast to The Clerk’s 
Tale and The Tale of Melibee, this text depicts marriages wherein both parties practice 
deceit, suspicion, exploitation, and belligerence. Moreover, Alison differs from other 
wife-counselors in her tendency to seek out conflict and create instability. But her 
prologue suggests that some kinds of marital strife can result in the “schooling” of both 
spouses, as well as in their increased mutual respect: “But atte laste, with muchel care 
and wo,” she recalls, referring to her fifth marriage, “We fille accorded by us selven 
two” (WBP 812). My study illuminates Alison’s transformation into a more effective 
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and conscientious counselor over the course of her tumultuous “scoleiyng” by “fyve 
husbondes” (44f).  
Chapter Four, “Curative Instabilities: Disport, Quest, and Multiplicity in The 
Wife of Bath’s Tale,” explains how Alison’s tale elaborates on her prologue's theme of 
instability as an engine for positive change. My study identifies mobility and 
multiplicity as two sources of narrative and rhetorical instability in the tale and argues 
that Alison promotes these concepts as strategies for reform. I theorize the knight's act 
of rape at the beginning of the tale as a perversion of male “disport”—a driving problem 
in The Clerk's Tale and The Tale of Melibee—and argue that Guinevere's riddle serves 
to transmute the knight's mobility from a criminal mode of disport into an edifying 
quest. I also contend with historicist criticism to argue that the queen is better 
understood as a counselor than as an intercessor. My section on multiplicity addresses 
the diverse perspectives the knight encounters on his quest and argues that even the 
antifeminist stereotypes are morally valuable, insofar as they add to his confusion and 
thus weaken his sense of authority.4 I propose that the shape-shifting loathly lady's 
rhetorical techniques, in their sheer variety and ethical imperfections, speak to Alison's 
argument for the civic value of diverse, experimental forms of wifely counsel in 
literature and life.   
My attention to positive depictions of wifely counsel amplifies some of the more 
radical arguments at play in the Tales. In aggregate, the texts in my study tend to 
                                                            
4  See Susan Phillips, Transforming Talk (University Park, Pennsyvania:  
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007): “[N]umerous pilgrims and their characters 
challenge the interpretation of various ‘acutoritees,’ pitting one against another, as 




undermine the credibility of patriarchal leadership in legal, ecclesiastical, and 
governmental structures; to credit female characters with superior competence and 
wisdom; and to promote marriage as politically advantageous for women and morally 
essential for men. By discerning these themes, I do not mean to negate the 
complications inherent in Chaucer's depictions of women. Rather, my aim is to show 
that Chaucer's interest in the political value of women's wisdom withstands the 
complexities of his investigation.  
 On the most general level, I hope my dissertation will challenge a bias in 
contemporary Chaucer scholarship against reading the Tales for feminist political 
arguments. In his chronicle of contemporary Chaucer scholarship, Ethan Knapp traces 
this tendency to Elaine Tuttle Hansen's Chaucer and the Fictions of Gender (1992) and 
concurs with her “acuity” in rejecting a “feminist Chaucer.” Knapp claims that 
Chaucer's “experiments with a feminized self-presentation are used to describe the 
vulnerabilities and marginilizations to which even men were vulnerable” (349-350). As 
Susan Carter notes in her discussion of the Wife of Bath texts, the stigma of associating 
Chaucer with feminism has also influenced Chaucer pedagogy: “It is a commonplace 
when teaching [these texts] to stress the anachronism of calling Chaucer a feminist” 
(329). But rejecting the Tales’ feminist resonances can lead to inaccurate reading, 
obscuring examples of women’s civic participation and leadership that are crucial to the 
narrative action and political themes in many of the Tales. In spotlighting the 
remarkable success of wife-counselors in The Tale of Melibee, The Clerk's Tale, The 
Wife of Bath’s Prologue, and The Wife of Bath's Tale, I hope to show that even the more 
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controversial of these characters embody subversive ideas about women's potential to 





CHAPTER ONE  
The Counsel of Dame Prudence in The Tale of Melibee 
 
 
Articles on The Tale of Melibee often open by acknowledging its unpopularity 
among modern readers, and many critics have expressed puzzlement as to why the tale 
exists at all (Collette, “Heeding the Counsel” 416).5 Different versions of the same 
question surface again and again across decades of scholarship: “why did Chaucer pay 
Le Livre de Melibee et de Dame Prudence the honor of such a close, one might 
justifiably say slavish, translation?” (Owen 267-268); “was it also regarded as dry and 
unpalatable by its medieval listeners?” (Volk-Birke 229); and, to quote the title of 
Edward Foster’s 2000 article, “Has anyone here read Melibee?” Even more favorable 
readings, such as Stephen Yeager's 2014 study of the tale's poetics, reflect the 
assumption that readers need a complex “interpretive program” in order to appreciate 
the text (307).6  
                                                            
5 For a typical opening paragraph on the unpopularity of The Tale of Melibee, see  
Sabine Volk-Birke’s Chapter XI, “Preaching Disguised: The Tale of Melibee,” in 
Chaucer and Medieval Preaching (Tübingen: Narr, 1991), 228.   
 
6  See Stephen Yaeger, “Chaucer’s Prudent Poetics,” The Chaucer Review 48.3  
(2104) 8. Yaeger borrows the phrase “interpretive program” from Jon Whitman's book 
Allegory (Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press, 1987). Patricia 
DeMarco's analysis of the the tale epitomizes a tendency among most twentieth-century 
critics to read the Melibee as a treatise on revenge, and mercy rather than as a tale. 
DeMarco explains the Melibee as primarily an ethical manifesto on “the illegitimacy of 
private violence wielded by the individual;” her particular intervention is to emphasize 
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Yet the Melibee succeeds immediately as an act of storytelling with a member of 
its inscribed audience. When the pilgrims' host, Harry Bailey, interrupts the “drasty 
speche” and “rym dogerel” of Sir Thopas, he insists that the Chaucer-pilgrim start over 
with an altogether different tale, “In which ther be som murthe or som doctryne” (923, 
925, 933-935). The Chaucer-pilgrim responds with The Tale of Melibee, which indeed 
leaves the Host in mirthful spirits. After the tale, Harry launches into a comic, self-
deprecating monologue about his hostile wife, Goodelief, whom he impersonates with 
relish, and remarks that he wishes she had the patience of “this Melibeus wyf Prudence” 
(1895, 1889-1923). Harry's high-spirited reaction to the tale undermines the 
longstanding modern assumption that readers need a complex interpretive system to 
engage with it.  
The Melibee’s medieval and early modern reception mirrored Harry's 
enthusiasm. Glenn Burger notes that The Tale of Melibee was “one of the most 
frequently anthologized of the Canterbury Tales during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.” He argues that the text attracted a robust and diverse readership because of 
its rhetorical “fluidity and openness,” which allowed for “a wider variety of lay readers' 
personal intervention in the story.” Burger glosses the “story” of the tale as an “agential 
plot,” in which one character becomes a more self-aware “agent,” actor, or decision-
                                                                                                                                                                              
the tale's reliance on “Romanist legal thinking” (“Violence, Law, and Ciceronian Ethics 
in Chaucer’s Tale of Melibee, SAC 30 [2008], 169). Ultimately, DeMarco’s  
article is less invested in narrative than in the particular ethical standards that Prudence 
elaborates; her interpretation is fairly typical in casting Prudence's sources as the text's 
central source of meaning. David Aers’ argument that the tale encapsulates Chaucer’s 
views on Christianity is in some ways opposite to DeMarco’s argument about 
secularism, but Aers imparts exactly the same privilege to source texts over narrative 
(“Whose Virtues?,” Medieval Literature and Historical Inquiry [Rochester, New York: 




maker through another character's counsel.7 Although the Melibee's compilation of 
quotations and proverbs reiterating “traditional clerical authority” certainly appealed to 
its earliest readers, the story’s historical popularity among ideologically diverse 
audiences suggests that the tale derives more of its rhetorical power from the events that 
it narrates than from an enduring core of theological, philosophical, or metaliterary 
meaning (Burger 164-165). A surface reading of The Tale of Melibee can help us 
recover the narrative that resonated with its contemporary audience.  
Harry's reaction to the tale suggests a way to refine Burger's reading of the 
“agential plot:” the Host's main takeaway is an admiration for “this Melibeus wyf 
Prudence” as a model of wifely cooperation (1896). Harry’s focus on Prudence suggests 
that the tale's narrative is not so much about Melibee's “becoming an agent,” as Scanlon 
argues, as it is about Prudence making him one (210). Whereas critics often read 
Prudence as an androgynous allegory, “female more by an accident of Latin grammar 
than because of her intrinsic nature” (Diamond 66), Harry understands her in human 
terms, imagining her as a replacement for his own wife. It is not the content of 
                                                            
7  See Larry Scanlon, Narrative, Authority, and Power (Cambridge, United  
Kingdon: 2007 [reprint]). Carolynn Van Dyke also builds on Scanlon's work and reads 
the tale as a story about counsel (Chaucer’s Agents [Madison, New Jersey: Farleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 2005], 256). David Wallace (Chaucerian Polity [Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1997]), Glenn Burger (Chaucer’s Queer Nation 
[Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003]), and Holly Crocker (Chaucer’s 
Visions of Manhood [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007]) have undertaken 
reconsiderations of The Tale of Melibee that address the importance of the domestic life 
in the narrative, but their areas of interest differ from my own. Crocker reads the 
conversation with Melibee as a debate about “the quality of women’s counsel” but 
tends to see Prudence as representing a kind of abstract feminine agency rather than an 




Prudence’s counsel but her patient performance as a counselor that he extrapolates from 
the tale in relation to lived experience.  
Taking a cue from Harry's understanding of Prudence, I suggest reading The 
Tale of Melibee as Chaucer’s most self-conscious and thoroughly elaborated depiction 
of wifely counsel. Wifely counsel is the most frequent and structurally fundamental 
event in the tale: after home invaders attack Dame Prudence and their daughter, Sophie, 
while Melibee is away, Prudence counsels her husband not to retaliate, counsels her 
attackers to arrange a truce, and finally counsels her husband to make a public statement 
of forgiveness. This literal reading of events not only recuperates an engaging way into 
the text but also reveals underexplored themes related to gender, marriage, and politics 
in the tale. As a narrative of wifely counsel, The Tale of Melibee casts the domestic 
sphere as an intellectual and political forum, and wifely counsel as an engine of civic 
reform.8   
                                                            
8 The few critics who take a more plot-centric approach to reading the Melibee  
have touched on the importance of marriage and domestic life in shaping the story. 
Somewhat in passing, Burger glosses “Melibee's marriage to Prudence […] as a private, 
interactive dialogue crucial to identity formation” (166). In a more thorough 
investigation of marriage in the text, Wallace reads the tale as a story about “a 
household dominated by a powerful, irascible, and violent male” (212). Both of these 
literalist readings hint at the thematic centrality of household life, but neither fully 
acknowledges Prudence's dominant role as a counselor-figure. Daniel Rubey surmises 
that “a large part of the appeal of this tale for contemporary audiences must have 
derived from the spectacle of a wife teaching her husband and modifying his behavior” 
(“The Five Wounds of Melibee’s Daughter,” Masculinities in Chaucer, ed. Peter G. 
Beidler [Cambridge, United Kingdom: D. S. Brewer, 1998], 257-172) (158). But the 
operative concept in this reading is “spectacle:” Rubey understands Prudence's 
“feminine” performance as external to the prevailing civic order and claims that it 
merely reinforces a masculine biblical ethics of mercy in a feudal context. In his focus 
on Christianity as an antidote to feudal vigilantism and on Melibee's “new masculinity” 
(165), Rubey pays little attention to Prudence's wifehood after his passing speculation 




In the following chapter, I show how Prudence exploits the relative privacy and 
longevity of married life to effect an ethical transformation in her husband and 
ultimately her community. In Section One, I draw attention to overlooked narrative and 
descriptive details that bring wifely counsel to life in the tale. I also tease out the tale's 
arguments for paying attention to these details and for the importance of specificity in 
counsel. In Section Two, I examine the tale's depiction of domestic life as a venue for 
counsel. My analysis reveals that Prudence's marriage to Melibee creates an ideal 
environment for cautious and thorough critical thinking. In a briefly concluding section, 
I touch on the tale’s ending, in which Prudence proves her merits as a counselor in the 
public sphere.     
 
 
I. Particularities:  
Specificity and detail in storytelling and counsel 
 
 My reading of The Tale of Melibee as a story of wifely counsel begins with the 
observation that the text contains more specifics—concrete, incidental narrative and 
descriptive details—than critics tend to acknowledge. For many modern scholars, the 
tale's “allegorical structure” evokes “a universalizing medieval Christian time and 
space” that entails “a transcendental mode of signification” and trumps “extraneous” 
particularities (Burger 173). I would argue, however, that the text moves away from “a 
transcendental mode,” as it is more obviously about the process by which Prudence and 
Melibee apply transcendental wisdom than it is about the ideals they may personify or 
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the wisdom they draw on. Narrative details in The Tale of Melibee are minimalistic but 
hyper-focused and purposeful, marshaled to depict the primary dramatic action of a 
wife transforming her husband through counsel.  
 The beginning of the tale contains a high concentration of details that should 
prepare us to read it as a literal narrative of domestic and public events. Although 
modern readers have found it difficult to reconcile The Tale of Melibee with the rest of 
the Tales, its opening passage immediately places the Melibee in conversation with 
vivid, plot-driven Canterbury texts. In the first line, the Chaucer-pilgrim describes a 
home invasion that occurs after Melibee leaves his house “for his desport” and goes 
“into the feeldes hym to pleye” (968). This line divulges a character detail that connects 
Melibee with a major theme in The Canterbury Tales and especially with men in other 
tales of wifely counsel. As I will further explain in later chapters, Melibee's “desport” 
exemplifies a pattern of behavior that The Clerk's Tale, The Wife of Bath's Tale, and 
other Canterbury texts attribute to young men in need of counsel. In The Tale of 
Melibee, a patriarch's disport exposes his family to danger, giving way to a violent 
incident that sets the counsel narrative in motion.  
 Chaucer underscores the importance of this moment by inventing a setting for 
Melibee's disport. “The feeldes” do not appear in Chaucer's French source, Renaud de 
Louens' Le Livre de Melibée et de Dame Prudence, or in Renaud's Latin source, 
Albertano of Brescia's Liber consolationis et consilii. Chaucer’s insertion of “feeldes” 
serves partly to highlight the ironic tension between Melibee’s pursuit of leisure and the 
attack his family suffers. It also links The Tale of Melibee to the tale that immediately 
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precedes it, Sir Thopas, which contains the same image in lines 909-915.9 More 
generally, the image of the fields aligns The Tale of Melibee with most of the other 
Canterbury tales, which consistently begin with details about geographic setting. 
Chaucer's brief nod to a physical environment thus invites us to read the Melibee as an 
imaginary tale and not merely a treatise on the topic of “private violence” versus 
institutional justice (DeMarco 169).  
 The account of the crime that occurs during Melibee's absence is especially 
loaded with detail. The Chaucer-pilgrim specifies that Melibee leaves for the fields with 
the doors to his home shut tightly, that the invaders are not strangers but enemies of 
Melibee, and that they use ladders to climb inside the windows. Once inside the home, 
the invaders assault Prudence and Sophie, wounding Sophie in her feet, hands, ears, 
nose, and mouth, and leaving mother and child for dead (969). Upon returning home 
and discovering his wounded wife and daughter, Melibee  begins “to wepe and crye,” 
“lyk a mad man rentynge his clothes” (973). His reaction to the attack—weeping, 
tearing his garments—is markedly visceral. Despite their brevity, the episodes of the 
                                                            
9 Benson cites Scattergood’s suggestion in Chaucer and the French War (Court  
and Poet, ARCA 5, ed. Glyn S. Burgess [Liverpool, United Kingdom: Francis Cairns, 
1981]) that the repeated image of the fields “establishes continuity between” the 
Melibee and Sir Thopas (Benson 924). See J. Burke Severs' edition of Reynaud de 
Louens' Le Livre de Melibee et de Dame Prudence in Sources and Analogues of 
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales (eds. W. F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster [Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1941], 560-614) and Diane Bornstein's article “Chaucer’s 
Tale of Melibee as an Example of the Style Clergial (The Chaucer Review 12.4 [Spring 
1978]), which lists phrases in Chaucer “that add details to the narrative or alter 
meaning” of the French (241). For Renaud's Latin source, see Alberano of Brescia's 
Liber consoltionis et consilii (ed. Sundby, Chaucer Society, 2nd Series, Vol. 8 [London: 
Triibner, 1873]). Askins’ “The Tale of Melibee” in Sources and Analogues of the 
Canterbury Tales (Vol. 1), Chaucer Studies, eds. Robert M. Correale and Mary Hamel 
(Woodbridge, United Kingdom: D. S. Brewer, 2002), contains the French along with 




invasion and Melibee's return are rendered in specific terms, and the people they depict 
are embodied. The tale's opening not only establishes social and familial relationships 
between the key figures in the narrative but endows them with physicality and 
existential vulnerability.    
 The Chaucer-pilgrim's description of the attack and of Sophie's wounds is a 
narrative of graphic, literal violence. Yet, as Wallace notes, Prudence offers a built-in 
allegorical discussion of the home invasion that can overshadow the literal account. 
Later in the tale, well into the course of her counsel, Prudence tells Melibee to think of 
the three enemies who broke into his home as “the three enemys of mankynde—that is 
to seyn, the flessh, the feend, and the world,” whom he has allowed to enter his being 
“by the wyndowes” of his five senses and to wound his soul in five places, just as his 
daughter was wounded in five places (1420-1426). But, as Wallace insists, “Prudence’s 
allegorization is only of local and limited effect” (240).10 Her allegory of “the flessh, the 
feend, and the world” serves the tale more as an event in itself—an act of counsel—than 
as a schematic explanation for other events. Prudence is not illuminating the 
transcendental meaning of her household trauma; rather, she is riffing on the details of 
this trauma to generate new meaning in the form of a teaching tool or mnemonic device. 
Her allegory provides Melibee with a new way of understanding the mental temptations 
he must contend with in his quest for a solution.  
                                                            
10  Wallace makes a similar point about Prudence's use of citations: “A citation of  
an auctor aims not to open the window onto universal truth, but rather to address the 
state of Melibee's emotions and to nudge them down the path toward 'a good 




 If the Chaucer-pilgrim's detailed crime narrative roots the rest of the tale in a 
concrete, high-stakes domestic and civic context, Prudence's interpretation of the details 
empowers her husband to think and act more responsibly within that context. The 
narrator of the tale supplies particularities—the facts about Melibee's enemies, the 
invasion, and his daughter's wounds—and Prudence devises a creative, in some ways 
esoteric, pedagogical use for them. Although her academic rhetoric and the formal 
trappings of allegory create an expectation for universal wisdom, Prudence's counsel is 
emphatically particular in its origins, its context, and its applications. 
Like the details of the crime at the beginning of the tale, character names also 
serve to create a narrative specificity that is in marked tension with any universal 
wisdom the tale might seem to offer. Sophie's name is especially loaded. As Larry 
Benson and Diane Bornstein have observed, Melibee and Prudence's daughter is 
anonymous in Chaucer’s Latin and French sources; the name “Sophie,” like the image 
of the fields, is his own insertion (Benson 924, Bornstein 241). Although Sophie 
receives little stage time in the narrative, both the literal and the allegorical 
significations of her name are integral to the tale's argument for the importance of 
specificity in counsel.  
On a literal level, Chaucer's use of the English diminutive “Sophie” rather than 
the fully Greek “Sophia” seems a deliberate nod to her specificity or personhood. The 
brevity of the child's appearance in the tale makes literal sense: there is no reason 
Sophie should be present for her parents' tense conversation on retribution and political 
strategy. But Chaucer's insistence on her personhood at the beginning of the tale plants 
that conversation firmly in a household context. Naming Sophie brings the wounded 
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family in the tale to life. The image of a battered child haunts the rest of the text and 
heightens the concrete stakes of Prudence's counsel, which is in large part motivated by 
the imperative to preserve her family.  
On the other hand, Sophie's name certainly has allegorical import. The literal 
attack on Sophia resonates symbolically with the detrimental effects of household 
trauma on Melibee's thinking and judgment. But the allegorical valence of “Sophie” 
also underscores the importance of Prudence's attention to particularity. If we 
understand the child as a personification of wisdom, her absence from the majority of 
this intellectual tale becomes conspicuous, provoking us to ask why wisdom should be 
so inoperative in a story about counsel. The contrast between Sophie's brief presence in 
the narrative and Prudence's near-total dominance of the text suggests that prudence—
the practical ability to aggregate, evaluate, and apply wisdom in a particular context—is 
the sine qua non of post-traumatic problem-solving and peace-making. Sophie is a 
wounded ideal in the tale, impotent in her youth and innocence and incapacitated by 
senseless violence. Prudence, by contrast, is resilient, recovering from her wounds 
faster than her husband recovers from seeing them. The tale depicts her prudential 
counsel as imperfect or un-ideal, insofar as it contains contradictions and “a melange of 
sometimes incompatible voices” (Van Dyke 256). But in the aftermath of trauma and 
the violence it does to ideals, Prudence has the resourcefulness, agility, and experience 
to build a pragmatic response from the fragments of different authoritative traditions, 
tailored to the details of her family's circumstance.  
 Although not original to the Middle English, Melibee's name also speaks to his 
particularity as a character and his consequent need for particularized counsel. Of all the 
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names in the tale, his is the most distinct and mysterious, and its moral ambiguity has 
major thematic implications. Unlike the Latin-derived “Prudence” and Greek-derived 
“Sophie,” “Melibeus” is a faux-Latin coinage. The name does not evoke an abstract 
concept or ethical ideal; rather, it combines a concrete noun (mel) and an action verb 
(bibens) to create a visual image: “a man that drynketh hony” (1410).  Whereas wisdom 
and prudence each have immediately apparent, positive connotations, honey has a 
heritage of both extremely positive and extremely negative meanings across a wide 
range of literary traditions. As a result, Melibee's name lends itself to a variety of 
conflicting interpretations.  
 In her counsel, Prudence exploits the ambiguous moral status of honey to 
interpret Melibee's name as a critical diagnosis of his character: “Thou has ydronke so 
muchel hony of sweete temporeel richesses, and delices and honours of this world,” she 
tells him, “that thou art drunken and hast forgeten Jhesu Crist thy creator.” Prudence 
casts Ovid and Solomon as fellow counselors whose “wordes” on honey Melibee has 
ignored: “ne thou ne hast nat wel ytaken kep to the wordes of Ovide, that seith, / 'Under 
the hony of the goodes of the body is hyd the venym that sleeth the soule.' / And 
Salomon seith, 'If thou hast founden hony, ete of it that suffiseth, / for if thou ete of it 
out of mesure, thou shalt spewe’ and be nedy and povre” (1411-1416). In total, 
Prudence offers three authoritative readings of her husband's name, or three ways in 
which honey symbolizes the adverse effects of wealth: wealth can intoxicate the person 
who possesses it, it can mask his wickedness, and it can make him sick. The grotesque 
and foreboding images of drunkenness, oblivion, venom, slaying, vomiting, and poverty 
that Prudence culls from her source texts serve to humble Melibee, to remind him of his 
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fallenness and humanity—“Thou has doon synne agayn oure Lord Crist”—to 
deconstruct his moral indignation, and consequently to undermine his sense of 
entitlement to retribution (1420-1427).  
 Prudence’s deceptively clear moral verdict on honey results from her own 
rhetorical choice to omit its more positive connotations. She expounds on Melibee's 
name in the same pragmatic way she conceptualizes Sophie's wounds and the household 
invasion: by abstracting a literal detail of the family's experience for pedagogical effect, 
with the aim of changing Melibee’s attitude. But given the many meanings of honey, 
there is no single, overriding explanation for Melibee's name. In The Tale of Melibee 
(and in Solomon) alone, honey appears to take on different connotations at different 
moments. When Melibee quotes Solomon to commend Prudence's defense of wifely 
counsel, he invokes both the sweetness and the healthful effects of honey: “I se wel that 
the word of Salomon is sooth. He seith that ‘wordes that been spoken discreetly by 
ordinaunce been honycombes, for they yeven swetnesse to the soule and hoolsomnesse 
to the body’” (1113). The variability of honey’s meanings and moral significance in the 
tale corresponds to Melibee’s moral inconsistencies and the malleability of his 
constitution. If moral inconsistency is a defining trait of Christian personhood, then 
Melibee’s name invites us to think about him as particularly human: susceptible to 
contingencies, dynamic, imperfect—yet, to an extent, perfectible, and thus ripe for 
transformation through counsel.  
 In addition to underscoring his malleability, the “honey” in Melibee's name also 
reinforces the crucial narrative detail of his “sweete temporeel richesses” (1411). 
Prudence explicitly addresses the issue of Melibee's wealth in her remarks on honey and 
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suggests that money and power have compromised his moral faculties. But Melibee's 
socioeconomic status also has a more global effect on Prudence's counsel and the way 
we read it. Being “mighty and riche,” Melibee has trouble finding transparent, 
trustworthy counselors in the public sphere and as a result must rely almost exclusively 
on his wife's advice (967, 1366). The first time Prudence advises Melibee to consult a 
council of his peers, she recommends rounding up “trewe freendes alle” and “lynage 
whiche that been wise” (1002). But Melibee is unable to discern his true friends and 
inadvertently invites “neighebores ful of envye, his feyned freendes that semeden 
reconciled, and his flatereres.” Although each of these parties may have a different 
motivation for envying, flattering, or “feigning friendship” with Melibee, the common 
denominator in their reactions to his misfortune is an express interest in his wealth and 
connections: all of the untrustworthy counselors respond to his dilemma by “preisynge 
greetly Melibee of might, of power, of richesse, and of freendes, despisynge the power 
of his adversaries.” The tale's description of these counselors draws a correlation 
between social politics, poor counsel, and violence: whatever their reasons, the council 
members who are most alert to Melibee's money and power end up aggravating his 
distress and urging him to hastily make war on his enemies (1018-1020). Prudence's 
commitment to Melibee in marriage minimizes sociopolitical friction between them and 
conduces to more cooperative, transparent, and ethical counsel.  
 When Melibee returns from the assembly, Prudence addresses and corrects for 
its failures, largely by forcing him to think in more specific terms about his dilemma. 
Increasingly reliant on the wisdom of her customized counsel, Melibee asks Prudence to 
“condescende in especial” (1235) or “get down to particulars” (Benson 225) and 
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evaluate the council he convened. One of her tasks is to deconstruct the reductive social 
hierarchy that Melibee's male counselors reinforced with their flattery. With their 
duplicitous praise of his wealth, these counselors sent Melibee a loud message that he 
ought to be esteemed and his enemies despised. In counseling him on the folly of 
vengeance-taking, Prudence corrects this paradigm by confronting her husband with the 
subtleties of his socioeconomic situation. She acknowledges his power and wealth but 
insists that he take the particulars of his social and financial position into greater 
account.  
 Gradually, Prudence builds a pragmatic argument against retributive violence 
from specific observations about Melibee's family structure and finances. She draws on 
her detailed knowledge of household politics to speculate about how the family’s 
enemies might incorporate specific information about Melibee into a military strategy. 
Observing, for example, that Melibee has few male relatives, Prudence warns that his 
enemies might wager they can kill him with impunity. Although Melibee is “myghty 
and riche,” he would be “but alone” and extremely vulnerable in his pursuit of 
vengeance: “for certes ye han no child but a doghter,/ ne ye han bretheren, ne cosyns 
germayns, ne noon oother for drede sholde stinte to plede with yow or to destroye youre 
persone.” The state of Melibee's finances would also make it easy for his enemies to 
bribe a killer from among his own household. Prudence reminds Melibee that his 
“richesses,” which “mooten been dispended in diverse parties,” would provide little 
incentive for a friend to resist betraying him: when “every wight hath his part,” she 
speculates, “they ne wollen taken but litel reward to venge thy deeth.” Melibee's foes 
are much better connected than he is. Three in number, they each have “manie children, 
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bretheren, cosyns, and oother ny kyndrede.” Even if Melibee could kill “two or three,” 
there would be enough remaining to avenge the deaths by slaying Melibee. Prudence 
concedes that Melibee's kindred are more “siker and steadfast” than his adversaries', but 
she reminds Melibee that his relatives are only distantly related to him, and that his 
enemies have close relatives, so that “hir condicioun is bet than yours” (1365-1376). 
Had Melibee been mindful of these particularities, he might have recognized the folly of 
the war-mongers at his council.  
 Though compatible with loftier and more general arguments for Christian mercy 
elsewhere in the tale, Prudence's argument for nonviolence in this passage consists 
entirely of shrewd political and military calculations. These worldly calculations grow 
out of a detailed familiarity with household structures and financial practices. Her 
wifely perspective and experiential knowledge disprove the common scholarly 
misapprehension that “[her] arguments and her words are men’s,” that she is merely 
regurgitating generalized, institutional wisdom, and that her performance of counsel is a 
far cry “from the Wife of Bath’s experientially-based challenge” to male authority 
(Laskaya 162). Although Prudence relies heavily on male auctors in her counsel, she 
also insists that Melibee pay greater heed to the circumstantial details and domestic 









II. Marriage as a venue for counsel:  
Household time and wifely rhetoric 
 
Honest and wise counselors are present at Melibee’s public counsel, but their 
lack of political cohesion and the weakness of their social ties to Melibee prevent them 
from making a clear and compelling case for peace. A group of surgeons at the 
assembly advises against war, but their spokesman stresses that Melibee should not 
understand them as political allies. It is the healing ethic of their profession, and not an 
allegiance to Melibee in particular, that requires the surgeons not “to norice were,” and 
they must categorically refuse to privilege Melibee’s interest over that of his enemies, 
since “unto oure art it is nat pertinent to norice were ne parties to supporte” (1012-
1014). The physicians argue “Almoost right in the same wise” but throw in a non 
sequitur that contradicts the argument for peace: “right as maladies been dured by hir 
contraries, right so shul men warisshe were by vengeaunce” (1016-1017). Though “an 
avocat that was wys” asks for time to deliberate on the matter (1021-1034), vociferous 
young hawks call for combat (1036). At the end of the meeting, a wise old man tries to 
dissuade Melibee against war, espousing a pacifism that foreshadows Prudence's (1037-
1046). But the war-mongers drown him out, and the man resigns to being ignored, 
quoting Solomon: “Ther as thou ne mayst have noon audience, enforce thee nat to 
speke” (1046-1047). Amid the confusion and temptations of the public assembly, the 
wise counselor cannot command Melibee's “audience” and so retreats into silence.  
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The wise old man and the other honest members of the assembly fail to convince 
Melibee because their individual commitments to his welfare are not strong enough to 
compel them to organize. They do not collaborate with each other to craft a rhetorically 
cohesive argument, and they do not espouse any motives to collaborate with Melibee in 
particular. As a result, the flatterers, who do espouse loyalty to Melibee, succeed in 
egging on his desire for vengeance (1018-1020). 
Prudence succeeds where the honest council-members fail partly because her 
commitment to Melibee in marriage motivates her to persist in counseling him. But her 
intimate familiarity with Melibee is also a rhetorical advantage: by crafting personalized 
appeals that acknowledge Melibee’s desires and remind him of their mutual 
commitment, she maintains his attention and trust. Furthermore, her prolonged and 
exclusive access to Melibee in a domestic context provides her with the time and 
privacy to elaborate her counsel with unparalleled thoroughness and clarity. More than 
any of Melibee’s other counselors, she has the environmental and rhetorical resources to 
transform the way he thinks and acts.  
 In her demand for Melibee to consider the details of his economic situation, 
Prudence demonstrates an experiential knowledge of household politics. But her 
counsel also reflects a more intuitive and intimate form of wifely wisdom: a familiarity 
with her husband’s feelings and ideas. This familiarity equips Prudence to coach 
Melibee through the ethical and intellectual challenges of evaluating diverse counsel. 
After witnessing his initial reaction to the home invasion, she can later discern when he 
is biased, insincere, or insufficiently critical in his reception of new arguments; she can 
also acknowledge and gently challenge his stubborn inclinations in her rhetoric. As a 
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result, Prudence is both a counselor and a meta-counselor, advising him not only on the 
dilemma at hand but also on questions about how best to take counsel.  
Until Prudence reforms him, Melibee exhibits a strong bias towards faulty 
counsel that merely validates his initial desire for retribution. Since Melibee did not 
enter into his public meeting in a spirit of sincere inquiry, Prudence shows him that the 
event “sholde nat, as to speke properly, be called a conseillyng, but a mocioun or a 
moevyng of folye” (1238). After the commotion of the assembly, she asks him what he 
understood by the physicians’ theory that “in maladies […] oon contrarie is warisshed 
by another contrarie.” When Melibee answers that the proverb implies one should take 
vengeance against wrongdoing, she laments, “Lo, lo, […] how lightly is every man 
enclined to his owene desir and to his owene plesaunce!” (1277, 1283). Invoking the 
wisdom of Saint Paul, Prudence shows Melibee his interpretive error: to cure 
wrongdoing with its contrary would mean to cure it with peace and mercy, not with 
further violence (1285-1294). Although she understands Melibee’s inclination towards 
“his owene desir and […] his owene pleasaunce” as ordinary human folly, common to 
“every man,” her familiarity with his experience allows her to diagnose the particular 
form this folly takes in her husband: a blinding desire to validate his rage. Thus 
Prudence turns the “moevyng of folye” that was his botched assembly into a rich 
pedagogical opportunity. She both corrects the physicians’ interpretation of their own 
theory and shows Melibee that his emotional bias makes him susceptible to false logic.  
 Prudence's familiarity with Melibee's emotional habits also empowers her to 
anticipate and counter his resistance to her counsel. When Melibee asks her to evaluate 
the counselors he has assembled, she prefaces her critique with a disclaimer designed to 
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maximize his receptivity to her counsel. Prudence beseeches Melibee “in al humblesse” 
not to “wilfully replie agayn my resouns, ne distempre youre herte, thogh I speke thyng 
that yow displese” (1336). Her direct appeal meets with no resistance, and her critique 
succeeds; Melibee replies “I graunte wel that I have ered” and says he is “al redy to 
chaunge my counseillours right as thow wold devyse” (1261, 1263). The “humblesse” 
and forthrightness with which Prudence frames her critique seem to elicit the same 
qualities in her husband's response.  
Although it would not necessarily take a wife to anticipate Melibee's temper and 
craft a disclaimer to mitigate it, neither of the wise counselors who speaks up at his 
public assembly frame his counsel with personalized appeals. The wise “advocat” 
speaks in especially impersonal terms, relying on passive constructions, abstract nouns, 
and legalistic reasoning. He opens with the vague claim that “the nede for which we ben 
assembled […] is a ful hevy thyng and an heigh matiere” and uses almost equally vague 
language to list the reasons Melibee's dilemma is “heavy and high:” “the wrong and [...] 
the wikedness that hath been doon,” “the greet damages that in tyme comyng been 
possibe to fallen for this same cause,” and “the grete richesse and power of the parties” 
(1021-1025). If the surgeon’s professional ethics alienate him from Melibee’s cause, the 
lawyer’s professional rhetoric also has an alienating effect; it transmutes the compelling 
particulars of Melibee’s case into logical but sterile generalities that fail to contend with 
his rage.  
The “olde wise” man who stands up later uses far more vivid rhetoric, invoking 
human subjects and action verbs to make what is probably the strongest case for peace 
at the meeting: “ther is ful many a man that crieth 'Werre, werre!' that woot fel little 
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what were ammounteth,” he warns; “ther is ful many a child unborn of his mooder that 
shal sterve yong by cause of thilke werre” (1037-1038). But his sweeping, third-person 
claims about the instigators and victims of war are too general and distant to resonate 
with most of his listeners, who experience the man’s intervention as a “sermon” and 
“beden hym ful ofte his wordes for to abregge” (1043-1044). By using direct address 
and acknowledging Melibee's emotional subjectivity, Prudence engages his attention 
and preempts his emotional disengagement or resistance. Although her ideas are similar 
to those of the old man and the advocate, her unique familiarity with Melibee enables 
her to craft more personalized, immediate, and persuasive rhetoric. 
In addition to making overly general claims, the well-intentioned male 
counselors at Melibee’s assembly also fail to establish their loyalty or good faith. 
Prudence, by contrast, prioritizes her self-presentation as an honest and committed 
counselor. Her wifehood is integral to this self-presentation. By frequently invoking 
their shared investments as a couple, Prudence establishes trust and transparency with 
her husband. When she pleads for Melibee not to “wilfully replie agayn [her] resouns, 
ne distempre [his] herte,” she strengthens her appeal for his patience by reminding him 
that her critical input is intended for his best interest: “For God woot that, as in myn 
entente, I speke it for youre beste, for youre honour, and for youre profite eke” (1236-
1237). The loaded terms “honour” and “profit” evoke various socioeconomic, moral, 
and material advantages that Prudence and Melibee would understand as beneficial to 
both of them. As a legal, social, economic, and spiritual partner to her husband, 
Prudence shares the greatest possible vested interest in Melibee's success. More than 
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any of his male counselors, she can sincerely claim to espouse her husband's honor and 
profit as her highest priorities, since her own honor and profit are bound up in his.  
By affirming that all of her counsel is for their mutual benefit, Prudence saves 
Melibee the mental work of discerning her motives and allows him to focus more fully 
on the content of her arguments. Most notably, she invokes the marriage bond and her 
credentials as a loyal wife to efficiently neutralize Melibee’s deeply counterproductive 
distrust of her gender. Early in the text, Melibee threatens to dismiss his wife's counsel 
entirely on the grounds of her sex. In response to his malicious comment that “alle 
wommen been wikke” (1057), Prudence argues that, though some women are disposed 
to counsel men for evil ends, she in particular has her husband’s best interest in mind, as 
evinced by past events in their marriage: “sire, by youre leve, [wicked] am nat I, / for ye 
han ful oft essayed my grete silence and my grete pacience, and eek how wel that I kan 
hyde and hele thynges that men oghte secreely to hyde” (1088-1089). Here, Prudence 
invites Melibee to recall past situations in which she demonstrated specific traits 
associated with good counsel: patience and discretion. She also supplements this 
personalized plea with a more conventional case, comparing her own righteous aims to 
those of Rebecca, Judith, and Abigail, whose actions in the Bible prove that “ful many a 
good woman” has been “ful discret and wis in conseillyng” (1096-1102). But even this 
seemingly general argument relies on Melibee’s intimate familiarity with Prudence's 
moral constitution through marriage. Though any counselor might compare himself to 
biblical exemplars, he or she would not be able to substantiate these claims as Prudence 
does. The intimacy and longevity of marriage have allowed her to demonstrate patience 
and discretion to an exceptional extent—in “grete” measure and “ful oft.” The particular 
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narrative of Melibee’s married life not only provides him with evidence of his 
counselor’s credentials but also forces him to reconsider his reductive ideas about 
gender and counsel.  
Although Prudence is strategically transparent in her commitment to Melibee's 
welfare, she must occasionally resort to deceptive rhetoric in pursuit of this end. When, 
as the tale nears its climax, she counsels her husband to make peace with his enemies, 
his old pridefulness flares up again, threatening to wreck all their progress. Melibee 
retorts that showing “greet humylitee or mekenesse” to his adversaries would make 
them despise him (1675, 1686). In order to get back on track with her counsel, Prudence 
must humble her husband once and for all. Her strategy is a performance of outrage, or 
“semblant of wratthe” (1687). She begins her remarks by reminding Melibee of her 
commitment—“I love youre honour and youre profit as I do myn owene, and evere 
have doon”—but proceeds by asserting her authority as a counselor and affirming the 
correctness of he argument: “if I hadde seyd that ye sholde han purchaced the pees and 
the reconsiliacioun, I ne hadde nat muchel mystaken me ne seyd amys” (1688-1690). 
The self-assured rhetoric and “wrathful” tone of this claim leave no room for dissent or 
resistance.  
Prudence's performance of rage succeeds at humbling Melibee and forcing him 
to think critically about his own behavior. He responds, “Dame, I prey yow that ye be 
nat displeased of thynges that I seye, / for ye knowe wel that I am angry and wroth, and 
that is no wonder; / and they that been wrothe witen nat wel what they don ne what they 
seyn” (1697-1701). Melibee's remarks demonstrate the simultaneous affective, 
rhetorical, and pedagogical effectiveness of Prudence's “semblant of wratthe:” the 
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performance gives him a renewed sense of humility, secures his assent to the argument 
for peace, and teaches him to think more clearly by controlling his anger. In his 
response, Melibee shows that he is simultaneously assimilating both Prudence's counsel 
on how to react to misfortune and her meta-counsel on how to think clearly about 
counsel.  
But notwithstanding this positive outcome, the ethical integrity of Prudence's 
surprising performance demands investigation. Typically a model of honesty and 
emotional control, Prudence violates both of these ideals by taking on the guise of rage. 
Just as Melibee’s flatterers make “semblant of wepyng” in order to garner favor with 
him, Prudence pursues her desired results through deceptive means, performing her own 
version of rage to contend with Melibee's (1019). But unlike the flatterers, Prudence has 
Melibee's honor and profit at heart, as she assures him even while in the throes of her 
“wratthe.” She also has the time and private access to deconstruct her own rhetorical 
strategy for Melibee's benefit after it has yielded the desired effect. Leaving off her 
“semblant of wratthe” as soon as there is no longer a need for it, Prudence debriefs her 
husband on her performance and reiterates its ultimate aim: “I make no semblant of 
wratthe ne anger,” she tells him, “but for youre grete profit” (1706). The familiar refrain 
of Prudence's commitment to her husband's profit signals a return to the trademark 
transparency and composure of her counsel.  
Both Prudence's “wratthe” and her subsequent debriefing of Melibee reflect her 
unrelenting commitment to thoroughness. Even in her pretend rage, Prudence sustains 
her exhaustive rhetorical style by dispensing a few nuggets of explicit counsel (1687-
1697). And by commenting the rhetorical purpose of her performance, she clarifies any 
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ethical confusion her strategy might have caused. Although medieval writers typically 
associated talkative women with “unruly,” “uncontrollable” habits of speech, 
Prudence's verbosity is a systematic bid for thoroughness and clarification (Bodden 6-
7). 
Critical studies by Diane Bornstein and J. D. Burnley have shown that these 
rhetorical imperatives inhere throughout The Tale of Melibee, and that enhancing 
linguistic clarity was an imperative for Chaucer when he translated Le Livre. Bornstein's 
meticulous comparative analysis of the English and French versions suggests that 
Chaucer worked with an eye to heightening Renaud’s “clergial style,” a courtly rhetoric 
that stressed elaborate, Latinate sentence structures, subordinate clauses, and doublets 
(237, 239). The study shows that Chaucer extended Prudence’s language into even more 
ceremonious and thorough turns of phrase than she uses in Le Livre.11  J. D. Burnley 
draws on and qualifies Bornstein’s reading by showing that Chaucer and his English-
speaking peers were well versed in “curial prose”—Burnley's term for the style—from 
“generations of documentary practice” (594). He argues that, because of its origins in 
civic and political documents, particularly letters, curial prose style reflects a “desire for 
a particular kind of clarity” (598).  
Bornstein's and Burnley's readings spotlight lucidity and thoroughness as 
primary values in the text, but neither aims to explore what it means for Prudence to be 
cast as an agent of English clergial or curial style. The Tale of Melibee depicts Prudence 
transforming the documentary practice of curial prose into a live, household 
                                                            




performance. In her insistence on clarity and thoroughness, Prudence reforms her 
husband's habits of mind and saves the polity from his wrath. By heightening the curial 
style of his source text, Chaucer shows the viability of marriage as a forum for 
conscientious and sophisticated counsel on matters of widespread political significance.  
The fluid, expansive temporality of marriage allows for all the elaborations and 
clarifications that Prudence’s “curial” counsel entails. But although she exploits this 
temporality to elucidate her ideas, she does not ramble, as if her time with Melibee were 
infinite. Instead, she dispenses organized counsel that reflects a strong rhetorical drive 
and takes issues of timing into account. By remaining acutely attuned to the passage of 
time and its effects on her husband, Prudence makes shrewd rhetorical calculations 
about when and how to train his thoughts, tame his emotions, and structure his 
movements between the household and the public sphere.  
For Prudence, wifely speech and household time are complementary instruments 
of control. One unusual feature of the Melibee and the other tales of wifely counsel in 
my study is that they tend to express a deep concern with the problem of controlling 
men's speech and behavior, reversing the conventional “criminalization of women's 
speech” (Bodden 7). Early on, The Tale of Melibee establishes Melibee as the unruly 
spouse and Prudence's speech as the antidote to his excesses. Although Melibee is the 
only member of his household who was not attacked during the home invasion, his grief 
over the incident is overwhelming, and at first even Prudence has trouble reining it in 
(973).12 But eventually she calculates a better time to intervene and make her counsel 
                                                            
12 “Prudence, his wyf, as ferforth as she dorste, bisoghte hyme of his wepyng for to  
stynte, / but nat forthy he gan to crie and wepen evere lenger the moore” (974- 
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heard: “this noble wyf Prudence suffred hir housbonde for to wepe and crie as for a 
certein space, / and whan she saugh hir tyme, she seyde hym in this wise […]” (978-
979). The work of transforming Melibee begins when Prudence discerns a strategic 
moment to diffuse his despair. From this early moment in her performance, 
considerations of time, pacing, and tact are integral to her counsel.13   
Prudence's considerations of tact and timing have roots in classical rhetoric. As 
David Wallace notes, the phrase “whan she saw hir tyme” occurs at three pivotal 
moments in The Tale of Melibee (979-980, 1051-1052, 1724-1729). In Wallace's 
reading, the trope speaks to Prudence's reliance on “all that Sophistic rhetoric 
understands by the concept of kairos: the timeliness of an utterance and its 
appropriateness to the particular circumstances obtaining at the moment of speaking” 
(233). Wallace even argues that understanding “kairos (or quando) as a guiding 
principle” in the tale can help modern critics make sense of Prudence's abundant, 
sometimes self-contradictory rhetoric: Melibee's shifting temperaments call for different 
philosophical perspectives at different moments (233). Like descriptive details 
pertaining to character and social context in the tale, narrative details related to timing 
throw the plot of wifely counsel into high relief and show how marriage can conduce to 
highly particularized counsel.    
                                                                                                                                                                              
975). 
 
13 Carolyn P. Collette and Nancy Mason Bradbury attribute the tale’s late- 
medieval popularity to a pervasive cultural “interest in measure, time and value” 
(“Time, Measure, and Value in Chaucer’s Art and Chaucer’s World,” The Chaucer 




Although Wallace focuses on the urgent need to deflect Melibee's ire, 
Prudence's attention to time and pace is more than just a passive or defensive response 
to her husband's moods.14 Her timing is also a means of diffusing and transforming 
those moods. Like Lady Philosophy in Chaucer's Boece, Prudence exploits the affective 
power of pacing in her counsel to heal her listener and simultaneously quiet his sense of 
entitlement. In her article “Chaucer and the Consolation of Prosimetrum,” Eleanor 
Johnson shows how Lady Philosophy's use of meter attunes Boethius to the temporal 
“order that embraces and governs all created phenomena in the universe.” By reminding 
him of this order, Philosophy provides Boethius with a new perspective on his cosmic 
position that both humbles and comforts him (455). But whereas Philosophy relies on 
the “sensuality and pleasurability” of song to console Boethius through his despair, 
Dame Prudence must eschew the intoxicating properties of meter (Johnson 458). As a 
solitary prisoner, Boethius relies on Lady Philosophy for a sensual path of escape from 
his rational worldly concerns; as a volatile man of the world, Melibee relies on 
Prudence for a rational path of escape from his visceral impulses. The deliberately 
prosaic organization of her “manye faire resouns” gradually leads him to recognize 
when he is “wrooth” and knows not what he does or what he says (1711, 1699-1700).   
                                                            
14 According to Wallace, when Melibee is “running on ire,” he must “be closeted  
away and softened by the feminine arts associated with rhetoric and the female body” 
so that he no longer poses a threat to the public at large (224; emphasis Wallace’s). 
However, as Bornstein and Burnley’s research bears out, Prudence’s rhetoric should not 
necessarily be classified as feminine; it reflects a style strongly associated with a public 
discourse that was male-dominated—or, in its courtliness, perhaps somewhat 
androgynous. And Prudence’s counsel seems designed to make Melibee a more 
rigorous and clear-headed thinker than to soften him; she is not “charming violence out 




The strategic pacing and thoroughness of Prudence’s rhetoric reinforces the 
tale’s deep philosophical investments in deliberation, caution, and patience. As 
Melibee’s first public meeting demonstrates, these values are all too easily 
compromised in the context of a public meeting, where time is necessarily limited and 
counselors rush to push political agendas. Melibee's eagerness to go to war after the first 
assembly demonstrates that rushed counsel can result in rushed actions, which can be 
both inadvisable for the person receiving counsel and dangerous for public safety. As 
Melibee prepares for battle, Prudence urges him to slow down: “I yow biseche, as 
hertely as I dar and kan, ne haste yow nat to faste and, for alle gerdons, as yeveth me 
audience” (1052). In support of her warning against haste, she cites Petrus Alphonsus 
and two proverbs:15 “He hasteth wel that wisely kan abyde,” and “in wikked haste is no 
profit’” (1054). The first proverb also appears word-for-word in Troilus and Criseyde 
(956), and both proverbs are among Chaucer’s few additions to Le Livre (Benson 925). 
Prudence's express commitment to deliberation and antipathy to haste preclude us from 
reading the slow-moving prose as parodic.16 Rather, her curial counsel models a 
cautious and gradual mode of thinking and acting that conduces to order and peace. 
But for all its emphasis on caution, clarity, and reconciliation, Prudence's 
rhetoric is not without bold variations in tone. The domestic environment allows her to 
                                                            
15 See also 1133-1137.  
 
16 In “What Chaucer Really Did to Le Livre de Melibee” (Philological Quarterly  
53 [1974], 304-320), a resoundingly negative article comparing the Melibee to its 
French source, Dolores Palomo, like Bornstein, concludes that Chaucer deliberately 
translated the work into more elaborate prose than can be found in the French (or, by 
extension, in Renaud’s Latin source); unlike Bornstein, Palomo reads these 




test the boundaries of formality, politeness, and obedience and to alternate more 
deferent rhetoric with carefully measured provocations. The beginning of the tale sets 
this pattern in motion: Prudence responds to Melibee’s initial outburst by saying, “why 
make ye yourself for to be lyk a fool?” (990), yet soon after listens to him “ful 
debonairly and with greet pacience” and asks “of hym licence for to speke” (1064). 
Although her accusation of foolishness is crucial to arresting Melibee's attention, her 
“sweete wordes” and performances of devotion secure his consent to implement her 
counsel: “wyf,” says Melibee, “by cause of thy sweete wordes, and eek for I have 
assayed and preved thy grete sapience and thy grete trouthe, I wol governe me by thy 
conseil in alle thyng” (1113). By insisting that he has “assayed and preved” his wife's 
merits, Melibee masks his profession of obedience as a claim to authority, then submits 
himself incrementally—and, in the end, entirely—to the authority of Prudence's 
wisdom. Prudence’s wifehood thus provides her with a traditional vocabulary of 
deference that makes her woman's counsel palatable to Melibee at the same time it 





Wifely counsel beyond the household 
 
By the end of the tale, Prudence exercises her authority not just for Melibee’s 
benefit but for the sake of public welfare. If The Clerk's Tale simply tells us that 
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Griselda, when given the chance, excels as a community leader—“Ther nas discord, 
rancor, ne hevynesse / In al that land that she ne koude apese, / And wisely brynge hem 
all in reste and ese”—The Tale of Melibee shows Dame Prudence doing the painstaking 
rhetorical work that goes into healing discord, both at home and in a more public 
context (432-433).17 Although most critical studies focus on Prudence's counseling of 
Melibee, her diplomatic interactions with the family's enemies are equally crucial to 
effecting the tale's peaceful resolution.  
Prudence's successful performance at home convinces Melibee to authorize her 
meeting with his enemies, to gauge their “wil and [...] entente” (1721-1724). Using 
organized, assertive, yet generous rhetoric, Prudence assembles her assailants and 
addresses them “[i]n a goodly manere,” beginning with general remarks about “the 
grete goodes that comen of pees / and the grete harmes and perils that been in were.” In 
typical fashion, she soon gets down to particulars, arguing that the invaders “oughten 
have greet repentaunce / of the injurie and wrong that they hadden doon to Melibee hir 
lord, and unto hir, and to hire doghter” (1726-1732). The household’s “enemies” 
respond in a spirit of meekness and apology, with an immediacy that once again speaks 
to Prudence's effectiveness as a counselor.  
Prudence maintains her authority at the meeting by claiming the role of 
counselor and asserting the previous success of her counsel. At first, the repentant 
assailants cast Prudence in the more decorous wifely role of a merciful intercessor. 
                                                            
17 “Nat oonly this Grisildis thurgh hir wit / Koude al the feet of wyfly  
moomlinesse, / But eek, whan that the cas required it, / The commune profit koude she 
redresse. / Ther nas discord, rancor, ne hevynesse / In al that land that she ne koude 




Invoking her “wommanly pitee,” they plead for Prudence “to taken swich avysement in 
this need that we ne oure freendes be nat disherited ne destroyed thurgh oure folye” 
(1750-1751). Ultimately, Prudence will grant them their wish, but she implicitly rejects 
the notion of womanly pity in her response to the assailants' plea. She assures the men 
that they can trust her to persuade Melibee as his counselor. With almost comic 
certainty, she professes to be “right seur that [Melibee] shal nothing doon in this need 
withouten my conseil.” In her promise to “werken in this cause that by the grace of oure 
Lord God ye shal been reconciled unto us,” Prudence leaves the office of “grace” or 
mercy to God and conceives of her own “werk” as a compatible but separate operation 
(1763-1764). By delivering a strong rhetorical performance and asserting herself as a 
counselor and political agent, she sets the tone for a rational and orderly reconciliation.  
The rest of the tale shows Prudence navigating diverse political contexts to 
facilitate this truce. Charles Owen sums up this section of the narrative as Prudence’s 
“[triumph] through a combination of secret diplomacy, public consultation with friends, 
formal parley with the enemies, and private suasion of her husband” (272). After 
Prudence assures Melibee that their former enemies are contrite, he asks to obtain “the 
assent and wyl of oure freendes” before sealing the peace (1778). This time, Prudence 
assembles a council of the family’s allies, and they immediately agree to pursuing a 
truce (1779-1790). Rather than show that Melibee has learned to discern ethical from 
duplicitous counselors, the tale depicts Prudence taking over the job and executing it 
with striking efficiency. Her success in convening this meeting does not undermine the 
tale’s many implications that Melibee has assimilated her counsel; nonetheless, it 
suggests that her own command of these lessons is more masterful. Prudence’s high 
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level of public activity near the end of the narrative emphasizes that she is not merely a 
skillful assistant to her husband. Her political and rhetorical performance throughout the 
tale is a formative influence on Melibee’s public performance but remains a superior 
alternative to it.  
Still, the final events of the tale emphasize Melibee's ethical progress. At court, 
he allows Prudence to critique him in public and embraces her counsel before an 
audience of his friends and enemies. When the assailants offer a full apology at 
Melibee's court (1806, 1816-1827), he responds by proposing their exile (1834-1835). 
But Prudence objects, arguing that the “crueel sentence” is “muchel agayn resoun” 
(1836). Thus, in the name of “resoun” rather than “pitee,” she calls for Melibee to treat 
the criminals more mercifully, and Melibee gamely consents (1885-1888). The tale's 
ending reflects his evolved understanding of judgment as a cooperative, revisionary 
process, in which his wife plays a vital, assertive, and public role.     
 In Prudence's performance of wifely counsel, Chaucer offers a normative case of 
highly skilled, rhetorically transparent wifely counsel that succeeds in both private and 
public settings. By seeing through the dense textuality of her counsel to the narrative of 
her success, we discover a thoroughly elaborated performance of wifely counsel that 
demands to inform how we read wives, husbands, and counsel in other tales. Prudence 
can especially help us better understand the aims, strategies, and accomplishments of 
less conventional wife-counselors in The Canterbury Tales, and her example will be a 





CHAPTER TWO  
Wonderful Counselor: 
Persuasive Strategies and Political Reform in The Clerk’s Tale  
 
Prudence's verbosity and Griselda's obedience would seem to represent very 
disparate points on a spectrum of female assertiveness. Yet both performances have 
long offended the sensibilities of modern critics. Articles about either The Tale of 
Melibee or The Clerk's Tale tend begin in a register of unease, struggling to explain why 
scholars and readers have found the tale unpalatable.18 But whereas the Melibee’s 
                                                            
18 In “Hagiography and the Problematics of Lay Sanctity” (The Chaucer Review  
33.1 [1998]), McKinley points out that the central bugaboo or “monster” for critics of 
The Clerk’s Tale “has been variously isolated, from Walter’s sadism to Griselda’s 
acquiescence to Chaucer’s artistic failure” (90). But I find that “Griselda’s 
acquiescence” has tended to arouse the most concern among scholars in recent years. 
For opening paragraphs on The Clerk’s Tale whose tone resembles that of the opening 
paragraphs I mentioned in my chapter on The Tale of Melibee, see Chapter Four in 
Pugh’s Sexuality and its Queer Discontents (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 
(75), Ashe’s “Reading Like a Clerk in the Clerk’s Tale” (Modern Lanugage Review 
101.4 [October 2006]) (935), and Mitchell’s “Chaucer’s Clerk’s Tale and the Question 
of Ethical Monstrosity” (Studies in Philology 102.1 [2005]) (1). Morgan (“The Logical 
of the Clerk’s Tale,” Modern Language Review 104.1 [2009]) also discusses “moral 
outrage among […] modern readers” in his opening section (3), and Shutters 
(“Griselda’s Pagan Virtue,” The Chaucer Review 44.1 [2009]) provides a useful 
summation of critical reactions to the “discomfort” that Griselda’s “extreme devotion” 
creates (64-65). Ashe credits Charlotte E. Morse (“Critical Approaches to The Clerk’s 
Tale,” Chaucer’s Religious Tales, eds. C. David Benson and Elizabeth Robertson 
[Rochester, New York: D. S. Brewer, 1990]) for providing a salient overview of pre-
1990 scholarship that underscores readers’ long-time difficulty with the Clerk’s 
“beguiling and horrific” tale (Morse 71; also quoted in Ashe 935). Mark Miller’s 
Philosophical Chaucer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), like Ashe’s 
study, cites Morse’s overview as “a useful guide” to Clerk’s Tale scholarship (270). 
Miller writes: “My claim here is not that each of these critics makes scandal their 
central theme, but rather that for each of them the tale’s main events or characters or 
metaphorical structures embody a scandal or outrage to important moral or political 
values, and that the core interpretive questions surrounding the tale concern how we are 
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troubled reception is a modern phenomenon, The Clerk’s Tale exhibits a fundamental 
darkness and moral ambiguity that “proved likewise troubling to medieval readers” 
(Pugh 75).19 Far from reflecting a clear set of values, Chaucer’s Griselda story has 
confounded generations of readers who find in it a perverse commitment to leaving 
high-stakes ethical problems grotesquely unresolved.20  
Different versions of the same question appear again and again in the critical 
literature: what role should Griselda play in our experience of the story (Miller 269-
270)? What should we make of a woman who keeps pledging allegiance to a man of 
senseless cruelty—and who, without protest, gives up her children to be murdered at his 
orders? The Clerk’s insistence on Griselda’s Christian (if not wifely) exemplarity makes 
these questions all the more difficult to answer (1145-1162). Explicit textual cues to 
read Griselda as a Christ-like or Job-like figure give the fleeting impression that she 
represents a clear set of ideals (204-210, 1146, 1149). But few readers accept that the 
Clerk’s orthodox gloss of Griselda—as an exemplar of self-sacrifice and patience for 
both genders—fully accounts for her role in the text.21  
                                                                                                                                                                              
to understand that scandal or outrage, and how Chaucer means us to understand it. […] 
I think there is something to be learned from the fact that such reaction to the tale 
persists across many differences of interpretation and critical methodology, and even 
across strong differences concerning what values are being violated, and by whom” 
(269-270). 
 
19 See Edward E. Foster, “Has Anyone Here Read Melibee?,” The Chaucer Review  
34.4 (2000), 398-409.  
 
20  McKinley also finds an element of the grotesque, as defined by Arthur  
Clayborough, in The Clerk’s Tale (90).  
 
21 See 932-938 for the Clerk's comparison of Griselda to Job “for his humblesse”  
(932). One problem with likening Griselda to Job is that the comparison entails a 
corollary analogy between the marquis and God that is not only bleak in the extreme 
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Some feminist critics have responded to these difficulties by more or less 
inverting the Job analogy and casting Griselda herself as the master, aggressor or victor 
in the tale.22 Griselda appears in such readings as “the ideal ruler” (Heng 412), “a truer 
image of God than Walter” (Mann xvii), “the most ‘masculine’ of the figures in the 
tale” and “less victim than the master of the man who apparently masters her” (Staley 
254). These interpretations are satisfying insofar as they move beyond simply 
acknowledging the tale’s diversity of meanings, now a commonplace in the scholarship. 
Yet they also tend to be as one-dimensional as the Griselda-as-Job tack has proven to 
be. A close reading of Griselda’s words and actions reveals her to inhabit a morally 
unstable position “outside of the binary opposition [between…] victimhood and 
subversion,” as well as between subordination and mastery (Rossiter 185).23 Both 
                                                                                                                                                                              
but also, given the Clerk’s overt critique of Walter (78-84, 460-462, 785), probably too 
blasphemous to for Chaucer to have intended. An understanding of God as a reckless-
bachelor-cum-abusive-husband is fascinating to consider but does not seem consistent 
with the devotion of a decent medieval clerk. (In Feminizing Chaucer [Cambridge: D. 
S. Brewer, 2002], Jill Mann argues that Griselda is the more God-like figure in the tale 
[xvii], although this reading is, for me, too counterintuitive in its particulars to be fully 
convincing.) Thus some critics have identified what could be called an ironic or 
deceptive quality in the tale’s biblical resonances—a “deliberate destabilizing of […] 
allegorical correspondences” and their religious implications (Bodden, “Interrogating 
‘Virtue’ through Violence,” A Great Effusion of Blood?, eds. Mark D. Meyerson, 
Daniel Thiery, and Oren Falk [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004], 220). Thus 
Clerk’s invocation of Job serves more as a moment of problematic yet fruitfully 
provocative free association—as well as an acknowledgment of Petrarch’s more 
orthodox reading—than as a blueprint for systematically interpreting Chaucer’s text.  
 
22  See Carolyn Dinshaw, Chaucer’s Sexual Poetics (Madison: The University of  
Wisconsin Press, 1989) 136. 
 
23  In Chaucer and the Energy of Creation (Gainesville, Florida: Univesrity press  
of Florida, 1999), Edward Condren reminds us that the exploration of wide behavioral 
spectra is fundamental to the overall structure and thematic content of the Tales: “[N]o 
one would seriously argue, outside of literature, either that the Wife of Bath’s campaign 
for female sovereignty or that Griselda’s unconditional subservience to her husband 
holds promise for a harmonious marriage or an ideal society, although one or the other 
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Griselda-as-Job and Griselda-as-master must necessarily gloss over the subtlety and 
variability of this position; they sanitize the “worrisome literality” of the heroine’s 
suffering by prioritizing the anagogical significance of the tale’s resolution over the 
emotional and political significance of literal events in Griselda’s marriage (Mitchell 2). 
Though undeniably resonant, the Christian and feminist implications of Griselda's 
endurance do not counterbalance the uneasiness that the marital dynamic of Walter’s 
brutality and Griselda’s apparent acceptance creates in the reader—or in the Clerk, who 
seems almost disoriented by the events of his own tale (Condren 124-125; Morgan 3; 
ClT 456-462; 694-700). 
The Clerk's response to his own story reflects the same anxieties that remain 
unresolved in much modern criticism (1142-1206). As some scholars have sensed, we 
have little choice but to embrace the story’s ambiguities as somehow meaningful in 
themselves: Griselda's role in the text has always resisted a coherent set of standards for 
moral assessment.24 Yet, in the very problems this role presents, we find it imbued with 
a valence of political and ethical significance.25 In order to comprehend this 
                                                                                                                                                                              
strategy may be effective in a given situation. On the contrary, […the two figures] 
define the limits of the spectrum within which may be found […] a promising 
philosophy of marriage […]. The same is true of the whole litany of opposing pairs with 
which Chaucer criticism has long been familiar” (3). However, as many critics have 
observed, Griselda’s position is unstable or at least difficult to define in The Clerk’s 
Tale; Condren is correct that her behavior inspires us to consider the extreme end of a 
spectrum, but, for reasons I will discuss in this chapter, she cannot be reduced to a 
model of consistent, “unconditional subservience.”  
 
24 Ashe credits Elizabeth Salter’s 1962 study Chaucer: The Knight’s Tale and the  
Clerk’s Tale (London: Edward Arnold, 1962) for establishing this interpretive tradition 
of embracing the text’s hermeneutic instability which continues to prevail among critics 
of The Clerk’s Tale (935).   
 
25 In his historicist reading of the tale and its Latin source, Warren Ginsberg  
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significance, I propose a turn away from the quest to resolve impossible questions about 
Griselda's moral status and toward the narrative of her work as a political agent in the 
most basic sense. Rather than dwell on her performance as a wife or a mother, we can 
focus instead on the consequences of her actions for the polity of Saluzzo. 
As I will argue, Griselda fulfills the role of a counselor in the tale, and studying 
her unconventional performance of counsel can help us better appreciate not only the 
problems but also the spiritual and political insights that she generates in the text. As 
Geraldine Barnes observes, Ricardian romance narratives are often deeply invested in 
the issue of counsel and its attendant problems (10), and this interpretive angle is 
especially fruitful for reading The Clerk’s Tale, where the class issues at stake in other 
medieval stories of counsel are exacerbated by Griselda’s poverty and the institution of 
wifely obedience. In my reading, Griselda’s fidelity to her marriage contract is a 
rhetorical performance that, in combination with the more explicit advice she dispenses, 
eventually transforms Walter into a more accountable and prudent leader and husband. 
This reading departs from the long critical tradition of straining to decipher Griselda's 
moral standing and identifies a coherent narrative of her political accomplishments in 
the text. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
demonstrates that the emphasis on problems and contradictions is a Chaucerian 
contribution to the Griselda story: “Chaucer records his response to early Italian 
humanism in the ways he translated the fractures that run through Petrarch’s 
discourse”—“fractures” being the “internal antagonisms,” contradictions or moral 
ambiguities inherent in the received narrative (Chaucer’s Italian Tradiction [Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002], 261). Likewise, David Wallace writes: 
“Contradictions detected in the Petrarchan story are not just smoothed away but are 
critiqued or carried over into English and made a part of the Chaucerian Tale” (282). 
Wallace sees a fundamental incompatibility between the historicity of Boccaccio’s 
Griselda tale (Petrarch’s source) and the “classicized, perpetual present” that Petrarch’s 




Few if any scholars, in discussing Griselda’s agency and relationship to Walter, 
have undertaken to study her as a wife-counselor, or in detailed relation to other 
Chaucerian wife-counselors as such. This gap is understandable, given that Griselda’s 
obedience and suffering loom larger in the modern imagination than most other details 
about her do. Yet, in much of her dialogue, Griselda implements key tools of the 
medieval counselor’s trade. Famously “discreet and fair of eloquence,” she makes 
pointed observations, advises discretion, takes public relations or “the peple” into 
account, and ventures some extremely memorable prescriptive statements (410).26 In the 
vein of more explicitly defined counselors, she accomplishes the rhetorical feat of 
speaking unflattering truths to a volatile and patronizing authority figure without 
offending him. Griselda's prodigious success at resolving conflicts among Walter’s 
subjects, which this chapter will discuss at greater length, serves almost entirely to 
establish her credentials as a counselor—moral wisdom, civic-mindedness, moral 
authority, and capacity for prudence—so that we can reasonably discern a coded 
valence of wifely counsel elsewhere in the text, including her professions of assent to 
Walter’s tyrannical will (428-441).27    
Yet Griselda’s performance of wifehood, in contrast to that of Dame Prudence, 
is not a transferable model. Her obedience to Walter is predicated on an understanding 
                                                            
26  “Ye koude nat doon so dishonest a thyng, / That thilke wombe in which youre  
children leye / Shoulde biforn the peple, in my walking, / Be seyn al bare” (876-879). In 
context, Griselda’s advisement against issuing this “dishonest” order seems at least 
partly rooted in concern for Walter’s image before “the peple.” 
  
27 Griselda’s moral authority among the people who inhabit the fictional world of  




of marriage not as partnership, as in The Tale of Melibee, but rather as a dynamic of 
automatic spousal unity, dominated by the husband and carried out to an extreme and 
dangerous degree. Griselda is a wife-counselor for readers to wonder at, question, 
sympathize with, speculate about, and try to understand—but, given the disturbing 
particulars of her situation, not, for the most part, one to imitate. As the Clerk himself 
seems to intuit, the ethical significance of the poem lies not so much in the exemplarity 
of Griselda's obedience as in the changes she effects in Walter.28 In other words, the tale 
does not necessarily endorse Griselda's obedience as obedience but rather as an ethical 
strategy for counsel and reform in a specific political context. 
This chapter will examine the eclectic repertoire of wifely counsel through 
which Griselda inspires changes in Walter and others. First, in Section One, I will show 
how Parts One and Two of the tale set up Walter’s deficient leadership and need for 
counsel as the driving problem in The Clerk's Tale. In Section Two, I will explain how 
Griselda’s understanding of wifehood empowers her to resolve this problem on 
Saluzzo's behalf. By stressing her ontological unity with the marquis, Griselda 
circumvents the dynamic of dread that reinforces Walter's political power; her 
resistance to dread sets her apart from his subjects and thereby allows her to represent 
their interests. Last, Section Three will elaborate the content and rhetorical strategies of 
Griselda's counsel, which are particular to each of her audiences. Griselda counsels in 
both a direct or conventional mode and a performative mode. Her explicit advocacy of 
reconciliation and cautious, benign rule is akin to Dame Prudence’s counsel The Tale of 
                                                            




Melibee; meanwhile, her performance of devotion models the accountability, self-
sacrifice and contractual fidelity that Saluzzo needs Walter to practice. By tracing the 
role of prudence as it vacillates across the different kinds of counsel Griselda dispenses, 
I gauge the degree to which her virtues should be imitated and by whom.  
 
 
I. Political precarity and the need for guidance:  
How the Clerk establishes a counsel narrative 
 
At the beginning of the tale, the Clerk sets the stage for a narrative of wifely 
counsel with an extended description of Walter that emphasizes his need for guidance. 
By the time she is introduced in Part Two, Griselda appears as a source of satisfaction 
to a set of clearly articulated public needs.    
Like the Melibee, The Clerk’s Tale begins with a male protagonist and patriarch 
enjoying himself (“in delit”) in a public setting, perhaps to the detriment of social order. 
But the first sentence of The Tale of Melibee mentions all three members of Melibee’s 
family, so that the protagonist is firmly situated within a network of social obligations 
from the very beginning of the narrative (967). By contrast, the Clerk’s unmarried 
marquis of Saluzzo is introduced as emphatically single, and his freedom from family 
ties in the domestic sphere parallels the relative lack of accountability that the political 
structure allows him to enjoy.29 As “The gentilleste yborn of Lumbardye,” Walter is, at 
                                                            
29 The Clerk attributes Saluzzo’s obedience of Walter—the love and dread that  
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this early point in the narrative, an object of superlative political and social worship: 
singular, socially distinct from and above everyone else in the polity. Even before the 
Clerk refers to the marquis by name, he describes him as being “Biloved and drad, 
thurgh favour of Fortune,” by his subjects (or “commune”) and his many lieges, who 
are “obeisant, ay redy to his hond.”30 Everyone in Saluzzo is tied to Walter through a 
relationship of steep verticality, of feudal obedience unalleviated by the leveling 
potential of blood, friendship, or marriage. Although it should be assumed there is some 
degree of mutual obligation in the relationship between Walter and his lieges, it is the 
polity’s deference to Walter, and not Walter’s devotion to the polity, that most 
characterizes Saluzzo’s political climate in the text.    
The Clerk presents this political arrangement in a critical light. By emphasizing 
the scope of Walter's power, he makes clear that there are dangerously high stakes 
attached to all of the marquis' choices and actions (83-85, 134-140). The issue of 
succession is a prime example: far from being a strictly personal choice, Walter's 
avoidance of marriage translates into a widespread sense of insecurity among his 
subjects. With the fate of all Saluzzo concentrated exclusively into the hands of a 
monocrat (and, as we later find out, a rather insouciant one), it becomes imperative for 
                                                                                                                                                                              
keep the power structure in place—to “favour of Fortune” rather than to God or to any 
merits of Walter’s. This detail both demystifies the origins of Saluzzo’s political 
structure by suggesting it is an accident of history and, by mentioning Fortune, hints at 
the possibility of change (68-70). It also aligns with the Clerk with the Wife of Bath, 
who's loathly lady argues that social class is not related to virtue or merit (WBT 1119-
1206).  
 
30 Syntactically, the obedience of Walter’s lieges appears even before the lieges  
themselves: “And obeisant, ay redy to his hond, / Were alle his liges, bothe lasse and 
moore” (66-67). This structure suggests early on that Walter’s ability to enforce or 




Walter to seek counsel, the go-to measure for patriarchs struggling with high-stakes 
decisions. Yet unlike other memorable patriarchs in The Canterbury Tales—Melibee, 
Januarie, the Man of Law’s sultan—Walter never convenes or even considers 
convening a “privee conseil” (see MLT 204). Like “spousaille or wedlok,” a council of 
advisors might pose a threat to the “free wyl” and unchecked “liberte” that Walter 
treasures (115, 145, 145, 171).31  
Ironically, the very political structure that renders counsel all-important to the 
success of Walter’s reign virtually precludes the cultivation of forthright counselors in 
Saluzzo. Walter’s ability to inspire universal dread or fear, “Both [in] his lordes and [in] 
his commune,” does not conduce to a culture of frankness and rationality (69-70). The 
people’s “murmur[ed]” resentment of Walter at multiple points in the tale suggests that 
dread rather than love prevails in the public culture.32 The “love” in the phrase “Biloved 
and drad” denotes an unstable, fear-induced, and possibly even grudging form of 
allegiance or “love” rather than entrenched devotion.33 As The Tale of Melibee explains, 
when a community espouses coexisting love and dread for a man of authority, the 
feeling of dread can predominate, rendering the people’s “reverence” unreliable and 
more conducive to flattery than wise counsel or meaningful support.34 Dread 
                                                            
31 See my Chapter Four, on The Wife of Bath's Tale, in which I discuss Walter's  
attachment to “choys” and “chesynge” (ClT 162-175).  
 
32  The term “murmur” appears in lines 635 and 726.  
 
33  The MED's entry for “love” “in phrases, etc.” (definition 1b) shows that “love”  
and “dread” are a common semantic pairing. Definition 1d (a) shows that “love” can 
denote a political agreement, “A covenant of peace.” 
 
34 “[A]nd therwithal ther coomen somme of his neigheboress that diden hym  
 
 55 
compromises openness and is therefore in itself inimical to good counsel. The people 
can interact with Walter in certain ways—eagerly do his bidding like the sergeant in 
Parts Three and Four (519-596; 673-686), or plead for a particular outcome like the 
spokesman in Part One (85-142)—but can never venture to radically challenge his way 
of thinking. 
The marquis’ youth exacerbates the anxiety this arrangement creates. The 
Clerk’s mention of “Fortune” in the aforementioned passage (“Biloved and drad, thurgh 
favour of Fortune”) evokes the precarity of Walter’s rule, as well as his need to guard 
against misfortune by grounding decisions in a sober and steadfast morality he does not 
yet seem to have fully developed. Walter possesses honor and courtesy, we learn, but he 
is problematically “yong of age:” the Clerk mentions his youth twice in the third stanza 
alone (73, 77). The strong implication that Walter lacks experience calls to mind 
mirrors for princes and other medieval advice genres, which commonly stress the 
incompetence of youth (Dunlop 197). The Clerk is forthcoming about the marquis' 
deficiencies: Walter is “Discreet ynough his contree for to gye, / Save in somme 
thynges that he was to blame” (75-76). Right after supplying Walter’s name, the Clerk 
ventures several bold, specific critiques:  
I blame hym thus: that he considered noght  
In tyme comynge what myghte hym bityde, 
But on his lust present was al his thoght,  
As for to hauke and hunte on every syde.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
reverence moore for drede han for love, as it happeth ofte. / There coomen also ful 




Wel ny alle othere cures leet he slyde,  
And eek he nolde – and that was worst of alle –  
Wedde no wyf, for noght that may bifalle. (78-84)35  
Being a man without peer has left Walter with underdeveloped powers of concentration 
and self-discipline; in this passage, he appears to lack forethought, prudence, and a 
sense of accountability.36 The Clerk’s striking shift from a generous and balanced 
assessment of Walter (“Discreet ynough […] / Save in somme thynges”) to more 
negative and totalizing language (“blame,” “on his lust present was al his thoght,” “Wel 
ny alle othere cures leet he slyde,” “worst of alle,” “for noght that may bifalle” 
[emphasis mine]) is ominous. It suggests that Walter’s leadership may be marked by a 
generalized ineffectuality, or at least by the constant threat of a lapse into ineffectuality. 
And, as I have discussed, the power structure does not allow for one of Walter’s lieges 
to make him a more disciplined leader; to catalyze the marquis’ political maturation 
would require the guidance of someone positioned just a little differently from “his 
lords and […] his commune” (70). Ideally, this counselor would fully share in the 
people’s perspective on Walter as a ruler, but her subordinate position would be slightly 
                                                            
35  This passage, especially, precludes us from reading The Clerk’s Tale as a simple  
retelling of Job, in which Walter tests his wife as God tests Job and all humanity. In 
Chaucer’s depiction, the Clerk has greater moral credibility than many of the other 
pilgrims, and no credible medieval Christian in a literary account would publicly assign 
blame to God the way the Clerk repeatedly assigns blame to Walter.  
 
36  As discussed later in the chapter, John Allen Mitchell defines medieval  
“prudence” as the habit of using forethought to discover appropriate courses of action 
(“Griselda and the Question of Ethical Monstrosity,” Studies in Philology 102.1 [2005] 
1). The detail that “on his lust present was al his thoght” clearly denotes an absence of 
prudence in Walter: the marquis loses himself in the present moment and values 




mitigated by an element of horizontality, as in a relationship of mutual affection or 
contract.  
The tale’s opening passages imply that a wife’s counsel, in particular, is the very 
counsel that would benefit Walter most. The marquis’ aimlessness seems bound up in 
his refusal to marry, and the Clerk names Walter’s bachelorhood as the “worst of alle” 
his offenses as a ruler. In omitting an explanation for this claim, the Clerk reinforces the 
great magnitude of the marquis' offense by presuming there is no need to elaborate its 
notoriety. The juxtaposition of Walter’s myopia with his unwillingness to wed sets up 
an ominous correlation between ineffectuality and bachelorhood in the tale and reflects 
a belief in the power of marriage to condition young men for political engagement. 
Before the wedding, Walter’s experience of seeing and finally meeting the woman he 
will marry appears to give him a new air of seriousness and integrity, at least outwardly. 
For the first time, with the text’s introduction of Griselda, we see the marquis 
experiencing sincere admiration of another person: “Commendynge in his herte hir 
wommanhede, / And eek hir vertu” (239-240). The passage that describes Walter 
watching Griselda from afar (he “wolde hym ofte avyse” “Upon hir chiere,” “noght 
with wantown looking of folye / […] but in sad wyse” [237-238]) shows him newly 
capable of paying sustained attention to something—someone—other than his usual 
“lust present”; he has turned from hawking and hunting to the “othere cures” of virtue 
and marriage. That Walter makes a habit of seeking out Griselda and appears 
“thoughtful” and “sober” in her presence seem at this moment to bode well for his 
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development as a public figure and thus for the future of the polity—that is, “if evere he 
wedde sholde” (232-245).37 
Although Griselda brings out a new seriousness in Walter, it would of course be 
misleading to imply that her only function as his wife is to help him reach ethical 
maturity. To be sure, historical context and the tale itself make clear that the failure to 
produce an heir is one of the major liabilities that Walter’s bachelorhood poses. 
Griselda’s foremost duty, by the public’s account, is to bear his offspring: the people’s 
spokesman tells Walter that they dread “a staunge successour” usurping the marquis’ 
“heritage” in the event of a childless reign (138-139). Nonetheless, the Clerk mentions 
Walter’s political weaknesses before the spokesman brings up his childlessness, and we 
ought to give those weaknesses equal consideration in relation to the problem of 
Walter’s bachelorhood. Furthermore, the contrast between the description of Saluzzo’s 
raw discontent on the one hand, and the extreme politeness of the spokesman’s 
language on the other, creates a note of dissembling or flattery in the address.38 The 
Clerk’s conjecture that the spokesman may have been elected for his rhetorical abilities 
also calls the thoroughness and sincerity of his monologue into question; the public’s 
message to Walter may well have been filtered through the mind of a crafty rhetorician 
                                                            
37 See 232-245: “[…] he considered ful right / Hir bountee, and disposed that he  
wolde / Wedde hire oonly, if evere he wedde sholde” (243-245); “This thoughtful 
markys spak unto this mayde / Ful sobrely” (295-296). Earlier, when Walter spies 
Griselda from afar, he looks on her “noght with wantown looking of folye / […] but in 
sad wyse” (235-238).  
 




(90).39 In any case, the spokesman’s address to Walter must be highly conditioned by 
the power structure and the dread I have already discussed, so that there is a lack of 
transparency in the text of his speech. Despite the spokesman’s exclusive focus on 
progeny, Saluzzo may have multiple reasons for begging Walter “hastily to wyve” 
(140). And given Walter’s youth, the imperative of political guidance seems even more 
pressing than the need for him to reproduce “hastily.” Indeed, the marquis himself 
chooses to marry Griselda based on her inherent virtue rather than her potential fertility 
(239-245). 
The public’s worshipful reception of Griselda in Part II confirms its appreciation 
for the marchioness in her own right. Although the spokesman’s plea for Walter to wed 
dwells on the issue of succession, the sense of relief and celebration that follows the 
marriage arises from the public’s approval of Griselda’s “thewes goode,” “heigh 
bountee,” “wit” and “juggementz of […] greet equitee” (406-441).  Following 
Griselda’s installation at the palace (389-391), the Clerk devotes seven stanzas to 
elaborating her virtues, talents and immense popularity (393-441), followed by only one 
stanza on the birth of her first child (442-448). Tellingly, there is no sign of public 
disquiet when it is revealed the child is female; instead, the people are content with the 
birth as a sign of Griselda’s fertility and with the “liklihede” that eventually “She may 
unto a knave child atteyne” (446-448; emphasis mine). The brevity and casualness with 
which this detail is treated suggests that Saluzzo’s desire for a successor is less of a 
                                                            
39 From an ethical standpoint, the public’s reliability is often dubious. Later in the  
tale,“sadde folk” lament the widespread approval of Walter’s second marriage: “A ful 




priority than the spokesman’s rhetoric implied. Nor does the public fret over the issue of 
succession later in the tale, when Walter and Griselda’s children disappear. After the 
male child is apparently killed, the people are angry not because they have lost a 
successor—this problem goes unmentioned—but because Walter has exploited his 
wife’s poverty as an excuse to murder their children. The anxious “murmur among hem 
comunly” is not in response to the broken continuity of Walter’s line but to the 
wickedness of his crime (722-735). Here again, the marquis’ moral failings trump the 
issue of succession as the public’s chief political concern. From the beginning of the 
tale, the people’s greatest civic need is for someone to improve the quality of his rule.  
In the early days of her marriage, Griselda satisfies this need in swift and 
obvious ways. Well before bearing a child, she has a galvanizing effect on the people 
and transforms the political atmosphere of Saluzzo. By instilling the realm with a 
greater sense of civic order, Griselda demonstrates a repertoire of political skills that is 
comparable to her mastery of domestic arts: 
Nat oonly this Griseldis thurgh hir wit 
Koude al the feet of wyfly hoomlinesse,  
But eek, whan that the cas required it,  
The commune profit koude she redresse.  
Ther nas discorde, rancor, ne hevynesse  
In al that land that she ne koude apese,  
And wisely brynge hem alle in reste and ese. (428-434) 
Just as, earlier in the text, Walter’s bachelorhood is suggestively paired with his 
shortcomings as a leader, here Griselda’s domestic know-how appears in close 
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juxtaposition with her political and diplomatic gifts. The Clerk’s mention of both sets of 
skills in the same stanza, the same long sentence, suggests a symbiotic relationship 
between domestic and political life, wifehood and civic leadership. In a stanza that 
strongly resonates with Chaucer’s depiction of Dame Prudence in the Melibee,40 the 
Clerk goes on to detail more of Griselda’s civic contributions to Saluzzo: when Walter 
is gone, she takes over some of his public duties, mediating between angry men (“gentil 
men or othere of hire contree”) to “bryngen hem aton,” all the while dispensing “wise 
and rype wordes” and “juggementz of so greet equitee, / That she from hevene sent was, 
as men wende, / Peple to save and every wrong t’amende” (435-441). Where before 
Walter’s marriage there were armed lieges, hawking, and a widespread anxiety, now 
there are wise pronouncements, peace summits, and civic feeling. Although most of 
Griselda’s dialogue contrasts sharply with Dame Prudence’s in both form and content, 
this passage reveals that, in the public sphere, the two women possess a similar degree 
of initiative, rhetorical prowess, and judiciousness.  
The Clerk thus situates Griselda as a renowned problem-solver and mediator, 
comfortable dealing with men from a range of social estates, willing to meet with them 
on her own accord and able to facilitate constructive solutions. These details take on 
particular significance in the larger context of an ongoing conversation about wives’ 
counsel in the Tales, especially regarding the issue of prudence. In keeping with a 
thematic association between wifehood and prudent speech that we also find in the 
                                                            
40  The image of Griselda using her ethical and rhetorical gifts to peacefully  
reconcile “wrothe” men outside of her household (437) resembles that of Prudence in 
The Tale of Melibee, when she leaves her husband at home and meets with his enemies 




Melibee, Griselda is given to prudently measure or time her rhetoric (her words have 
“ripened” by the time she speaks them) and uses measured speech to restore peace and 
order where there is rancor. Although the narrator’s interest in prudence is not as 
obvious as in The Tale of Melibee, The Clerk’s Tale does invoke the term explicitly: 
details about Griselda’s work as a mediator follow directly after the Clerk’s observation 
that Walter’s subjects begin to think of him as “a prudent man” (Scanlon 183).  
Granted, Griselda has not yet been depicted as instructing Walter in prudence. 
However, it is the marquis’ marriage to Griselda that makes his prudence possible: the 
people admire him for having seen “that under low degree / Was ofte vertu hid” and 
choosing so commendable a wife (421-427).41 Thus Griselda provides an opportunity 
for Walter to exercise and reflect the prudence that she seems to possess in a higher 
degree.   
Considered in this light, Griselda’s political accomplishments in Part Two of the 
tale are not just symptoms of a generalized exemplarity but rather particular functions 
and qualities of a wife-counselor. This vocation seems to be the most accurate and 
comprehensive way to categorize her performance in the text. Despite Griselda’s 
undeniable saintliness elsewhere in the narrative, there is little information about her 
relationship to the divine during the first phase of her life in the palace.42 All we learn in 
                                                            
41  The reason they consider him prudent is that he has chosen to marry a worthy  
woman of lowly estate (425), but this reasoning reinforces a more general association 
between prudence and marriage in the tale and speaks to Griselda’s success in the role 
of marchioness. 
 
42 For a reading of Griselda-as-saint, see McKinley’s “Hagiography and the  
Problematics of Lay Sanctity.” McKinley suggests that the tale is little more than 
Chaucer’s “artistic, aesthetic” experiment with hagiographic conventions, and that in 
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this regard is that the people believe her to be a heaven-sent savior (“as men 
wende”)43—in the same precarious way and at the same point in time they now believe 
Walter to be prudent.44 Nor is Griselda an intercessory figure along the lines of Alceste 
in the Legend of Good Women; regarding the topic of justice, we are told that her 
judgments are equitable, not necessarily merciful.45 Griselda’s purview extends beyond 
mercy to encompass a range of civic and judicial activities, and the Clerk’s description 
of her work in the public sphere pertains to her powers of reason, judgment, mediation, 
persuasion, and problem-solving—in other words, the basic tools of a counselor.46   
                                                                                                                                                                              
respect to thematic or moral content “he is quite absent.” She concludes that “this 
[hagiography] is what Chaucer seems to be ‘about’ in the Clerk’s Tale, however much 
this may disappoint, anger or irritate us” (90). However, decades of scholarship bear out 
that Chaucer’s version of the tale, in particular, has impacted readers with distinctly 
troubling (if not always coherent) moral and political implications. The English poet 
certainly makes fascinating use of hagiographic tropes, but this dimension of the text is 
not the only thing he “seems to be ‘about.’” 
 
43 We are also told that Griselda and Walter “In Goddes pees lyveth ful esily / At  
hoom” (423-424), but the mention of God here does not lend Griselda an aura of 
sanctity.  
 
44 It may be significant that wende, the past tense of wenen (“believed”) is a  
homonym of wende, the present tense of wenden, which can mean “to wander” or “to 
change course” (MED). Exile, shifting positions and changing course (in contrast to the 
fidelity Griselda practices) are recurring motifs in the tale, and the changeable nature of 
public opinion parallels Walter’s erratic decrees and the various relocations these 
decrees enforce. Like any good counselor, Griselda maintains a moral constancy that 
counterbalances her husband’s changeability as well as the public’s.  
    
45 Alceste intercedes for the poet by pleading for the irate God of Love to have  
mercy on him: “Now as ye be a god and eke a kyng, / I your Alceste, whilom queen of 
Trace, / Y aske yow this man, ryght of your grace, / That ye him never hurte in al his 
lyve; / And he shal swere to yow, and that as blyve, / He shal no more agilten in this 
wyse” (LGW F 431-436). 
 
46  Mediation entails persuasion—the use of rhetoric to coerce behavior—insofar as  




Considered together as an isolated story, Parts One and Two of The Clerk’s Tale 
are thus a straightforward counsel narrative with a simple problem-solution structure. 
The problem lies in Walter: his recklessness and bachelorhood and the resultant 
political precarity of Saluzzo. The solution lies in his marriage to a wife-counselor. 
With the wedding, this two-part narrative culminates in a spirit of joy: Griselda brings 
peace and equilibrium to Saluzzo not by bearing a male heir but rather by improving the 
quality of Walter’s rule. As Part Two draws to a close, she seems not only to have 
reconciled feuding elements in Saluzzo but also, for a short time, to have helped bring 
out her husband’s latent prudence.47  
In Part Three, however, Walter’s attention shifts away from the public sphere 
and back onto his private whims: namely, a longing “To tempte his wyf, hir sadnesse 
for to knowe” (452). Griselda confronts his cruelty with the infamous performance of 
obedience that has puzzled so many readers and critics over the centuries. Yet her 
astonishing devotion is consistent with an ethic of civic-mindedness that she exhibits 







                                                            




II. Griselda’s counsel:  
Values, strategies, and consequences 
 
 The marquis’ determination to test his wife launches us into a second political 
narrative of problem and solution, this time spanning Parts Three through Six of the 
tale.  Once again, the problem originates in Walter’s turn away from his responsibilities 
to the polity. His recklessness appears even more destructive now that it threatens the 
wellbeing of the marchioness, whose work has revitalized Saluzzo and improved 
conditions for its subjects. The solution, then, must be to effect a more permanent 
change in Walter than the one that occurred in Part Two. Griselda’s exceptional values 
of service, generosity, and fidelity to contract, in combination with her access to Walter 
through marriage, make her the only person in Saluzzo who is equipped to reform the 
marquis.  This section will explore Griselda’s commitment to community—as borne out 
by discrete moments in the narrative and underscored by her analogous relationship to 
the Clerk—as well as explain how the circumstances of her marriage enable her to 
counsel Walter on behalf of the polity.   
Unlike anyone else in the narrative, Griselda is almost constantly engaged in the 
service of others. Her actions throughout the tale betray a deep investment in values of 
cohesion: cooperative labor, participation in one’s community, fulfillment of one’s 
duties, and faithfulness to one’s word. Even before she meets Walter, Griselda 
establishes her commitment to each of these values. At a “tendre […] age,” she acts as a 
servant of “Hir olde povre fader” by keeping sheep while “spynnynge” in the field (218-
224). Soon after, in the only passage in the tale to quote her thoughts directly, Griselda 
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devises a plan to stand among “othere maydens […] that been my felawes” and watch 
the marquis’ wedding. Though excited to participate in a community event, she builds 
in time to complete “The labour which that longeth unto [her],” demonstrating 
accountability, community-mindedness, and conscientious forethought all at once (274-
294). Several other moments depict her working busily in the service of others, laboring 
not only manually—at home, on the farm, and in the palace (221-231; 149-150, 953-
980; 1008-1029)—but also intellectually, as a mediator (428-441).48 Griselda is thus a 
conscientious servant in multiple settings and capacities, including the intellectual 
service of a counselor. If there is anyone qualified to instill an ethic of service, 
accountability, and discipline in the marquis, it is his own wife.  
That the tale’s narrator provides a similar model of intellectual service (to the 
pilgrims and to us as readers) supports a reading of Griselda’s devotion to Walter as 
strategic and instructive. The prologue begins the work of developing a comparison 
between the Clerk and his heroine that makes it possible to consider the entirety of her 
work in the text—all of her actions and dialogue—as part of an edifying performance. 
To put it simply, as R. A. Shoaf suggests, “the Clerk is to Harry Bailey as Griselda is to 
Walter” (124)—a formulation that would read as reductive if it weren’t so clearly borne 
out in Harry’s dialogue.49 The Clerk’s resemblance to a bride reinforces the possibility 
of reading him as morally or socially aligned with Griselda, and the host’s use of 
                                                            
48  In Social Chaucer (Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press,  
1992), Strohm contrasts Griselda’s “attention to ‘commune profit’ and to relief of civil 
discord (431-434)” with Walter’s “lying misrepresentation of his subjects’ views (624-
637)” (160).  
 




“ryde”—given its imagistic incompatibility with “sittynge at the bord” in the next 
line—seems an especially deliberate link.50 (Walter sets Griselda “Upon a hors” after 
their marriage [386-388].) The Clerk’s transition, at the host’s bidding, from a retiring 
demeanor into a skillful performance of verse also foreshadows the manner in which 
Griselda is plucked from obscurity, only to dazzle the public with her competence, 
eloquence, and “ripe words” (438). Just as the Clerk, who is not a poet by trade, gamely 
translates Petrarch's prose into finely crafted rhyme royal, the low-born Griselda 
interprets her marriage contract more faithfully than its author does.51 But what is 
perhaps most significant in the Clerk’s thematic alignment with Griselda is the 
suggestion that beneath his outward appearance of reserve there lies a highly active and 
deliberate intellect: “I trowe ye studie aboute som sophyme,” conjectures Harry (5), 
speculating about the Clerk’s inner life in exactly the way that Walter speculates about 
Griselda’s (687-693). Though some readers may interpret “sophyme” as light-heartedly 
derisive, Harry’s musing nonetheless raises the possibility of reading complexity and 
strategy into the Clerk’s performance of effeminate self-effacement, so that we might 
also read Griselda’s professions of obedience in a similar, investigative mode.52  
No matter what the Clerk says in the course of his tale, he is always performing 
a public service by telling a story, both to us and to his fellow-pilgrims; likewise, 
                                                            
50  See Benson’s note and sources on the “maidenly” demeanor of clerks (879).  
 
51  Walter lays out the terms of their marriage contract in lines 344-357. 
  
52  However, according to Benson, the word may not have any negative  
connotations here: “By the fourteenth century, sophisma had come to mean not merely 
an enigmatic proposition or a fallacious argument or conclusion, but any question 




Griselda is always dispensing counsel on multiple levels, though often in unexpected 
ways. Just as a community of pilgrims gathers around the Clerk to hear his tale, and a 
readership, figuratively speaking, coheres around the text of the Tales, “men and 
wommen, as wel yonge as olde” from “many a regioun” around Saluzzo are drawn to 
Griselda by “the bountee of hir name” (414-420). All of these communities have a 
quality of instability: the pilgrims are competitive, we readers disagree about the tale’s 
meanings, and the fictional populace of Saluzzo is nothing if not fickle. Yet each 
community is subject to the edifying impact of Griselda’s or the Clerk’s performance, 
or to both. As Laura Ashe argues in her article “Reading like a Clerk,” Griselda can be 
said to interpret or “read” Walter’s actions insofar as her dialogue comments on or 
recasts their shared experiences. But her own performance, like the Clerk’s, also 
demands to be read, and her actions, in their consistency and seriousness, are suggestive 
of an edifying and community-minded authorial mission. This mission involves 
reaching and permanently transforming the ethical choices of her most resistant 
audience: Walter himself.  
The thematic connections between Griselda and the Clerk include a certain 
reformist resonance in their relationship to authority. William T. Rossiter and Carolyn 
Dinshaw have explored how the Clerk and Griselda deal with Harry's and Walter’s 
respective attempts to limit their expression:53 both narrator and heroine manage to carry 
off sophisticated rhetorical feats without breaching their contractual obligations to an 
                                                            
53  Dinshaw draws on Judith Ferster’s work support her interpretation of Griselda’s  




overbearing authority figure.54 Harry calls on the Clerk to tell “som murie thyng of 
aventures,” in “so pleyn” a manner “That we may understonde what ye seye” (15-20), 
but the Clerk responds with a challenging tale of cruelty and intrigue, with overtones of 
violence and even incest—“pleyn” in diction, not in form or meaning, and “murie” only 
on a fleeting basis, at the ends of Parts Two and Six. The tale’s bright conclusion, 
themes of fortune, and clear language fulfill Harry’s requirement that it be “murie,” “of 
aventures,” and “pleyn,” but only technically speaking.55 Likewise, Griselda conforms 
her will to Walter’s in strict accordance with her marriage vow, but she also maintains a 
consciousness apart from his and confronts him with a model of ethical consistency that 
radically challenges his approach to leadership.  
In light of these accomplishments, Dinshaw and Rossiter read Griselda and the 
Clerk’s performances as acts of rhetorical “aggression” against “feminization […] as a 
means of subordination,” performed in the service of self-assertion or subjectivity 
(quoted from Rossiter 189; see also Dinshaw 136). These readings of wifehood and 
resistance in the text resonate with Paul Strohm’s observation that “the fourteenth-
century household” was considered “a critical site of struggle within which the 
assumptions of hierarchy and the privileges of patriarchy were subjected to sore trials” 
(“Treason” 143). But Strohm’s argument, which draws extensively on documentary 
evidence and on Chaucer’s portrayal of the Wife of Bath, deals mostly with issues of 
                                                            
54  “For what man that is entred in a pley,” says Harry, “He nedes moot unto the  
pley assente,” so that the Clerk’s presence among the pilgrims binds him to participate 
in the Host’s tale-telling game, the same way Griselda’s marriage vow binds her to 
obey Walter’s whims (10-11). 
 




sex and property: “violence and mayhem as figures for insurrectionary impulses, the 
marriage bed as a place where relations of domination and subordination are both 
evoked and transgressed,” as borne out especially in The Wife of Bath's Prologue (143). 
His study focuses on texts that depict wives as dangerous, and married couples as 
essentially at odds, vying for power in a spirit of conflict.  
Strohm’s research, along with the readings by Rossiter and Dinshaw, supports 
the hypothesis that a valence of undisclosed political intentionality underlies Griselda’s 
devotion. But the marchioness, like her narrator, challenges patriarchy in a way that 
differs from the forms of aggression and self-assertion that these scholars describe. 
Although it may be possible to read Griselda and the Clerk as espousing private grudges 
in the tale, the Clerk’s overriding investment in ethical questions and Griselda’s 
determination to honor her vow of devotion render such readings unlikely.56 Rather than 
engage with authority figures in a dynamic of aggressive conflict, both figures seem 
unfazed by the bait of Harry’s and Walter’s provocations and maintain enough 
composure to preserve a platform for articulating crucial observations. Both are, in a 
sense, wife-counselors—recall that the Clerk, in Harry’s estimation, resembles a wife—
whose “rhetorical dexterity,” “not inconsiderable powers of speech,” and “skillful, 
deliberate negation” of patriarchal fallacies, to use Rossiter’s terms, help them 
transcend social disparities to assert a certain kind of public-minded counsel (189). 
                                                            
56  As I will argue in the closing section of this chapter, the envoy celebrates wifely  
insubordination in such a way that reflects the Clerk’s sympathy with the  
“insurrectionary impulses” that Strohm’s research deals with, but this expression of 
sympathy serves as a coda; the narrative itself depicts counsel rather than insurrection 
(Paul Strohm, “Treason in the Household,” Hochon’s Arrow [Princeton: Princeton 




Thus Griselda’s vow serves not as an opportunity to transgress or undermine her 
powerful husband but rather to remake him, slowly but strategically and permanently, 
so as to benefit both household and polity. Although, in Part Six, Walter claims he has 
been trying or testing his wife in the years leading up to her restoration, Griselda has 
been subjecting him to a different manner of “sore trials” and training him in the values 
of fidelity and devotion that he decidedly lacked in Part One (Strohm 143).  
The public need for this kind of rhetorical performance in The Clerk’s Tale is 
dire. Recurring examples of concealment, strategy, dishonesty, dissembling and 
fickleness in Saluzzo establish the necessity for an ethical reformer, a wonderful 
counselor “from hevene sent” (440). After the brief period of civil order occasioned by 
Walter’s marriage, the political environment of Saluzzo sours. In other words, 
Griselda’s implied retirement from the public sphere coincides with a new proliferation 
of deceptive or otherwise ethically dubious acts under Walter’s watch. If the counsel 
narrative in Parts One and Two spotlights the problem of Walter’s insouciance, the 
counsel narrative in Parts Three through Six explores the problem of duplicity, both 
individual and systemic.   
In Saluzzo’s culture of intrigue, communicational transparency is rare or at best 
variable. When Walter sends “A maner sergeant” of “Suspecious […] diffame” to carry 
away Griselda’s child “Despitously,” the Clerk’s language suggests that the sergeant’s 
untrustworthiness reflects a wider political or cultural trend: “Suspect his face, suspect 
his word also; / Suspect the tyme in which he this bigan” (340-342). The ethically 
suspect sergeant reflects poorly on the political climate under Walter’s leadership (after 
Griselda’s public activities seem to cease, and the testing begins), not only because he is 
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acting and lying on behalf of Walter himself, but also because the Clerk links his 
suspiciousness to that of the “tyme” in which his actions occur.57  
Secrecy, the flipside of suspicion, is also crucial to Walter’s modus operandi, 
even in relationships that extend beyond Saluzzo. Covertly, the marquis orders “the 
court of Rome” to forge papal bulls detailing “How […] the pope, as for his peples 
reste, / Bad hym to wedde another, if hym leste” (736-749); arranges for his sister in 
Panico to “hyde / From every wight” the children’s identity (594-595); and later writes 
a letter to the Earl of Panico in Bologna, praying “That he to no wight, though men 
wolde enquere, / […] nat telle whos children that they were” (767-770). Again, Walter’s 
delegation of unsavory acts to other parties suggests a lack of accountability for his 
decisions—as does his failure to assure Griselda, despite her explicit request, that 
anyone has given the child in question a proper burial “in som place / That beestes ne 
no brides it torace” (570-572). Over the course of the tale, the aforementioned sergeant, 
“the court of Rome,” the Earl of Panico, and Walter’s own daughter (without her 
necessarily knowing it) all participate in the marquis’ deceptions and omissions (737, 
764-770).  
Even the community at large, whose vulnerability is a major theme and receives 
a fair amount of sympathy in the text, is depicted as unreliable. Like The Tale of 
Melibee, The Clerk’s Tale emphasizes the need for a patriarch to act in a community’s 
best interest at the same time it expresses distrust in the ethical integrity of the 
                                                            
57 Strikingly, the Clerk also uses “suspect” to describe Janicula’s view of Walter’s  
marriage proposal (905); Griselda’s achievement is to transform the nature of their 




community itself. Prudence and Griselda can counsel their husbands to act on behalf of 
public order precisely because their values, resources, and social positioning set them 
apart from the public, among whom “men shal alwey fynde a gretter nombre of fooles 
than of wise men” (Mel 1258). Whereas Walter’s own changeability is mirrored in the 
fickleness of the “stormy peple” he rules, Griselda’s marriage vow allows her to 
practice a deep-rooted constancy that stands out in contrast to this familiar dynamic 
(995).58 Chaucer emphasizes this point of distinction between Griselda and her people 
by adding two stanzas to his source that elaborate the public’s problematic taste for 
“noveltee”: one stanza in the voice of wise, “sadde folk” who are disappointed in 
Saluzzo’s “stormy peple” for approving of Walter’s second marriage, followed by 
another stanza in the voice of the Clerk himself, who draws the passage to a close by 
                                                            
58 The tale’s argument is not that all wives can reform all patriarchs, but that  
wifehood is a major factor in Griselda’s particular suitedness to reforming the marquis. 
In addition to her wifehood, Griselda’s background further distinguishes her from all of 
his other subjects. Her poverty, in part, has equipped her with the stamina to practice 
these virtues over time, and her intellectual gifts allow her to practice them in such a 
way that will enlighten her husband. The symmetry between her status as the daughter 
of “a man / […] holden povrest of hem alle” (204-205) and Walter’s status as “The 
gentilleste yborn of Lumbardye” creates at once both an extreme imbalance of nominal 
power and, paradoxically, a perfect balance of personal resources (204-205, 72). On the 
one hand, it would seem that Walter is more superior to Griselda, in terms of 
socioeconomic status, than to anyone else in Saluzzo; on the other hand, according to 
the story’s logic, Griselda’s innate gifts and long acquaintance with hardship (as “a 
povre fostred creature” [1043]) have armed her with unmatched diligence, patience, 
resilience and humility, equivalent in magnitude and significance to the unmatched 
material power and authority that Walter wields. As the poorest in the land, only 
Griselda can claim to have developed personal and moral resources that are strong 
enough to compete with the audacity and “vanytee” that correspond to Walter’s might 
(250). Since the totality of Walter’s power over all of Saluzzo renders the social 
distinctions among his subjects rather trivial, the material results of Griselda’s poverty 
are more important than her nominal status in defining the terms of her relationship to 
the marquis. The abstract marker of her socioeconomic position certainly remains a 
factor—Walter exploits it in each of his lies (481-490, 624-644, 792-805)—but the 
concrete virtues she has acquired through living with this abstract marker substantially 




evoking the values that Griselda represents by contrast: “Namoore of this make I now 
mencioun, / But to Griselde agayn wol I me dresse, / And telle hir constance and hir 
bisynesse” (995-1008; see Benson 885). Over the course of the tale, public opinion 
undergoes a dizzying succession of changes: from anxiety about Walter’s childlessness 
(85) to consternation when he delays his betrothal (246-252), admiration for his choice 
of a wife (421-427), hatred for “the sclaundre of his diffame” as a “mordrere” (722-
732), cynical or grudging acceptance of the papal-bull scheme (750-751), grief over 
Griselda’s expulsion from the palace (897-898), approval for Walter’s plan to remarry 
(with the exception of some dissent among the aforementioned “sadde folk” [985-987, 
995-1001]), delight in the novelty of a second wedding (1003-1005), and finally a 
combination of relief, sympathy for Griselda, and joy at her restoration to the palace 
(1086, 1104, 1109-1110). Although Griselda’s emotional state also changes in response 
to narrative events, her readiness to accept Walter’s actions is constant. That she never 
betrays signs of malice or bitterness—an accomplishment she humbly attributes to her 
poor upbringing (1041-1043)—confounds Walter’s expectations.59  
Griselda’s demonstrations of patience and constancy have an unprecedented 
effect on Walter. Like more traditional forms of counsel, her performances cause him to 
“wonder” (687-693), to “wait” (708-710), to pay attention (598-602), and ultimately to 
change his conduct, when he decides to quit testing her (1044-1056). Whereas the 
marquis inspires wonder and curiosity in his subjects and the Clerk on multiple 
                                                            




occasions,60 Griselda is the only person with the time, venue, and personal resources to 
command his fascination, and thus the only one to exercise any real power over his 
mind (see 246-252, 456-462, 621-624, 698-700).61 Had she practiced a grudging form of 
obedience like that of the public, there would have been no cause for wonder in Walter 
and no incitement to change his ways.  
If the rhetorical purpose of Griselda’s faithfulness is to arrest Walter’s attention 
by breaking from prevailing modes of communication, the moral purpose is to model a 
sense of accountability that is transferable to the political sphere. Just as Griselda 
guarantees the continuity of Walter’s line by bearing his children, she establishes 
                                                            
60  Walter’s absolute authority renders him accountable to no one and allows him  
to take action without explaining himself; thus he is often a subject of speculation by 
the people and the Clerk. On the day set aside for the marquis’ wedding, before his 
surprise proposal to Griselda, the people wonder “in privetee:” “Wol nat oure lord yet 
leve his vanytee? / Wol he nat wedde? Allas! Allas, the while! / Why wole he thus 
himself and us bigile?” (246-252 and 249-252 are Chaucer’s insertion [Benson 881]). 
Later, just before the staged “murder” of Griselda’s first child, the Clerk himself 
wonders why a husband would “assaye a wyf whan that is no nede:” “He hadde assayed 
hire ynogh bifore, / And foond hire evere good, what neded it / Hire for to tempte, and 
alwey moore and moore, / Though som men preise it for a subtil wit?” (456-462). 
 
61 The spokesman at the beginning of the story inspires “pitee” in Walter (141- 
142) and convinces him to marry, but the people’s sense of defeat on the day appointed 
for the wedding, before they see Walter follow through on his promise (246-252), 
suggests their intuition that, in the spokesman’s words, their leader has had the freedom 
“to doon right as [he] leste” all along (105). Walter did, after all, have the last word in 
their exchange, when he told the people to “speketh namoore of this matere” (175). His 
choice of a low-born wife also allows him to exercise a certain amount of power and 
liberty over the people even as he assents to “that blissful yok / Of soveraynetee, noght 
of servyse” that they request he take on (113-114): Walter categorically rejects the 
spokesman’s call for him to “Honour […] God” and himself by finding a nobly-born 
bride. (Walter sees the privilege of choosing his own wife as compensation for the loss 
of his bachelorhood: “For sith I shal forgoon my libertee / At youre requeste, as evere 
moot I thryve, / Ther as myn herte is set, ther wol I wyve” [171-173].) That the people 
assent to Walter’s choice “With heretely wyl,” as if they have been consciously won 
over to the compromised terms of his promise, underscores a lack of steadfastness on 




another kind of continuity between Saluzzo’s past, present, and future by confronting 
Walter with narratives that emphasize the fulfillment of promises. All of her responses 
to Walter’s cruel acts either allude to past events that we know to be true or assert a 
pledge that is later borne out as truthful in the narrative: “This wyl is in myn herte, and 
ay shal be; / No lengthe of tyme or deeth may this deface, / Ne chaunge my corage to 
another place” (509-511); “For as I lefte at hoom al my clothing, / Whan I first cam to 
yow, right so […] / Lefte I my wyl and al my libertee, / And took youre clothing; […] / 
[…] I wol youre lust obeye” (654-658); “How gentil and how kynde / Ye semed by 
youre speche and youre visage / The day that maked was oure mariage!” (852-855); “To 
yow broghte I noght ells, our of drede, / But faith, and nakednesse, and maydenhede / 
[…] Naked out of my fadres house […] I cam, and naked moot I turne agayn” (865-
872); “Ne nevere, for no wele ne no wo, / Ne shal the goost withinne myn herte stente / 
To love yow best” (968-973). Griselda’s promises to remain faithful are unfailingly 
borne out by the end of the story, and all of her claims about the past are grounded in 
specific events, usually associated with some kind of physical object or evidence; even 
the biblical allusion “Naked I cam,” though figurative, truthfully recalls Griselda’s 
arrival to the palace with “no thyng of hir olde geere” (372-376). Her professions of 
assent and devotion insist on their own honesty and demonstrate to Walter that truth and 
integrity remain possible despite the precedent he has set for deceit.  
Thus it is not just Griselda’s faithfulness and commitment to service that make 
her a successful model for Walter; her marriage itself—the bare fact of the contract’s 
existence—provides her with a venue to enact these virtues in the first place. For one, 
on the most basic level, there are ways in which the institution of marriage gives 
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Griselda a small but unique measure of socioeconomic leverage to assert the moral 
power I have been describing. Even as it enforces her extreme obedience, Griselda’s 
wifehood slightly boosts her social standing, in that being married to Walter makes her 
the only person in Saluzzo with something like a horizontal tie to the marquis. The 
marriage does not make Griselda Walter’s equal—“modified-vertical tie” might be a 
better term, especially since Walter continues to invoke her “povre estaat ful lowe” 
(473; see 466-485, 624-633, 795)—but it does seem to dissolve the dread that he once 
inspired in her as a subject and that reinforces his stringently vertical relationship with 
all other subjects. Walter himself understands “drede” as a political currency in Saluzzo 
and can imagine the people’s unwillingness to “pleyn speke in [his] audience” (634-
637).62 Griselda’s yes to Walter’s proposal may even be a direct result of this 
widespread, disorienting fear; seconds before their betrothal, she decides to accept 
Walter’s hand while “Wondryge upon this word, quakynge for drede” (358). But this 
premarital dread dissipates after the wedding, and Griselda takes on a certain 
confidence and openness that further sets her apart from those whose relationship to 
Walter is more strongly characterized by dread.63  
                                                            
62 These terms are quoted from one of Walter’s lies, but they nonetheless reflect  
his grasp on the role of dread in cementing Saluzzo’s political structure.  
 
63  In the second stanza of Part Three, before the Clerk begins to detail Walter’s  
tests, he interjects, “But as for me, I seye that yevele it sit / To assaye a wyf whan that it 
is no nede, / And putten hire in angwyssh and in drede” (460-462). But the events that 
follow, in Parts Three through Six, set Griselda slightly apart from the generic “wyf” 
the Clerk imagines in this comment. As each of the tests are described, the emphasis is 
always on her patience, constancy and composure—“And as a lamb she sitteth meke 
and stille” (538); not even in her tender treatment of the children before their “deaths” 
does she betray signs of dread. (Or even, if one looks closely, of anguish [see 563-567 
and 677-679]: we find out later of her woe and “sorwe,” but these emotions are not the 
same as anguish [1094, 1107].)  
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The marchioness understands her relinquishing of dread in a very technical 
sense, as a requirement of her marriage contract. After Walter tells her he must dispose 
of their daughter, concluding with a demand that Griselda honor the “pacience […] / 
That [she…] highte and swore […] / That day that maked was oure mariage,” Griselda 
readily complies, explaining that there is nothing she can desire “Ne drede for to leese” 
now that her will has been subsumed in Walter’s (495-497, 508):  
 Ther may no thyng, God so my soule save,  
 Liken to yow that may displese me;  
 Ne I desire no thyng for to have,  
 Ne dred for to leese, save oonly yee. 
This wyl is in myn herte, and ay shal be;  
No lengthe of tyme or deeth may this deface,  
Ne chaunge my corage to another place. (505 – 511)  
In this interpretation of her marriage contract, Griselda emphasizes not the destruction 
of her own will but rather the perfect compatibility between her will and the marquis’. 
She can longer dread any loss or blow that comes of Walter’s will because she 
understands his will to be congruent with her own. The narration substantiates 
Griselda’s claim to have internalized Walter’s will and thus to be free of dread; the 
Clerk tells us she is emotionally composed, “noght ameved / Neither in word, or 
chierre, or contenaunce” and “nat agreved” (498-500). Griselda thus remains far below 
Walter in terms of social and legal status, but, in emphasizing their congruent wills, she 
has slightly bent the vertical column of power that once made her fear him and has thus 




acquired a modicum more social power than anyone else in the realm can claim. She 
may not be able to control Walter directly, but, once married, she can face him with the 
emotional control of a good counselor.  
The terms of the marriage contract make this composure possible, and invoking 
the marriage contract allows Griselda to articulate her lack of dread and substantiate her 
appearance of equanimity. By way of contrast, the “maner sergeant” Walter hires to 
take Griselda’s daughter relates to Walter more predictably; we learn that “the lord 
knew wel that he hym loved and dradde,” making it easy for Walter to enlist the 
sergeant’s services in unsavory business (519-523). The marquis cannot, however, 
count on Griselda’s dread, much less on any dread of him to have overridden her moral 
principles, because she understands her marriage vow as a moral imperative to eschew 
dread. Walter can count on his wife’s love and obedience, but this obedience results 
from Griselda’s own sense of moral obligation, rather than from the dynamic of dread 
and manipulation that marks his dealings with the sergeant. Although it could be argued 
that both the sergeant’s and Griselda’s obedience lead to the same end—the children’s 
ostensible deaths—Griselda’s obedience has the merit of modeling a sincere fidelity to 
contract, unalloyed by fear or opportunism, that Walter might internalize and imitate in 
the political sphere.     
In reminding Walter of their vow, Griselda not only shows her husband that she 
does not, cannot, dread him, but also confronts him with his own consequentiality, thus 
hinting at the issue of his responsibilities. Her statements of compliance remind him of 
her shared stake in his will and take pains to specify that, though her will is congruent to 
Walter’s, Walter alone chooses his actions and thus determines what their wills will be: 
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“My child and I, with hertely obeisaunce, / Been yours al, and ye mowe save or spille / 
youre owene thyng; werketh after youre wille” (502-504); “I wol no thyng, ne nyl no 
thyng, […] / but as yow list. Naught greveth me at al, / Though that my doughter and 
my sone be slayn— / At youre comandment, this is to sayn” (647-649; emphasis mine). 
That the last two lines of the latter quotation are Chaucer’s addition suggests the poet’s 
investment in portraying Griselda’s ability to remind Walter of his own conduct 
(Benson 882). Her professions record the consequences of the marquis’ decisions, 
attribute all initiative to him alone, undermine his false excuses about public pressure, 
and eliminate any potential ambiguity as to his total responsibility for his actions. In 
another of Chaucer’s additions, Griselda records her own treatment of the wedding vow 
in such a way that draws a stark and ironic contrast with Walter’s: “God shilde swich a 
lordes wyf to take / Another man to housbonde or to make!” (839-840; see Benson 
883). At the very moment when Walter is completely disavowing Griselda, she shows 
that, for her part, she cannot conceive of taking another husband.  
Although the cruelty of Walter’s tests suggests that he does not yet understand 
his wife to be an extension of himself, Griselda persists in reminding him of their 
connectedness, and Walter experiences increasing sympathy with her over time. After 
announcing the first execution, he puts on a “drery” face but is privately “glad […] of 
her answeryng” (512-514);64 after the second such announcement, he is struck by 
Griselda’s reaction, “wonder[s], evere lenger the moore, / Upon hir pacience” and 
                                                            
64 After the sergeant brings Walter his daughter, the marquis “Somwhat […] hadde  
routhe in his manere, / But nathelees his purpose heeld he stille, / As lords doon, whan 




seems to consider the issue of her perspective in the ordeal (“wel he knew that next 
himself, […] / She loved hir children best in every wyse” [694-695; see 687-695]). 
After Walter banishes Griselda from the palace and grants her permission to keep her 
smock, he reacts with genuine sadness—“wel unnethes thilke word he spak, / But wente 
his wey, for routhe and for pitee” (890-893)—showing no trace of gratification. Finally, 
in response to Griselda’s plea that he “ne prikke with no tormentynge” his second wife 
(1037-1043), Walter makes an active choice to change his conduct towards her: “And 
whan this Walter saugh hire pacience, / […] This sturdy markys gan his herte dresse / 
To rewen upon hire wyfly stedfastnesse. / ‘This is ynogh, Griselde myn,’ quod he” 
(1044-1051). By degrees, Walter has learned to take Griselda’s perspective and feelings 
into account, so much so as to let them change him in the end.  
Over the course of the tale, the marquis develops a corresponding appreciation 
for his connectedness to the public. Just as his consideration and sympathy for Griselda 
increase over time, so does the complexity of his political imagination. Twisted though 
they be, Walter’s lies to Griselda about her reputation reflect a revision in his 
understanding of what a ruler should, in theory, owe to the people he rules. Whereas, in 
conceding to marry at the beginning of the story, Walter emphasizes his “free wyl” and 
insists on establishing his own terms of marriage, in later moments his dialogue 
emphasizes the issue of his own obligations and accountability to the public.65 In Part 
                                                            
65  On Walter's “liberte:” “‘Ye wol,’ quod he, ‘myn owene peple deere, / To that [to  
marry] I nevere erst thought streyne me. / I me rejoysed of my liberte, / That seelde 
tyme is founde in mariage; / Ther I was free, I moot been in servage. / […] And 
forthermoore, this shal ye swere: that ye / Agayn my choys [of a wife] shul neither 
grucce ne stryve; / For sith I shal forgoon my libertee / At youre requeste, as evere moot 
I thryve, / Ther as myn herte is set, ther wol I wyve” (143-175).  
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Three, when Walter tells Griselda he must have their firstborn killed, he invokes the 
principle that it is “for the beste” for a ruler to prioritize the public's satisfaction over his 
own: “I may nat in this caas be recchelees; / I moot doon with thy doghter for the beste, 
/ Nat as I wolde, but as my peple leste” (488-490). Although Walter is fabricating the 
public’s hostility toward Griselda, the content of his lie rests on the assumption that a 
ruler should serve the demands of the people he rules. Nonetheless, his putative reason 
for wanting to serve the public is fundamentally self-serving—“I desire, as I have doon 
bifore, / To lyve my lyf with hem in reste and pees” (486-487)—so that even his 
hypothetical or disingenuous public-mindedness derives from a selfish understanding of 
rulership. Yet when Walter approaches Griselda about their second child, though his 
concept of rulership retains this dimension of selfishness (“I wolde lyve in peese, if that 
I myghte” [638]), his comments reflect a subtler and more complex understanding of his 
relationship with the public: “Swiche wordes seith my peple, out of drede. / Wel oughte 
I to swich murmur taken heede, / For certainly I drede swich sentence, / Though they 
nat pleyn speke in myn audience” (631-637). Here, Walter’s lie imagines a public will 
at odds with his own, acknowledges the importance of the public’s dread in cementing 
his rule, and even posits a scenario in which his own dread of the people is greater than 
the people’s dread of him.  
Later, the marquis takes even more elaborate measures to misrepresent public 
opinion, so that his lies betray a greater interest in issues of protocol and accountability, 
as well as what is perhaps a humbler understanding of rulership and its limitations. In 
Part Five, Walter imagines an institutional check on his power in the form of the 




church, claiming that the pope supports the people’s demand for a new marchioness 
(736-749, 800-805):  
 But now knowe I in verray soothfastnesse  
 That in greet lordship, if I wel avyse,  
 Ther is greet servitute in sondry wyse. 
 
 I may nat doon as every plowman may.  
 My peple me constreyneth for to take  
 Another wyf, and crien day by day;  
 And eek the pope, rancor for to slake,  
 Consenteth it – that dar I undertake –  
 And trewely thus muche I wol yow seye:  
 My newe wyf is comynge by the weye. (796-805) 
By this point, Walter seems to have achieved a fully developed theoretical 
understanding of lordship as “servitute” and of the limits to his own authority. He 
should, hypothetically, be a servant to the people, seek permission from the pope for 
morally ambiguous actions, and substantiate the pope’s permission by promulgating a 
document available to the public (736-742). Whereas, in Walter’s first lie, he only 
claimed to act out of a self-serving desire for peace, his lie about the pope aspires to 
reflect a philosophy of rule-following, accountability, and self-sacrifice.   
Of course, Walter’s monologue about the pope, like the papal bull itself, is an 
assemblage of lies. The marquis is not yet putting his new political theory of 
accountability into practice, as his personal inclination to test Griselda still seems to 
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trump his devotion to the public’s best interests. But Walter has nonetheless fully 
attained the intellectual grasp that can precede behavioral reform. Before his wedding, 
Walter saw himself as free from obligation to anyone; understood marriage, not 
leadership, as the only conceivable form of “servage” that would threaten his “liberte;” 
and indulged the people’s will out of “pitee” alone, as opposed to a rational sense of 
obligation (145-147). But over the course of the narrative, as his monologues suggest, 
the marquis has begun to understand leadership as an obligation to separate personal 
whims, allegiances, and feelings from political rationale—and even to work against his 
personal desires if they do not conform to the people's will. In fact, Walter’s transition 
from breaking the bad news about his children to Griselda “with ful trouble cheere” 
earlier in the tale (464), as if the public’s murmuring “destroyed hath [his] herte” (627-
630), to suppressing his genuine “routhe and […] pitee” and stoically banishing her 
from the palace in Part Five (796-805, 893), reflects a (pretend) effort to completely 
merge his will with the public’s. He claims to be “constrained” by his people’s call for 
him to take a new wife, but he never apologizes to Griselda and no longer complains 
about the pain of any contrary inclinations on his part. Thus Walter has come to 
understand his relationship to the public in a way that resembles Griselda’s 
understanding of their marriage contract: as an obligation to conform one’s will to 
another’s, without betraying signs of resentment (920-924). Just as Griselda remains 
steadfastly “bisy in servyse” even after her child is supposedly killed, Walter—in the 
imaginary circumstance of Giselda’s unpopularity—must persist uncomplainingly in the 
“greet servitute” his lordship requires.  
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Thus Walter’s changing relationship to Griselda correlates with his changing 
political philosophy.66 These two arcs of progress converge when Walter announces 
publicly that Griselda has passed his tests of her wifely devotion. The scene marks 
Walter’s conversion to prudence, as evinced, in part, by his practical implementation of 
a principle of fairness: that Griselda demonstrates “no malice at al” and remains 
“constant as a wal, / Continuynge evere hire innocence overal” when “he so ofte had 
doon to hire offence” inspires him to cease testing her (1044-1057).67 Further, when 
Walter feels compelled to offer the public a rationale for his treatment of the 
marchioness, his explanation of the tests reflects a new level of both accountability and 
prudence. The values of judiciousness, forethought, and responsibility are no longer just 
strangely promising figments in his fantasies of public unrest over Griselda. For the first 
time, the marquis provides a clear and fully articulated justification for his actions:  
And folk that ootherweys han seyd of me,  
I warne hem wel that I have doon this deede  
For no malice, ne for no crueltee,  
But for t’assaye in thee thy wommanheede,  
                                                            
66 Chaucer’s section divisions clarify the counterpoint between Griselda’s  
constancy and the shifts in Walter’s thinking that I have described (Benson 881). 
 
67  Other critics have observed a relationship of causality between Griselda’s  
performance and Walter’s constitutional improvement at the end of the tale. Laura Ashe 
argues that Griselda inspires positive moral change in her husband by offering generous 
critical interpretations or “readings” of his actions (940). Anna Baldwin explores the 
effects of Griselda’s “criticiz[ing] Walter’s changeability,” arguing that Griselda’s 
implicit critique of Walter is one of Chaucer’s most important contributions to 
Petrarch’s version (“From the Clerk’s Tale to The Winter’s Tale,” Chaucer Traditions, 





And nat to sleen my children—God forbeede!—  
But for to kepe hem pryvely and stille,  
Til I thy purpose knewe and al thy wille. (1172-1176) 
Thus Walter claims to have tested his wife and kidnapped her children as a necessary 
precaution, to determine the extent of her loyalty and fitness for motherhood. Since 
Walter articulates this rationale retroactively, having never revealed it before, it reflects 
a brand-new sense of accountability to his wife and to the public.68 We might even read 
the tale as being more about Walter’s abandonment of the wife-testing scheme than 
about Griselda’s passing of the test; or, rather, we can understand Griselda’s passing of 
the test as a catalyst for the more remarkable narrative trajectory of Walter’s change. Of 
course, Griselda’s performance is remarkable, but since it does not entail a change in 
her constitution or conduct, it is less of an event that Walter’s final announcement is.  
This event reflects the marquis’ new appreciation for two aspects of what I have 
referred to as political and ethical “accountability”: transparency and purposefulness. In 
some of Chaucer’s most telling additions to Petrarch, the Clerk describes Walter’s wife-
testing scheme as needless and excessive. In contrast to those who might “preise 
[testing one’s wife] for a subtil wit,” the Clerk declares plainly: “as for me, I seye that 
yvele it sit / To assaye a wyf whan that it is no nede, / And putten hire in angwysh and 
in drede” (459-462; emphasis mine).69 This addition reinforces the translated claim, a 
                                                            
68 Griselda, too, divulges a retroactive account of her behavior: “I nevere heeld me  
lady ne mistresse, / But humble servant to youre worthynesse” (823-824).  
 





few lines earlier, that “Nedelees, God woot, [Walter] thoghte [Griselda] for t’affraye” 
(455; emphasis mine). In another addition, in Part Four, the Clerk emphasizes the issues 
of pointlessness yet again, exclaiming, “O nedelees was she tempted in assay! / But 
wedded men ne knowe no mesure, / Whan that they fynde a pacient creature” (621-623; 
emphasis mine). Later, our narrator locates the origins of Walter’s “merveillous desir 
his wyf t’assaye” in an old, irrational whim (454, 696-707): he wonders, “What koude a 
sturdy housbonde moore devyse / To preeve hir wyfhod and hir stedefastnesse, / And 
she continuying evere in sturdinesse,” and describes Walter as persisting in the 
endeavor “as if [he] were bounden to that stake.” The image suggests that Walter tests 
his wife out of inertia or lack of control, rather than from conscious reassessments of the 
trials’ value (698-700).  
By contrast, at the close of the story, Walter demonstrates a conviction that his 
actions should grow out of rational precepts. Whereas the narrative begins by critiquing 
his lack of forethought, it ends with him straining to justify his actions by articulating a 
plan that might have motivated them. Walter’s explanation for testing Griselda also 
reflects a newly self-conscious regard for public opinion; he is no longer fabricating 
malicious stories about the public but voicing sincere and explicit concern about 
whether or not his subjects approve of him. Furthermore, the address reflects a greater 
complexity in Walter’s understanding of the relationship between his political and 
domestic circumstances. Whereas the marquis’ tests seem, initially, to have served only 
a private desire—to verify his wife’s feminine virtues or “wommanheede” (1075)—his 
explanation for the tests, by its public nature, reflects a newfound appreciation that his 
domestic life is a matter of importance to the public. By the end of the tale, Walter has 
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not necessarily been converted to the complete subservience that characterized 
Griselda’s professions of devotion, or even to the “greet servitute” that he invoked 
earlier—tellingly, albeit disingenuously—as a standard for his own behavior (798). But 
his demonstration of accountability is significant, and his acquisition of prudence in 
particular shows that Griselda, in her constancy, has served the role of a counselor.  
Granted, the marquis’ new regard for prudence or principled forethought in this 
passage is retroactive and even a little farcical. As the Clerk’s comments affirm, 
Walter’s desire to test Griselda hardly justifies kicking her out of the palace, pretending 
to murder their children, and staging a fake incestuous wedding. But Walter’s 
rationalization is not worthless. It completes the work of restoring his household and 
seems to establish a precedent for him to behave more rationally and accountably in the 
future. In her address to the children upon their return, Griselda invokes images that 
deftly underscore the narrative of Walter’s transformation from the reckless sportsman 
of Part One, hawking and hunting “on every syde” (79-84), to the more benign patriarch 
of the story’s conclusion: “Youre woful mooder wende stedfastly / That crueel houndes 
or som foul vermyne / Hadde eten yow; but God of his mercy / And youre benyngne 
fader tendrely / Hath doon yow kept” (1094-1098). That Griselda refers to herself and 
her husband in the third person, choosing to focus the address on their children instead, 
is in keeping with her tendency to understand the marriage mainly in terms of its 
consequences for others.   
 The material that follows this passage seems intended to bear out the 
permanence of Walter’s change. The Clerk tells us that Walter and Griselda “Lyven 
[…] in concord and in reste” for “many a yeer in heigh prosperitee” and that Walter 
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takes in Janicula “Til that the soule out of his body crepeth” (1128-1134). That the 
couple’s “sone succedeth in his heritage / In reste and peese, after his fader day” and 
“putte he nat his wyf in greet assay” marks the ultimate satisfaction of Saluzzo’s wish 
for a successor and suggests that Walter leaves a legacy of prudence and kindness to his 
son (1135-1138). All of these politically significant events are set in motion by 
Griselda’s passing of Walter’s test, and, although we are led to roundly critique the style 
of leadership that occasions a trade-off between Griselda’s well-being and Saluzzo’s 
political stability, we cannot deny that her abject obedience and devotion, however 
disturbing, result in positive change for the polity.  
This victory on behalf of Saluzzo reflects Chaucer’s interest in the constructive 
merits of wifehood and wifely instruction or counsel in the context of political reform. 
Now that we have discerned the narrative of Griselda’s success as a wife-counselor and 
the values that operate within this narrative, we are in a better position to clarify the 
specific political arguments that operate within The Clerk’s Tale, as well as to address 
the literary and ethical problems that make these arguments hard to discern.  
 
 
III. What’s to be learned, and by whom 
Prudence and exemplarity for different audiences 
 
By the time of the tale’s conclusion, Griselda’s performances of devotion 
gradually serve the same ethical end that any good wifely counsel should serve: to make 
her husband more prudent. Drawing on her resources as Walter’s wife and “a povre 
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fostred creature,” the marchioness inspires her husband to quit behaving cruelly, leave 
off his personal obsession, and provide a rational account of his actions. Yet the form 
her counsel quite often takes is ethically confusing. With the “murders” of her children, 
Griselda’s devotion to the vow takes on a stubborn or reckless quality that recalls that of 
Walter’s persistence in bachelorhood and, later, his tests of Griselda herself (“This 
markys in his herte longeth so / To tempte his wyf, […] / That he ne myghte out of his 
herte throwe / This merveillous desir his wyf t’assaye” [451-454]).70 These choices, as I 
have discussed in previous sections, are the main ways in which Walter endangers his 
polity. If Griselda’s more extreme speech-acts reflect an obstinacy that mirrors the 
marquis’ (albeit in an edifying fashion), it is not immediately evident how these more 
performative acts of counsel serve to break the cycle of Walter’s imprudence and to 
inspire his rational, public-minded self-explanation in Part Six (1072-1078). Though it 
is clear how Griselda models fidelity for her husband, it is more difficult to understand 
how she teaches him prudence.   
J. Allen Mitchell begins his essay on Griselda and “Ethical Monstrosity” by 
opposing her “voluntary submission” to the virtue of “ordinary prudence, where 
                                                            
70 Griselda’s counsel is part of a rational program “Peple to save and every wrong  
t’amende” (441), but a lifetime of poverty and an intuitive gift for “wyfly hoomlinesse” 
(429) have so deeply instilled her strengths and values that she can access and persist in 
them without wavering. When, after both supposed executions, the Clerk describes the 
“condicion” that sustain’s Walter’s urge “To tempte his wyf as he was first disposed,” 
he might as well be describing Griselda’s unflagging endurance: “But ther been folk of 
wich condicion / That whan they have a certein purpose take, / They kan nat stynte of 
hire entencion, / But, right as they were bounden to that stake, / They wol nat of that 
firste purpose slake” (701-707). In keeping with the symmetry of their social statuses,  
Griselda meets Walter’s “firste purpose” to test and possibly destroy her with an 
equally intractable determination to honor him in fulfillment of her marriage vow. Her 
ambition to satisfy all of Walter’s demands results from a prudent, civic-minded 




prudence is understood in the medieval sense as a matter of discovering practical 
precepts for action” (1; emphasis Mitchell’s).  Regardless of the extent to which 
Griselda’s submission is voluntary, her fanatical adherence to an ethic of wifely 
submission does not reflect any degree of the prudence we associate with wise wifely 
counsel (or with any counsel). So by what alchemy of prudence, exemplarity, and their 
opposites does Griselda’s extremism “slake” Walter’s own—his radical adherence to a 
“firste purpose” (705)—rather than continue to enable and exacerbate it? And, further, 
what should readers glean from her instruction as a wife-counselor, with so much of her 
counsel eschewing conventional prudence, that core value of medieval counsel? I 
answer these questions in terms of prudence and exemplarity, a key strategy of certain 
kinds of counsel and of “moral tales” in general. Parsing these interrelated concepts in 
the narrative is crucial to understanding the lessons that Griselda, the Clerk, and the 
poet of The Clerk’s Tale have to offer.  
When Mitchell refers to “a problem of prudence” in the tale, he speaks of the 
apparent loss of focus, clarity, and rhetorical force that occurs when a potentially 
exemplary performance transcends the bounds of prudence and practicability (2). Both 
the narrator and Griselda recognize this problem. The Clerk addresses it when, in the 
envoy, he counsels “noble wyves, ful of heigh prudence” to “lat no clerk have cause or 
diligence / To write of yow a storie of swich mervaille / As of Grisildis” (1183-1188). 
This passage occurs within the nine stanzas of framing material (1163-1212g) that 
Chaucer appends to the tale after his translation of the French and Latin sources ends 
(1163; see Benson 883). This added material foregrounds the knot of moral 
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contradictions at the heart of the text and compounds our confusion by adding a layer of 
irony: quasi-veiled, tongue-in-cheek jabs at insubordinate wives.  
Yet in its mention of prudence and its irreverent take on the tale, the envoy 
serves as a useful starting point for discerning the text’s arguments. Behind the Clerk’s 
humor, there lies a sincere critique of standards for wifely obedience, forming what 
Richard Neuse aptly calls a “humorous but nonetheless serious ‘recantation’” of the 
inherited tale (222). In combination with the tale’s more troubling moments, the 
envoy’s stress on Griselda’s exceptionality implies that most living wives should—
unlike the heroine—exploit the value of prudence for the protection of themselves and 
their children.71 The word “mervaille” also reminds us of Griselda’s extreme 
particularity and precludes us from reading the tale as a straightforward prescription to 
imitate her. Perhaps most significantly, the Clerk warns that Griselda’s wifely 
forbearance is “inportable” and that her Christian exemplarity, according to Petrarch, 
lies more in her general capacity for patience than in the particular acts that manifest her 
patience (1142-1144).72 Yet his closing comments invite readers to think critically and 
                                                            
71 By calling to mind the “heigh prudence” of “noble wyves” in a jocular fashion,  
the Clerk undermines a tradition of representing wifehood in a flattering light: today’s 
wives, he suggests, don’t have it in them to behave as Griselda did. However—he also 
suggests—they shouldn’t be expected to. The joke of the envoy is that wives can be 
insubordinate, even a pain in the neck, but good for them; so be it, when the alternative 
model of wifehood (Griselda’s) is so extreme. This celebration of wifely 
insubordination reflects sincere pleasure in the idea of women’s resistance and sincere 
resentment over the patriarchal understanding of marriage that allows for abusive 
behavior like Walter’s. It also provides comic relief from the marital dynamic the tale 
depicts; the tone should not be misread as sarcastic or acerbic. 
 
72  Benson defines “inportable” as “intolerable” (152). For the Clerk, Griselda is  
only an exemplar insofar as “every wight”—every Christian—should imitate her 
patience and humility in the face of adversity (1145). The Clerk emphatically objects to 
a reading of Griselda’s exemplarity as a model for wifely obedience (1142-1169). One 
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creatively beyond Petrarch’s interpretation of Griselda’s “virtuous suffraunce.”73 The 
envoy also suggests that the wives of cruel husbands may in fact be an exception to 
Petrarch’s exhortation that “every wight” adopt Griselda’s patience in the face of 
adversity (1162, 1142).74 Ultimately, the envoy implies, Griselda should be a negative 
exemplar for married women; her self-sacrifice is a useful strategy in Saluzzo’s political 
circumstance, but readers should take from her a lesson on how not to interpret their 
marriage vows. The one, improbable exception would be a reader/wife-counselor who 
finds herself in exactly the same political/domestic circumstance as Griselda. 
Like the Clerk, the marchioness herself is aware of her own performance’s 
inimitability—and perhaps even of its inadvisability in marriage. In an illuminating 
moment, she speaks about issues of imitability, obedience, and wifehood in a clearer, 
more decisive register than the Clerk uses in his envoy. Just before Walter’s ostensible 
                                                                                                                                                                              
of his reasons, he claims, is that contemporary women are morally weaker than Griselda 
was (“The gold of hem hath now so bade alayes / With bras, that thogh the coyne be 
fair at ye, / It wolde rather breste a-two than plye” [1163-1169]), but this comment’s air 
of misogynistic nostalgia seems tongue-in-cheek when paired with the merrily glib 
opening line of the envoy (“Griselde is deed, and eek hire pacience” (1176). 
Furthermore, the Clerk’s words of praise for women’s patience at the end of Part Five 
undercut the surface meaning of disparaging comments about women elsewhere in the 
tale and envoy and are far more sincere by comparison (932-938).  
 
73 The mention of “heigh stile” here further distinguishes the Clerk’s retelling of  
the story from Petrarch’s, insofar as it recalls two less-than-flattering mentions of 
“heigh stile” in the Prologue: first, when the host demands that the Clerk offer a tale in 
“pleyn” speech rather than “heigh stile” (16-20), and second, when the Clerk mentions 
that his source features “A prohemye” in “heigh stile” that strikes him as “a thyng 
impertinent” (translated by Benson as “irrelevant”) (39-43, 53-55). 
 
74 The Clerk further qualifies or distances himself from Petrarch’s reading by  
scrupulously attributing it to his source (“therefore Petrak writeth / This storie, which 
with heigh stile he enditeth” [1147-1148]), burying it under the nine stanzas of framing 
material and, as I have already discussed, taking pains elsewhere to undercut whatever 




second wedding, Griselda implies that a second wife would either perish under or rebel 
against the marquis’ harsh treatment:  
 O thyng biseke I yow, and warne also,  
 That ye ne prikke with no tormentynge  
This tender mayden, as ye han doon mo;  
For she is fostred in hire norissynge  
Moore tenderly, and, to my supposynge,  
She koude nat adversitee endure 
As koude a povre fostred creature. (1037-1043) 
Here, Griselda counsels both Walter and us not to read her devotion as an imitable 
standard for wifely obedience. The passage is a clear-cut example of advocacy—
explicit counsel to another party on behalf of a third party’s best interest—and a 
relatively rare instance in which Griselda chooses a rhetorical strategy as prudent as the 
mission behind it. (This section of Part Six explicitly describes Griselda as having 
“prudence” again [1022].) As at the end of Part Two, which depicts Griselda mediating 
public disputes, her language here reflects the deliberation and measured rhetoric that is 
characteristic of more traditional counsel. In the manner of a skilled diplomat, she 
conveys a severe admonition about Walter’s cruelty in the language and tone of 
someone rendering an intellectual service. The veneer of subservience is wrought from 
sincere respect and love—her devotion is a strategy of packaging rather than a 
disguise—but the spirit of the counsel lies in its offer of an ominous warning, gentler 
than but similar in tone to the Clerk’s critiques of Walter in Part One.  
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As compared to Griselda’s professions of assent, this example of her counsel is 
craftier in terms of language and politics, yet also more overt in its rhetorical purpose as 
counsel. Rather than harnessing the raw, overt language of devotion in the service of a 
covert mission to change Walter over time, Griselda now relies on more traditionally 
tactful and measured verbal rhetoric in an overt mission to influence the marquis’ 
behavior in a discrete situation.75 Recalling the rhetorical signposting characteristic of 
more traditional counselors like Dame Prudence and Boece’s Lady Philosophy, Griselda 
prefaces her advice by specifying the hybrid register in which Walter should receive it: 
not only as a plea (“biseke I yow”) but also as an admonition (“and warne also”). In 
using the word “warne” without elaborating the ultimate dangers she is warning of—the 
                                                            
75 Yet, for all its sincerity, the language of Griselda’s professions of devotion is not  
without a few subtleties, modest coups, and even ironies of its own. Her addresses to 
Walter are simply too long to be free of any rhetorical complications, and the tensions 
we find in these passages reflect a cognitive astuteness befitting of a counselor. There is 
at least one example of irony in Griselda’s dialogue that is sufficiently glaring to 
consider intentional and that suggests the intellectual complexity of her devotion. After 
agreeing to let her second child be slain, Griselda concludes at the top of a new stanza 
(addressing Walter): “Deth may noght make no comparisoun / Unto youre love” (666-
667). In context—if we ignore certain prosodic cues—this quotation simply reiterates  
Griselda’s claim in the previous stanza that she would die for her husband if such were 
his will (“For wiste I that my deeth wolde do yow ese, / Right gladly wolde I dyen, yow 
to plese” [664-665]). But her conclusion that death cannot compare to Walter’s love can 
have a second meaning: that Walter’s “love”—his side of the nominal marriage bond—
is more destructive to her than death would be; his attentions to Griselda far surpass the 
ultimate form of destruction. This second meaning is reinforced by the rhymes’ 
indication of a stanza break before the start of the sentence, as well as by a dramatic 
moment of metrical irregularity at the beginning of the line (the pregnant absence of an 
unstressed syllable before “Deth”). It may be especially obvious if the reader is attuned 
to a certain pitch-dark comedy in Walter’s egregious lies and morbidity. From this 
angle, Griselda’s words reflect a new readiness to die that contrasts with her earlier, 
more reluctant comment about love and death (“I nyl yow disobeye, / For to be deed, 
though me were looth to deye” [363-364; emphasis mine]). The subtle shift in her affect 
acknowledges the destructive potential of Walter’s actions in a non-confrontational 
way, and the artfulness with which two clear, contrasting, yet sincere meanings are 




public and private risks Walter would take were he to destroy his second wife—
Griselda is, in part, being tactful: she honors Walter’s authority, as well as the occasion 
of his second wedding, by minimizing discussion of doom and cruelty. But she is also 
being highly suggestive. Her concision prompts us to imagine any number of disastrous 
consequences that could result from Walter’s abuse of a second wife, not only for the 
woman’s well-being but also for the state of Walter’s soul, as well as for his political 
reputation and thus for the fate of the polity. The inextricability of Walter’s marital life 
from his performance as a ruler, as established at the beginning of the tale, makes it 
easy to imagine both private and public consequences. Griselda's language also 
implicates Walter in directly harming his people; her use of the plural “mo” in phrase 
“as ye han doon mo” is an ever so brief yet striking reminder that the marquis is guilty 
of “tormentynge” not only his first wife but also his subjects. Although Griselda's 
ability to endure “adversitee” distinguishes her from other subjects, she shares in the 
polity's collective experience of Walter's torments.  
The example of Griselda’s counsel, in its relative conventionality or 
explicitness, recalls the spokesman’s monologue at the beginning of the tale and thus 
invites a comparison between the two speakers as counselors. In keeping with Walter’s 
dissolution of their marital intimacy, Griselda has prudently shifted to a more restrained 
manner of address. Doing away with affective professions, which would now be 
inappropriate, and with documentary observations, which she no longer has the access 
to make, Griselda adopts a rather distanced register of rational speculation (“to my 
supposynge”). Like Saluzzo’s spokesman, Griselda is addressing Walter in her capacity 
as one of his subjects, worried about the dangers of a particular eventuality. Both the 
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spokesman and Griselda, in these bookending moments of the tale, cautiously express 
concern over Walter’s perilous contempt for marriage. But despite thematic similarities 
with the spokesman’s counsel, Griselda’s argument for Walter to treat his new wife 
kindly seems, in retrospect, wiser, bolder, more informed, more philosophical, and even 
more artful by comparison. Well-intentioned as it was, the spokesman’s counsel 
regarding Walter’s first marriage now appears reckless or irreligious in light of the 
hasty and abusive union it gave rise to. It also reflects a timid, dissembling quality that, 
though quite understandable given political circumstances, underscores the dignity and 
substance of Griselda’s tactful but more incisive counsel regarding Walter’s impending 
second marriage.76 Whereas the spokesman’s counsel results in a marriage that is in 
some ways disastrous, Griselda’s corresponding act of counsel results in Walter 
abandoning plans for an even more grotesque union, as well as in his repairing the first 
one.77 Despite its brevity, Griselda’s final act of counsel reflects an unassailable 
foundation of experiential moral wisdom that renders it more effective than the 
spokesman’s somewhat cynical promotion of marriage as a means to continue Walter’s 
                                                            
76 In addition to the ambiguities discussed much earlier in the chapter, there is also  
the suggestion of insincerity in the spokesman’s explanation for why he was chosen to 
address Walter: “for as muche as ye, my lord so deere, / Han alwey shewed me favour 
and grace / I dar the bettre aske of yow a space” (99-105). This explanation is flattering 
to Walter in that it depicts the marquis as gracious; it also establishes a special (if 
temporary) good will between him and the spokesman. But earlier the Clerk offers a 
few different explanations for the spokesman’s election: “oon of hem, that wisest was 
of loore— / Or ells that the lord best wolde assente / That he sholde tell hym what his 
peple mente, / Or ells koude he shew wel swich matere” (87-91). According to the last 
of these explanations, the spokesman may have been chosen because of his rhetorical 
abilities alone.  
 
77 Taking Griselda’s father into the household, settling son and daughter into  
untroubled marriages, and sustaining his own marriage for “Ful many a yeer in heigh 




line and straighten out his attitude. Like The Tale of Melibee, The Clerk’s Tale thus 
draws a clear and formally prominent contrast between corresponding examples of 
masculine and wifely counsel that is far more flattering to the latter tradition and points 
to Griselda’s exemplarity as a political agent.  
I have explained why the passage quoted above is an important example of 
wifely counsel and how it reflects a strategy that is, for Griselda, characteristically 
prudent in its mission and rather uncharacteristically prudent in the form it takes. But 
the raw content of the passage is also significant for clarifying what impact Griselda's 
performance should have: in the passage, Griselda articulates a highly accurate self-
assessment of her own role in the narrative. She is speaking unapologetically as an 
advisor who does not often lead by example. The “inportable” humility Griselda 
practices is a rhetorical strategy tailored to a particular sociopolitical circumstance and 
should not be expected of all women who have had the misfortune of marrying a 
tormentor (1143-1144). It thus follows from Griselda’s warning and plea (“O thyng 
biseke I yow […]”) that one should not fault other wives who “koude nat adversitee 
endure” in the same circumstance. In effect, this deliberately vague phrase, which 
refuses to specify in what events or actions a second wife’s lack of endurance might 
manifest itself, apologizes for a vast spectrum of wifely responses to male domination, 
in such a way that might condition our reading of other wives in the Tales. Whether 
Walter’s second wife crumbles and dies as a result of Walter’s mistreatment, or whether 
she rises to his aggression by morphing into another Wife of Bath, Griselda’s sympathy, 
it is suggested, extends to all, even though her example is not to be followed in the 
home.   
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As the above passage most clearly suggests, exemplarity and prudence operate 
differently on various levels in The Clerk’s Tale. Although the critical tradition has 
focused on the issue of Griselda’s problematic exemplarity and lack of conventional 
prudence as a wife and mother, her political exemplarity for Walter, and for embattled 
political agents among her readers, may be more fruitful matters to consider. The tale’s 
defining narrative event is a political leader’s ethical transformation as occasioned by 
Griselda’s performance; thus rulers and their counselors stand to gain considerably from 
the tale’s instructive dimension. If we read Chaucer’s heroine as an exemplar, we must 
read her as multiple exemplars in one: inside the world of the tale, she counsels Walter 
by exemplifying self-sacrifice and commitment; beyond the world of the tale, she 
exemplifies these same qualities for political leaders like Walter, as well as for 
particularly embattled counselors like herself, whose circumstances have rendered 
conventionally prudent counsel ineffective. Of course, she remains Petrarch’s exemplar 
of patience for Christians experiencing severe crisis (1145-1148). But by way of 
exception, according to the Clerk’s envoy, she is a negative exemplar for wives of cruel 
husbands, whether among the inscribed audience of pilgrims or the living audience of 
readers (1142-1143).  
The slowness with which Griselda’s counsel converts Walter does not 
compromise its political exemplarity for counselors under duress or for rulers in 
general. The contention that beleaguered counselors should practice Griselda’s 
uncompromising openness, devotion to institutional authority, and commitment to 
contract may be unsatisfying to some readers; the tale is indeed reformist rather than 
radical in posing gradual and legally spotless strategies for political change. But the 
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implication that leaders (real-life Walters) should imitate Griselda’s extreme devotion 
and self-sacrifice is obviously a radical idea, as is the critique of misogyny and 
misogamy that is implicit in the Clerk’s depiction of Griselda’s trials. If all leaders 
practiced a devotion to the public good that resembled the devotion required of wives, 
counselors could make their points using frankness and simple advocacy; there would 
be no need for them to abandon prudence in extreme displays of self-sacrifice. In the 
end, Chaucer’s Griselda story invites us to consider the prospect of demanding 




“Crabbed eloquence” in the Clerk’s envoy 
 
At the end of his tale, the Clerk dedicates an envoy not to his main character, the 
patient and discreet Griselda, but to his fellow narrator Alison of Bath and “al hire 
secte:”  
 For which heere, for the Wyves love of Bathe— 
  Whos lyf and al hire secte God mayntene 
  In heigh maistrie, and ells were it scathe— 
  I wol with lusty herte, fresh and grene,  
  Seyn yow a song to glade yow, I wene; 
And lat us stynte of ernestful matere. (1170-1175)  
This explicit dedication to Alison is followed by a six-stanza envoy that strongly evokes 
 
 101 
ideas developed in The Wife of Bath’s Prologue and Tale and invites readers to imagine 
the possibility that Alison's combative behavior in marriage has positive exemplary 
value (1203, 1177-1212). The Clerk’s call for wives to use an arsenal of strategies—
from “crabbed eloquence” to “jalousie” to affectation (“Be ay of chiere as light as leef 
on lynde”)—as weapons in the struggle for spousal sovereignty resonates with Alison's 
penchant for various tools of verbal argument and emotional game-playing in marriage 
(ClT 1203, 1205, 1211).78 More specifically, his images of combat and of 
insurrectionary speech—“The arwes of thy crabbed eloquence / Shal perce his brest and 
eek his aventaille”—recall Alison's “Marcien” heritage and the close relationship 
between physical and verbal abuse in her prologue, as when she recalls telling her 
husband that she wished for his “welked nekke be tobroke!” (ClT 1203-1205, 1192; 
WBP 276-277, 609-613).79 Like Alison's prologue, the Clerk's envoy depicts marriage 
as a competition in which wives must struggle fiercely to get “the bettre in each degree, 
/ By sleighte, or force, or by some maner thyng, / As by continueel murmur or 
gruchhyng” (WBP 404-406).  
 In the wake of The Clerk's Tale, the envoy's clear echoes of The Wife of Bath's 
Prologue call on us to understand Alison's model of wifehood in contradistinction to 
that of the steadfast Griselda, “the flour of wyfly pacience, / That neither by hire wordes 
                                                            
78 For an example of her expert facility with the kinds of techniques the Clerk  
advocates, see WBP 395-402, when Alison recalls her “myrthe” in pretending to be 
jealous of her elderly husband’s supposed affairs with other “wenches”—a performance 
that involved flattering him (“tikled I his herte”) as well as manipulating him with the 
“Deceite, wepyng, [and] spynnyng God hath yive / To wommen kyndely.”  
 





ne hire face, / Biforn the folk, ne eek in hire absence, / Ne shewed she that hire was 
doon offence” (ClT 919-922). Even without a cue from the envoy, it is easy to see the 
conceptual distinction between Alison and Griselda as wives: rather than suffer her 
husbands’ demands with the patience of Job or Griselda, Alison puts the onus on her 
husbands to “been al pacient and meke, / And han a sweete spiced conscience, / Sith 
[they] so preche of Jobes pacience” (WBP 343-436). Her declaration that “I have the 
power durynge al my lyf / Upon [my husband’s] proper body, and noght he” is all but 
diametically opposed to Griselda’s pledge: “I have […] seyd thus, and evere shal,” she 
tells Walter, “I wol no thyng, ne nyl no thyng, certain, / But as yow list” (WBP 157-158; 
ClerkT 645-647). If Griselda understands marriage as a surrender of her will and as a 
threshold of radical stasis, Alison sees marriage as a female-dominated power struggle, 
an opportunity for wives to grapple, gain, and grow.  
In underscoring this distinction, the Clerk leaves us to puzzle out why he would 
suggest Alison’s pugnacious model of wifehood as a desirable alternative to Griselda’s 
devotion and patience. The Wife of Bath is obviously not an exemplar of the morally 
unassailable variety, and the envoy's comic, un-“ernestful” tone precludes us from 
reading its exhortations to “archewyves” as entirely literal (1175, 1192). Even if we 
bracket the Clerk's irony, treating his envoy, implausibly, as a literal prescription for all 
wives to emulate Alison's aggression, her prologue does not elicit our approval of all the 
particular sins and foibles she admits to. The Wife of Bath's transgressions emerge in a 
comical, sometimes even endearing, but rarely entirely flattering light. We might, for 
example, enjoy the lies she recalls telling, as when she recounts a monologue of over 
130 lines that she used to accuse her husbands of having “seyden in hir dronkenesse” 
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(WBP 246-378).80 After Alison finishes the monologue and admits to having Jankyn and 
her niece corroborate its malicious accusations, her swift, unrepentant confession that 
“al was false” is both intriguing—to what end, exactly, was her lying so elaborate?—
and, in terms of comic timing, hilarious (WBP 380-383). But the humor in such 
passages, however it may endear readers to Alison’s mischief, does not invite us to 
condone her dishonesty or other offenses, and we cannot ignore the examples of her 
wrongdoing when we consider her potential as some kind of model for wives.   
 And yet, after the trauma of The Clerk’s Tale, there is something more desirable 
than dystopian about the envoy's fantasia of wives gone wild. Signs of the Clerk’s 
sympathy for married women throughout the tale invite us to reconsider Alison and her 
sect with an open mind.81 The Clerk's plea that wives do their husbands “no reverence” 
both evokes and recontextualizes Alison’s trademark irreverence in The Wife of Bath’s 
Prologue: readers who once found her lapses in honesty and wifely devotion to be 
egregious must now reconsider them in light of Walter’s more severe acts of dishonesty 
and cruelty.   
 The Clerk hints at the social value of voluble, combative wives like Alison by 
suggesting that his depiction of Walter the marquis has contemporary relevance. Unlike 
Griselda and her patience, “bothe atones buryed in Ytaille,” Walter and his cruelty, to 
                                                            
80 Alison’s dishonesty with her husbands often takes the form of false accusations: 
“They were ful glade to excuse hem blyve / Of thyng of which they nevere agilte hir 
lyv. / Of wenches wolde I beren hem on honed, / Whan that for syk unnethes myghte 
they stonde” (WBP 391-394).  
 
81 See my previous chapter, as well as Neuse, Chaucer’s Dante (Berkeley:  




the Clerk’s mind, can transcend the boundaries of time and geography. “Grisilde is 
deed,” perhaps, but the Clerk’s “crie” that “No wedded man so hardy be t’assaille / His 
wyves pacience in trust to fynde / Grisildis” implies that Walter, or the kind of authority 
he represents, is dangerously alive (1177-1182). The ostensible “death” of Griseldian 
patience as a cultural practice may bode well for most married women, but the Clerk’s 
envoy suggests that some wives could still use a rousing nudge in the direction of 
resistance. By raising our awareness that “Walter” remains a threat in the realm of lived 
experience, the Clerk invites us to consider Alison's attitude of defiance—that is not to 
say all of her particular sins—as a strategy for staving off abuses of patriarchal power. 
 The raucous presence of Alison's sect in the Clerk's envoy also serves to 
redresses a poetic injustice inherent in the end of the Griselda story. In many ways, The 
Clerk's Tale conforms to the standard ending for Chaucer's tales of good wifely counsel: 
Walter becomes more humane and accountable; he acknowledges the virtue of 
Griselda's performance; the marriage shifts to a happily-ever-after mode; the couple's 
son even turns out to be a kind husband, indicating that Walter's transformation has set a 
precedent for future generations of men (ClT 1051-1057, 1128-1129, 1135-1138). But a 
comparative study reveals that Walter escapes a fate commonly reserved for willful 
husbands in Chaucer's tales of wifely counsel. Whereas the once-bellicose Melibee, the 
once-fatuous Jankyn in Alison's prologue, and the rapist in Alison's tale all end up 
conceding some form of permanent authority over to their wives, the marquis in The 
Clerk's Tale never explicitly “enclyne[s] to the wil of his wif,” surrenders to her “wise 
governance,” or tells her to “Do as thee lust the terme of al thy lyf” (Mel 1870-1871, 
WBT 1230-1235, WBP 820). Rather than revise Petrarch's ending, wherein the marquis 
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maintains his authoritative status, the Clerk spotlights the injustice of Walter's easy fate, 
by reminding us how the marquis “putte [...] his wyf in greet assay” (ClT 1138). He also 
redresses this injustice by generating carnivalesque images of female power and male 
subordination in his envoy, allowing us to envision the Walters of the world as they 
“couche as doth a quaille” (1206), receiving their comeuppance from all manner of 
wives: “archewyves,” “sklendre wyves” and, in a lovely echo of Alison’s “loathly lady” 
tale, “fair” wives and “foul” wives (1195-1199, 1207-1210). The sense of poetic justice 
that results from Alison's presence in the envoy thus invites us to (re-)read her “crabbed 
eloquence” as yet another important rhetorical strategy for contending with patriarchal 
power.  
The Clerk’s Tale and envoy also serve to remind us that transformative events in 
individual marriages can have consequences of a more global nature. When the Clerk 
advises married women the world over to eschew Griselda’s example, he espouses the 
same end for which Griselda herself dispenses counsel: “For commune profit sith it may 
availle” (1193-1194; emphasis mine; see ClT 431).82 His universalizing appeal to a 
diversity of “noble wyves, ful of heigh prudence” (1183), invites us to consider the 
Wife of Bath’s sect not just as practitioners of radical behavior in their own homes but 
also as participants in a widespread movement. Thanks in large part to The Clerk’s Tale 
and envoy, we have a strong basis for understanding Alison’s “crabbed eloquence” to 
                                                            
82 Nat oonly this Griseldis thurgh hir wit / Koude al the feet of wyfly hoomlinesse,  
/ But eek, whan that the cas required it, / The commune profit koude she redresse. / Ther 
nas discorde, rancor, ne hevynesse / In al that land that she ne koude apese, / And 




be, like the more idealized forms of wifely counsel I have already explored, socially and 






“Muchel Care and Wo:” 
The Making of a Counselor in The Wife of Bath’s Prologue 
 
The Clerk's Tale and envoy suggest that women are entitled to argue with and 
even berate their husbands in order to stave off the kind of cruelty that Walter of 
Saluzzo represents. For the Clerk, it is better that women be loud and aggressive than 
that they be “bidaffed for [their] innocence” (ClT 1191).83 This perspective invites us to 
consider the Wife of Bath's irreverent, combative rhetoric for its social and political 
value. But what are the intellectual merits of Alison's speech and rhetorical style? Is her 
wifely “crabbed eloquence” merely a necessary tool for keeping husbands in line, or 
does it serve the constructive, pedagogical purpose of counsel?  
Whatever Alison's store of rhetorical, intellectual, and ethical gifts, she seems 
lacking in certain strengths that Griselda and Dame Prudence exemplify as wife-
counselors: consistent and scrupulous honesty, highly measured and organized speech, a 
disarming attitude of service, a capacity for affective restraint, a commitment to peace, 
and an appreciation for prudence. In her prologue, Alison not only fails to enact most of 
these values but quite joyfully embraces their opposites. With typical relish, she baldly 
admits to following her “appetit” rather than using “discrecioun,”84 a term that Benson 
                                                            
83 Benson glosses “bidaffed:” “fooled, cowed, deafened (?)” (153). This instance is  
the only one listed in the MED, which defines the term as “Outwitted; ?cowed.”  
 
84 Alison is referring to her behavior in situations involving love (WBP 609-626). 
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glosses, significantly enough, as “moderation” or “prudence” (WBP 622-623, Benson 
113). The language of her prologue—like, one imagines, the language of her gossip 
“From hous to hous”—eschews decorum and meticulous logic in favor of swagger and 
hyperbole (640).85 And unlike Griselda, who commands wonder with her “rype words,” 
or Prudence, who exhibits an unwavering command of formal rhetoric, Alison is by her 
own estimation “a verray jangleresse” and identifies more readily as a gossip than as a 
counselor (ClT 435-441; WBP 112-113, 524-542, 638).  
 In her reading of The Wife of Bath's Prologue, Elaine M. Treharne sums up 
Alison's ostensible lapses in rhetorical discipline. Treharne's analysis of Alison's 
language shows why it is easy to discount the Wife of Bath's potential as counselor, 
especially if we as readers are susceptible to the institutional prejudices that Alison's 
prologue critiques:  
 [C]onfirming the stereotype of the verbose woman are the 
speeches within the speech by which the Wife recalls her 
own words to her husbands, condemning the successive 
husbands’ anti-feminist commonplaces, while 
simultaneously confirming them. The myths of women’s 
inability to maintain privacy, their tendency to gossip, 
and to speak of ‘trivial’ matters—such as love and 
relationships—are shown to be part of the operative mode 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
85 Elaine M. Treharne also discusses hyperbole in Alison’s speech (“The  
Stereotype Confirmed?,” Writing Gender and Genre in Medieval Literature 
[Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2002], 106-109).  
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of the Wife. (103) 
The “anti-feminist commonplaces” and thematic focus on eros that Treharne observes 
in the prologue certainly set the Wife of Bath's rhetoric apart from that of the idealized 
wife-counselors I have studied. But Treharne's reading reveals the danger of projecting 
our own prejudices onto Alison's performances and attributing these prejudices to the 
poet. The topics of “love and relationships” are of tremendous moral and intellectual 
import to Chaucer in the Tales; it is Treharne herself who buys into the myth of their 
triviality. Rather than devalue her rhetoric, Alison's engagement with these topics 
connects her to “a number of ancient and medieval currents of thought in which, by the 
late Middle Ages, questions of sexuality and questions of agency and autonomy had 
come to intersect” (Miller 3).86 Likewise, it is Treharne who judges the stereotypically 
female characteristics of Alison’s language as rendering it “perceptibly inferior,” “less 
authoritative, more subjective and less effective than it might otherwise have been” 
(113, 110). In her study of medieval gossip, Susan E. Phillips acknowledges the 
stereotypical features of Alison's speech—levity, gossip, verbosity—but links these 
tropes to “both theory and […] practice of pastoral instruction” and notes their 
“centrality to Chaucer's poetic practice.” In revealing how Chaucer exploits “gossip's 
utility as a rhetorical technique,” its capacity for “discursive approriations,” and “its 
                                                            
 
86  Miller lists these “currents of thought” as “the tradition of Christian thinking  
about morality and sociality that Peter Brown has so brilliant traced from Paul to 
Augustine, a tradition that turned time and again to the conceptual and metaphorical 
links between problems of sexuality and problems of autonomy; […] an Augustinian 
and Boethian tradition of thinking about desire and its frustrations, an Aristotelian 
tradition in philosophical psychology, and an analysis of utopian intimacy developed in 




myriad narrative possibilities,” Phillips' analysis suggests that Alison's speech contains 
some of the most complex, sophisticated, and groundbreaking rhetoric in the Tales 
(106, 11).  
 We can read Alison as a counselor not only because her speech is intellectually 
sophisticated, as Phillips demonstrates, and politically meaningful, as the Clerk 
suggests, but also because it is ethically transformative. The Wife of Bath forces her 
husbands to question the sources of their knowledge and their assumptions about 
women; successfully protests against her fifth husband's “book of wikked wyves,” a 
cause of “wo” and “pyn” in their marriage; and counsels him (her fifth husband, 
Jankyn) to give her “al the bridel in [her] hond, / [and…] the governance of hous and 
lond, / And of his tonge, and of his hond also” (685, 813-815). As I will argue, Chaucer 
depicts Jankyn's transformation as an ethical triumph, insofar as it engenders household 
peace and mutual kindness and honesty among spouses (811-828).87  
 Like the other wife-counselors I have so far discussed, the Wife of Bath is not 
only a counselor to her husbands but also to individuals and groups beyond her 
household. Both she and her fellow pilgrims to Canterbury treat her prologue as a 
didactic performance. Even though the Wife of Bath offers an unorthodox intellectual 
perspective and exhibits a complex and uneasy relationship to institutional authorities, 
her experience allows her to fulfill an authoritative role among the pilgrims. 
“Experience” may be “noon auctoritee / […] in this world,”  but it is immensely 
valuable in the “liminal” context of pilgrimage, “a religious rite” wherein members of 
                                                            




“a new and wider communitas” can, at least partly, set aside traditional epistemologies 
to make room for more practical, raw, and unconventional kinds of wisdom (WBP 1; 
Duffy 164-165). Eager to learn whether or why he should sell his “flessh” to a woman 
in marriage, the Pardoner playfully but aptly dubs Alison “a noble prechour in this cas” 
and calls on her to share her experience: “Telle forth youre tale, spareth no man,” he 
says, “And teche us yonge men of youre praktike” (163-187). The Pardoner explains 
that he “was aboute to wedde a wyf” but is still unmarried, implying his interest in the 
Wife of Bath's first-hand experiential knowledge of marriage. Alison affirms her 
“expert” status, promises to educate the Pardoner on “tribulacion in mariage,” and 
quotes Ptolemy’s Almageste to remind her listeners that “Whoso that nyl be war by 
othere men, / By hym shul othere men corrected be.”88 The Wife of Bath understands 
her marriages to have been a form of “scoleiyng,” herself to be a clerk, and her 
pilgrimage to be a platform for transmitting what she has learned (44a-44f).  
In this chapter, I aim to elaborate the Wife of Bath's “practike” as a counselor. 
Section One explains the ethical value of Alison's irreverence and epistemological 
skepticism in counseling her husbands and fellow pilgrims. Section Two examines the 
ethical complexity of Alison’s gossip, which her prologue invites us to consider in 
relation to advice-counsel. Last, Section Three explores the transformative effects of 
                                                            
88 As I will later discuss, Alison concedes that she dislikes being corrected (“Ne I  
wolde nat of hym corrected be. / I hate hym that my vices telleth me” [661-662]), but in 
this case she is responding to an example of unquestionably faulty counsel (654-660) 
and therefore exercising intellectual discernment by rejecting her husband’s “olde 
sawe” (660). By acknowledging her resistance to correction, she is also owning up to 
her imperfections (both to her resistance itself and to the vices that stand in need of 
correction) and betraying a familiarity with human behavior (“And so doo mo, God 
woot, of us than I” [663]) that also characterizes the counsel of more consistently 
virtuous women, such as Griselda, Dame Prudence, and Lady Philosophy. 
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Alison’s counsel, not only on her husbands but also on herself, and explains how she 
achieves a hard-won condition of marital harmony at the end of her prologue (811-827). 
In sum, I hope to show that Alison's infamous ethical and rhetorical lapses are what 
make her performance of wifely counsel Chaucer's strongest argument for the efficacy 
of women's wisdom. The Wife of Bath's Prologue demonstrates that even a self-
professed “jangleresse,” book-burner, and liar can foster ethical and intellectual growth 
in other people through an aggressive, unorthodox, yet distinctly “wifely” brand of 
counsel (380-383, 816). 
 
 
I. Irreverent counsel:  
Source critique and self-critique 
 
The Wife of Bath's unique rhetorical style is characterized first and foremost by 
a tone of irreverence, both towards her sources and towards herself. Her refusal to take 
institutions and authorities too seriously coincides with a lack of self-seriousness that is 
both refreshing and ethically valuable. One the most conventional yet skillful examples 
of Alison’s counsel establishes the rejection of vanity as one of her defining values. 
Addressing the pilgrims, the Wife of Bath  recollects her life with husband number four, 
“a revelour” (453):  
How koude I daunce to an harpe smale 
And synge, ywis, as any nyghtyngale, 
Whan I had dronke a draughte of sweete wyn!  
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. . . . . .  
Whan that it remembreth me 
  Upon my yowthe, and on my jolitee, 
  It tikleth me aboute myn herte roote.  
  Unto this day it dooth myn herte boote 
  That I have had my world as in my tyme.  
But age, allas, that al wole envenyme, 
Hath me biraft my beautee and my pith.  
Lat go. Farwel! The devel go therwith!  
The flour is goon; ther is namoore to telle;  
The bren, as I best kan, now moste I sell;  
But yet to be right myrie wol I fonde. (452-480) 
 
In this passage, Alison’s joyful memory of her revels gives way to a morally astute and 
theologically valid lesson about the inevitability of decline and the necessity to embrace 
it with a “myrie” attitude. In a subtle way, the passage’s formal structure enacts the 
classic, one-two technique by which a counselor first establishes credibility and then 
moves on to dispense counsel:89 first, Alison reminds us of her “Experience”—the 
foremost of her credentials, established as early as line 1—by hinting at her relatively 
advanced age and showing off the vividness of her memory. Then she moves on to 
teach a lesson, both explicitly and by example, about how to age gracefully. On an 
                                                            
89 See my Chapter One on Dame Prudence’s performance of counsel, which takes  




explicit level, the passage uses imperative language (“Lat go. Farwel! The devel go 
therwith!”) to advise against vanity and acedia as one ages; in a more exemplary mode, 
it demonstrates a correct attitude, a way of maintaining one’s self-respect, energy, and 
faith after youth and beauty have disappeared. We learn from Alison’s model how to 
transmute the worldliness of youth into the vital contentment of untroubled age, a 
process that requires abandoning vanity and self-importance.90  
This passage prefigures the thematic importance of physical appearance and 
women’s aging in The Wife of Bath’s Tale, in which an implicit critique of standards for 
feminine beauty coincides with the loathly lady’s theologically unassailable counsel 
against another form of vanity: economic prejudice (“He nys nat gentil, be he duc or erl, 
/ For vileyns sinful dedes make a cherl” [1157-1158, 1106-1206]). That the latter 
argument resonates perfectly with the ethics of The Clerk’s Tale (“But hye God 
sometime senden kan / His grace into a litel oxes stalle” [206-207]) not only enhances 
the ethical credibility of Alison and her loathly lady but also elevates the parallel 
argument against privileging physical attractiveness in women. Reconsidered in light of 
the The Wife of Bath’s Tale, Alison’s rejection of vanitas in her prologue takes on 
greater thematic and ethical significance and emerges as one of her most accomplished 
performances of counsel.   
The Wife of Bath's eschewal of vanitas is rooted in her resistance to acedia or 
                                                            
90 As Sue Niebrzydowski points out, Alison is interested in what might be  
considered vain pursuits—namely, fashion, material wealth, and worldly 
entertainments. But it seems she is able to revel in these pusuits precisely because she is 
willing to “Lat go” of them, send them to “The devel,” and move along on her journey 





grief: Alison rejects vanity precisely by refusing to grieve for her looks, her youth, and 
her late husbands. This resistance creates room in the prologue for her trademark 
“jolitee” (WBP 470, 587-592). Lest we be tempted to judge the mirthful, irreverent style 
of The Wife of Bath's Prologue as a mark of intellectual or moral inferiority, we should 
consider the thematic emphasis in Alison's texts, The Tale of Melibee, and The Parson's 
Tale on resisting different forms of vanity and acedia, the sin that makes people “hevy, 
thoghtful, and wraw” so “that they ne may neither wel do ne wel thynke” (ParsT 677, 
686). According to the Parson's definition, acedia can be paradoxically intellectual and 
anti-intellectual, taking the form of an excessive thoughtfulness that ultimately gets in 
the way of thinking “wel.” Prudence, too, depicts acedia as an enemy of wisdom; one of 
her first acts of counsel in The Tale of Melibee is to argue that “it aperteneth nat to a 
wys man to maken swich a sorwe” (Mel 981). Alison's banishment of her youth and 
former beauty to the devil shows her unwillingness to be too long “anoyed and 
encombred” by her own nostalgic thoughts (ParsT 687). By voicing a rejection of 
vanity and acedia in her own life, she not only counsels her listeners to do the same, but 
also demonstrates her mental and emotional agility and her fitness to be a counselor.  
The Wife of Bath brings a lightness and mental resilience not only to the events 
of her life but also to her dealings with source texts. Rather than elaborate her ideas 
schematically, Alison tends to free-associate, registering brief reactions, critiques, or 
questions about her sources before pushing the sermon forward and finding fruitful new 
tangents (WBP 14-25, 66-70). Although she does venture some memorable extended 
discussions, usually with a theological valence, she avoids the rhetorical signposting 
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and thoroughness that we see in The Tale of Melibee and The Parson's Tale.91  In 
keeping with Alison's worldview, this rhetorical style eschews both vanity and acedia. 
Her refusal to pay “reverence” to the “Honour,” “dignytee,” and “heighnesse” 
traditionally accorded to worldly authorities reflects a lack of intellectual or academic 
vanity; it also allows her to engage with authoritative and often offensive sources 
without getting bogged down in the overly serious or “hevy” habits of mind associated 
with acedia (ParsT 190).  
Alison brings her irreverent mode of textual interpretation both to her marriages 
and to her performance of the prologue. At the beginning of her prologue, in her 
discussion of remarriage, Alison recalls Jesus’ “sharp word” to the Samaritan woman—
“Thou has yhad fyve housbondes, […] / And that ilke man that now hath thee / Is noght 
thyn housbonde”—and admits she does not know what the passage means: “What that 
he mente therby, I kan nat seyn.” Rather than give up on the passage, Alison asks 
questions about it—“I axe, why that the fifthe man / Was noon housbonde to the 
Samaritan? / How manye myghte she have in mariage?”—and, in search of answers, 
moves on to another “gentil text” a few lines later (9-25, 27-28). Her response reflects a 
commendable humility, a lack of intellectual vanity, at the same time that it shows her 
unwillingness to fret for too long over cryptic scripture—or over her own five 
marriages.  Likewise, the Wife of Bath's decision to “sette noght an hawe” by her 
husband's antifeminist proverb from Ecclesiastes not only speaks to her laudable 
skepticism towards mortal authors—echoing her irreverence toward Solomon at the 
                                                            
91 These longer theological discussions include Alison's remarks on remarriage and  




beginning of the prologue (35-38)—but also serves as a form of resistance to Jankyn's 
“wood”-ness and to the “wo […] and pyne” that his misogynistic books create in their 
household (650-665, 787).92 Alison often reacts emotionally to her sources—not with 
the “slouthe,” “hevynesse,” “despair,” or “drede” of acedia, but instead with the 
constructive aim of reshaping her marriages, or reshaping our ideas about marriage 
(ParsT 686, 694).   
Alison's irreverence extends from specific sources and authorities to the concept 
of counsel itself. Like The Clerk’s Tale and The Tale of Melibee, The Wife of Bath’s 
Prologue invokes counsel as an issue of some importance fairly early in the text, but 
Alison's discussion of the term is distinctively skeptical. Whereas the Clerk introduces 
the theme by portraying efficacious acts of counsel—by Saluzzo’s spokesman and, soon 
after, by Griselda herself (85-140, 428-441)—and Prudence elaborates at length on the 
value of good counsel, Alison first mentions counsel in such a way that undermines its 
authority and usefulness, reminding her audience that any counsel ought to be 
considered in perspective, understood as suggestive rather than imperative. In her 
critique of the Pauline cult of virginity, Alison remarks, “Men may conseille a woman 
to been [a virgin], / But conseillyng is no comandement” (63-67). Fewer than twenty 
lines later, she reiterates this philosophy: “I woot wel that th’apostel was a mayde; / But 
nathelees, thogh that he wroot and sayde / He wolde that every wight were swich as he / 
                                                            
92 Technically, Alison’s casual attitude towards scriptural counsel also inheres in  
her remarks on scriptural commandments, despite the early distinction she makes 
between these two forms of prescriptive speech. The “proverb of Ecclesiaste” by which 
she “sette[s] noght an hawe” is actually, by her account, a commandment: “That ilke 
proverb of Ecclesiaste / Where he comandeth and forbedeth faste / Man shal nat suffer 




Al nys but conseil to virginitee” (79-82; emphasis mine). Here Alison qualifies the 
prescriptive status of counsel—and of exemplarity, a common strategy of medieval 
counsel—not only by defining “conseil” as less binding than “comandement” but also 
by refusing to let Paul’s theological status alter her stance on the weight that counsel 
ought to carry. In keeping with the irreverence towards authoritative counsel that Alison 
betrays in these passages, her language throughout the prologue, though often self-
consciously prescriptive, does not announce itself as “counsel” proper.93  
It is worth noting that the Clerk, whose tale reflects considerable respect for the 
political and ethical value of counsel, also speaks, or sings, of “counsel” with irony and 
irreverence, in his envoy. When he advises wives to use “crabbed eloquence” and to 
“[clap] as a mille, I yow consaille” (1203, 1200), the Clerk flouts idealized depictions of 
counsel as ethically impeccable; his counsel is mischievous, intended to sow the seeds 
of marital conflict. With supreme irony, he also manages to “consaille” wives against 
providing good counsel, at least in its traditional guise. Yet the tale’s thematic emphasis 
on counsel withstands the Clerk’s ironies: Walter is transformed by the counsel of his 
people, and even more so by the subsequent counsel of his wife. Like The Clerk's Tale, 
The Wife of Bath's Prologue thus acknowledges some epistemological and ethical 
limitations of counsel at the same time that it offers meaningful and compelling 
performances of advice and instruction.  
Nowhere in Alison’s comments on scripture does she fully reject the value of 
counsel. The Wife of Bath demonstrates undeniable interest and skill in counseling even 
                                                            
93 Except where “conseil” means something different—“gossip” or “secret”—as I  




as she disavows an overly reverent attitude toward it. The very comments in which 
Alison would seem to disparage the value of counsel reflect a counselor’s expertise. Her 
remarks on the cult of virginity reflect her mastery of a skill that is crucial to the cycle 
of receiving, assessing, and transmitting wisdom that counsel involves: source critique. 
Dame Prudence’s advice to her husband about weighing the credibility of sources 
demonstrates the importance of source critique to even the most orthodox of counselors. 
For Chaucer, counseling a listener to keep someone else’s counsel in perspective is not 
only wise but standard, as when Prudence advises Melibee to think critically and ask 
probing questions about the counsel he receives:  
[C]onsidere the thynges that acorden to that thou purposest 
for to do by thy conseillours, if resoun accorde therto, / 
and eek if they myght may attaine therto, and if the moore 
part and the bettre part of thy conseillours acorde therto, / 
[…and] what thyng shal folwe of that conseillyng, as hate, 
pees, werre, grace, profit, or damage, and […] of what 
roote is engendred the matiere of thy conseil and what 
fruyt it may conceive and engender. Thou shalt eek 
considere alle thise causes, fro whennes they been 
sprongen. (Mel 1205-1210) 
Prudence's philosophy inheres in the critique of clerkly wisdom that Alison launches 
later in the Prologue: “it is an impossible / That any clerk wol speke good of wyves, / 
But if it be of hooly seintes lyves / […] / Who peyntede the leon, tel me who?” (688-
692). This question speaks to Alison’s sincere interest in the very questions that Dame 
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Prudence advises Melibee to ask in the excerpt quoted above. In her remarks on clerks, 
Alison betrays a keen appreciation for the ways in which the source of a given claim 
can affect the claim’s accuracy and usefulness and astutely implies that the truth value 
of institutional wisdom has been compromised by generations of male bias. She 
underscores her argument with a metaphor (painting the lion) and a rhetorical question, 
“imprint[ing] a lesson in our minds” about the value of source critique (see ClT 1193-
1194: “Emprenteth wel this lessoun in youre mynde, / For commune profit sith it may 
availle”). Thus the Wife of Bath promotes a specific type of critical thinking that Dame 
Prudence herself considers essential to the successful reception and transmission of 
advice. In this regard, Alison seems more interested in the operations of counsel—the 
intellectual processes by which we generate, assimilate, evaluate, and share prescriptive 
wisdom—than in the raw artifacts of wisdom.   
One could even say Alison takes Prudence’s methodology—the principle of 
determining “of what roote [counsels are] engendred […] and from whennes they been 
sprongen”—to a comically literal, yet illuminating, extreme, when she traces the origins 
of institutional wisdom to issues of sex and gender. In a particularly memorable 
passage, the Wife identifies a root cause of clerical misogyny in male sexual frustration: 
“The clerk, whan he is oold, and may noght do / Of Venus werkes worth his olde sho, / 
Thanne sit he doun, and writ in his dotage / That wommen kan nat kepe hir mariage!” 
(707-710). Similarly, she explains the theological concept of paying one’s marriage 
debt not in terms of contractualism or Christian virtue ethics but rather as a custom 
enjoined by sexual biology: the “membres of generacion,” the Wife explains, were 
designed not just for purgation but also “for ese / Of engendrure, ther we nat God 
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displese. / Why sholde men elles in hir books sette / That man shal yelde to his wyf hire 
dette?” (115-130). Although the Wife of Bath’s discussions of sex draw heavily on 
“capitalistic” economic metaphor, revealing what Sheila Delaney calls “the 
psychological effects of economic necessity” on sexual practices (104), Alison also 
locates an origin of the “marriage debt” in biological determinism. By tracing the roots 
of this and other theological conventions and intellectual commonplaces all the way 
back to primal sexual motives and determinants, Alison provides a comic dramatization 
of Prudence’s imperative to locate the root from which a particular claim is 
“engendered.” She is also enacting the role of a gender theorist. 
For all of her notorious antifeminist comments in the prologue and tale, Alison’s 
insistence on locating the formative role of sex and gender in a variety of institutional 
structures—from theology to marital customs to fashion and public life (338-356)—
instructs pilgrims and readers in an alternative critical methodology that allows us to 
critique examples of misogyny in her own texts. We might understand her delivery of 
what Jill Mann calls “the most extensive and unadulterated body of traditional 
antifeminist commonplace in the whole of the Canterbury Tales” as, in part, a 
demonstration of Alison’s irreverent zeal for calling any and all sources of wisdom into 
question, including her sex and herself (57). Her stereotypical depictions of women as 
wanting what they can't have, as “vinolent” and “likerous,” and as untrustworthy 
certainly complicate issues of feminism in her texts, but they also establish the 
indiscriminate or poly-discriminate nature of Alison’s critical approach: women are not 
exempt from the scathing critiques that Alison inflicts on clerks (WBP 205-210, 465-
468; WBT 950). 
 
 122 
In this way, the Wife of Bath’s willingness to invoke antifeminist stereotypes 
lends her a certain kind of integrity as a counselor. It assures us that her take-downs of 
authoritative, masculine sources of counsel and wisdom do not derive from an 
epistemological bias towards her own sex. Whereas Prudence and Griselda establish 
moral credibility, in part, by advocating for other women in clear, persuasive ways (see 
Mel 1070-1111 and ClT 1037-1043), Alison establishes a measure of intellectual 
credibility in her unwillingness to spare her own sex a proper roasting. Unlike that of 
the clerks, for whom women seem to be an exclusive target—at least according to the 
prologue—Alison’s ridicule is nonpartisan. 
Just as Alison reminds us to keep Paul’s counsel and clerks' arguments in 
perspective, her prologue reminds pilgrims and readers to keep her own counsel in 
perspective as well. The text begins with a reminder that the Wife of Bath's counsel (on 
the “wo that is in mariage”) simply is what it is: lessons learned in the course of an 
individual life, valuable in her estimation (“for me”) but not by the worldly standards of 
any “auctoritee” (1-6). That her experiential wisdom has little to no institutional cachet 
beyond the liminal community of pilgrims precludes her from buying into the illusion 
of total certainty that “auctoritee” can provide. Behind Alison's swagger lies an 
intellectual modesty that reads as even more sincere than that of the Clerk, whose 
translation of Petrarch seems self-consciously virtuosic.  
Although Alison is famous for her more raucous behavior—berating her 
husbands, destroying books, playing possum—the combination of her intellectual 
discernment in critiquing sources and her rejection of intellectual vanitas can make for a 
graceful performance of wifely counsel. In one passage, Alison recalls her fifth 
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husband, the “joly clerk Jankyn” (628), confronting her with some particularly fatuous 
counsel. In the passage, she astutely critiques Jankyn’s counsel yet acknowledges her 
own shortcomings, demonstrating a degree of moral self-awareness that more idealized 
wife-counselors do not get the chance to perform:  
Than wolde he seye right thus, withouten doute:  
   ‘Whoso that buyldeth his hous al of salwes,  
And priketh his blynde hors over the falwes,  
And suffreth his wyf to go seken halwes,  
Is worthy to been hanged on the galwes!’  
But al for noght, I sette noght an hawe 
Of his proverbs n’of of his olde sawe,  
Ne I wolde nat of hym corrected be.  
I hate hym that my vices telleth me,  
And so doo mo, God woot, of us than I.  
This made hym with me wood al outrely;  
I nolde noght forbere hym in no cas. (654-665)  
In espousing a ridiculous proverb, Jankyn demonstrates a lack of humility, of ethical 
sophistication, of religious ardor (in disallowing pilgrimages), and of literary taste. His 
would-be counsel comes off as especially fatuous if we read the phrase “withouten 
doute” not just as an idiomatic filler but rather as a literal reference to Jankyn’s 
certainty. His counsel is as flawed as counsel gets: the rhyming couplets and the horse 
that “priketh” anticipate the self-consciously bad poetry of Sir Topas (see ST 754), and 
the hyperbolic misogyny behind suggesting a husband who lets his wife take a religious 
 
 124 
pilgrimage should be put to death seems blasphemous, or in any case unworthy of a 
clerk.  
The husband’s “olde sawe” in this passage belies Treharne’s argument that the 
Wife of Bath texts portray Alison’s speech and rhetoric as consistently “‘deficient’ or 
‘deviant’ in relation to the norms of male language usage” (113). Thanks to a disclaimer 
early in the prologue, we can attribute any rhetorical or ethical sloppiness in Alison’s 
performance to the fact that her “entente nys but for to pleye” (188-192)—a rhetorically 
skillful maneuver of self-deprecation that the Nun’s Priest, too, invokes in his own 
discussion of wifely counsel (“If I conseil of wommen wolde blame, / Passe over, for I 
seyde it in my game” [3261-3262]). But Alison’s husband provides no such disclaimer, 
and his “wood” affect at the end of the passage, as well as his lumping the “olde sawe” 
together with a proverb from Ecclesiastes (650-653), can be read as evidence that he 
takes the “olde sawe” quite seriously.94 Alison’s response, though certainly obstinate, is 
almost humble by comparison, and her silence, set against his “wood”-ness, is eloquent. 
At least in this situation, rather than attack her husband or assure him of her own 
correctness, she simply ignores what she knows to be faulty counsel. In other passages, 
misogynistic books by learned men are worth grappling with, but this “olde sawe” isn’t 
worth a “hawe.” Alison discerns that, unlike the works by Jerome, Tertullian, and the 
other authorities bound in her husband’s “book of wikke wyves,” this mindless nugget 
is beneath her intellectual attention (669-685).  
                                                            
94 Even if the last two lines of the passage (664-665) are read as a more general  
comment on the marital dynamic, Jankyn’s “woodness” suggests a self-seriousness that 
contrasts with Alison’s playful expressions of irreverence, which the text presents as a 




It is significant that the Wife of Bath’s judgment here does not reflect the 
doubtless self-righteousness that characterizes her husband’s belief in the old saw. 
Although, in the passage, she admits to resisting criticism—“I hate hym that my vices 
telleth me”—she attributes this resistance to ordinary emotional defensiveness—“And 
so doo mo, God woot, of us than I” (661-663)—rather than to a belief in her own moral 
or intellectual perfection. That she neither deigns to engage with the trivial text nor 
denies her own fallibility or vices demonstrates that she lacks the need to establish her 
own rightness. Here and elsewhere, her characteristic inclination to critique, resist, 
argue, fight, and master is less about pure self-gratification than about achieving an 
array of other, often worthier objectives: to participate in social life (“walke […] / From 
hous to hous, although he had it sworn” [639-640]), to rectify ignorance or intellectual 
complacency, and—when she tears “thre leves” from Jankyn’s “cursed book”—to 
redirect her husband’s focus away from misogynistic tropes, forcing him to engage with 
her directly instead (788-806). The Wife of Bath certainly values “wynnyng” (translated 
by Benson as “profit” [110]), “maistrie,” “soveraynetee,” “honour,” and wealth or 
“estaat,” but, in keeping with her Tale’s claim that women have no special desire to be 
trusted, she does not express a wish “to been holden stable, and eek secree”—or, for 
that matter, “to been holden” wise and virtuous (416, 946, see ll. 945-950). Whatever 
the purpose of her counsel, whether she is teaching her audience about the “wo that is in 
mariage” or critiquing her husbands’ reading material, we can trust that intellectual 
arrogance or conceit is not among her motives, and in this sense she has greater 






II. Guidance-conseil and gossip-conseil:  
Tensions and convergences 
 
I have so far explained a few of Alison's accomplishments as a counselor: she 
both argues for and models a kind of ethical merriment as an alternative to acedia and 
vanity; she also argues for and models a vigilant irreverence toward the sources of one's 
knowledge. Furthermore, in her moral imperfection, the Wife of Bath shows an 
impressive willingness to acknowledge and understand her own vices, to confess her 
least dignified acts in an instructive fashion. Her lack of self-importance allows her to 
freely recount memories that are morally unflattering to her, endowing her counsel with 
a confessional style that aims “to transform her texts as well as her audience” (Phillips 
110).95 As a result, Alison's prologue resonates with medieval Christian religious 
practice in ways that Griselda’s and Prudence’s counsel cannot.96 Perfect wives have 
nothing to confess; Alison, by contrast, has a wealth of material.    
But, as Susan E. Phillips and Karma Lochrie have noted, Alison's confessional 
register is also a register of gossip. For all their didactic value and rhetorical 
effectiveness, Alison’s confessions often drag her prologue into dubious ethical 
territory, resulting in a “tricky and treacherous” “slippage from confession” into the 
                                                            
95 See Phillips and Lochrie (Covert Operations [Philadelphia: University of  
Pennsylvania, 1999]).  
 
96 See Phillips 17, 44-47, 120. 
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mire of secrecy and betrayal (Lochrie 56).97  By aligning her “gossib” or confidante 
with her “parisshe preest,” Alison reminds us that even her most edifying and curative 
confessions are a form of gossip, a mode of speech we often associate with shame, 
deception, and perfidy (533, 540-542).  
Any discussion of Alison's counsel must take her gossip into account, not only 
because her confessions and anecdotes are examples of gossip but also because her 
prologue spotlights the close semantic and conceptual ties between gossip and counsel 
in Middle English. A passage in which the Wife of Bath recounts gossiping about her 
husband establishes “conseil” as a synonym for “secret” or “gossip” in the remainder of 
Alison's texts and draws attention to the complex relationship between gossip and 
advice-counsel as modes of communication (WBP 525-542).   
If guidance-counsel is a traditionally a form of highly deliberative, organized, 
emotionally controlled speech, related to homiletic speech in its ethical aims, gossip-
“counsel” (by which I mean “gossip” or “secret”) often has an uncontrolled quality; it 
can be laced with malice, and the transmission of gossip-counsel involves a volatile flux 
between secrecy and outburst.98 As a result, Alison's gossip is both rhetorically and 
morally disruptive. Whereas Griselda consistently invokes contractual rhetoric in her 
counsel to Walter, and Prudence endlessly invokes authoritative wisdom, Alison 
                                                            
97 “And as a bitore bombleth in the myre,” Midas’ wife “leyde hir mouth unto the  
water doun: Biwreye me nat, thou water, with thy soun” (WBT 972-974). For a salient 
and thorough discussion of gossip, secrecy, and confession in Alison’s Prologue, see 
Karma Lochrie, “Tongues Wagging: Gossip, Women, and Indiscreet Secrets,” Chapter 
2 of Covert Operations (56-92).  
 
98 See my chapter on The Clerk’s Tale for a discussion of Walter’s secrecy and the  




combines “clerkish proverbs and proof texts and exempla” with a wealth of personal 
anecdotes (Mitchell 87).99 The stories Alison tells her husbands are often deceitful; the 
stories she tells the pilgrims and her confidantes are slightly treacherous, insofar as they 
cast her husbands in a negative light. Given these complications, how does Alison's 
infamous gossip affect the moral status of her wifely counsel, and what kind of ethical 
(or unethical) work does her gossip accomplish?  
The prologue’s much-discussed passage on gossip shows Alison using words 
carelessly and destructively to rile up her husband, making “his face often reed and 
hoot” with shame and regret for ever having trusted her. In effect, Allison’s gossiping 
provokes in her husband the kind of volatility that Prudence seeks to neutralize in 
Melibee, and results in the kind of suspicion and guardedness that Walter creates in his 
marriage to Griselda.100 In the passage, the Wife of Bath recalls divulging her husband’s 
secrets to a beloved gossip, also named “Alisoun,” as well as to other confidantes:   
 To hire biwreyed I my conseil al.  
For hadde myn housbonde pissed on a wal,  
Or doon a thyng that sholde han cost his lyf,  
To hire, and to another worthy wyf,  
And to my nece, which that I loved weel,  
                                                            
99 On preaching and homiletic conventions in the Wife’s prologue, see Lindeboom  
(Venus’ Owne Clerk, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007) 319-394, Mitchell 79-93, and Tinkle’s 
“The Wife of Bath’s Marginal Authority” (SAC 32 [2010]), which reads Alison as 
Chaucer’s “unlikely woman preacher” (67). Phillips makes a similar point about the 
tension between the Wife of Bath’s gossip and her references to religious institutions 
like confession (119-121).  
 
100 The narrator describes Melibee as behaving “lyke a mad man,” and Prudence  




I wolde han toold his conseil every deel. 
And so I dide ful often, God it woot,  
That made his face often reed and hoot 
For verray shame, and blamed himself for he  
Had toold to me so greet a pryvetee. (527-542) 
Here, the connotations of “counseil,” meaning “secret(s),” are in tension with the more 
positive connotations of “counsel,” meaning “advice,” that can be found elsewhere in 
the Tales. In The Tale of Melibee and The Clerk’s Tale, Chaucer’s idealized depictions 
of wifely counsel are deeply infused with virtue ethics: Griselda and Prudence are 
steadfastly devoted to their husbands' welfare; they are almost always honest; in the 
name of service or fidelity, they prioritize their marriages over all other relationships. In 
light of these depictions, Alison’s use of the term “counsel” to denote the rumors she 
used to spread about her husbands—rather viciously, or at least carelessly—is both 
striking and unsettling. The passage suggests that, ironically, Alison would go out of her 
way to betray her husband's gossip-counsel to her friends and niece, all the while 
neglecting to provide him with much-needed wifely counsel at home. Her account 
simultaneously emphasizes his physicality and vulnerability, forcing us to imagine his 
body in intimate, dangerous, and embarrassing situations—urinating on a wall, putting 
himself in harm's way, turning red for shame—and implying that he could have used 
plenty of wifely support or guidance at the time. 
Yet for all that, the Wife of Bath’s performance of gossip-counsel entails some 
of the values and consequences we associate with guidance-counsel. In the above 
passage, it is particularly significant that Alison conflates her own “counseil” or secrets 
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with the secrets of her husband: the direct object shifts from “my conseil” in line 527 to 
“his conseil” in line 538, suggesting that Alison conceives of the marriage as a sort of 
partnership of pooled or interchangeable experiences. Just as Prudence betrays a sense 
of her shared stake in Melibee’s future, and Griselda insists that Walter’s will has 
subsumed her own, Alison blurs the distinction between her own private consciousness 
and her husband’s.101 In her discussion on “biwreying conseil,” as I understand it, Susan 
E. Phillips interprets the phrase “his conseil” (the husband’s secrets) as a sort of 
overwriting or correction of the phrase “my conseil” (Alison’s own secrets) and argues 
that the entire passage on gossip can be read as pertaining to “[Alison’s] husband’s 
secrets […] and not her own” (120). But I would argue that both pronouns, his and my, 
carry equal weight and meaning in the passage, and that their juxtaposition reflects the 
Wife of Bath’s sense of a shared stake in her husband’s experience. Here, for her, the 
pronouns are more or less interchangeable, because she understands her “conseil” and 
her husband’s to have become one and the same. That the Wife’s gossip about her 
husband, as Phillips explains, has the quality of a confession or shrift—the act of 
acknowledging one’s own sins—further indicates the degree to which Alison 
understands her husband’s experience as bound up in her own: her husband’s gossip-
worthy deeds are sufficiently hers to merit mentioning in her own confessions, both to 
her friend and to the pilgrims (119-120).  
The Wife of Bath returns to ideas about marriage, shared identity, secrecy, 
                                                            
101 “For God woot that, as in myn entente, I speke it for youre beste, for youre  
honour, and for youre profite eke” (see Mel 1236-1238, as well as the analysis in my 




gossip, confession, and shame after she launches into her tale, in a passage so tangential 
to the main narrative as to suggest her extreme investment in these themes. In 
recounting the knight’s struggle to discover “What thyng is it that wommen moost 
desiren,” Alison digresses to dispute the falsehood or “tale” that women desire “to been 
holden stable, and eek secree / […] / And nat biwreye thyng that men us telle.” To her, 
the common belief that women enjoy earning trust by keeping (or appearing to keep) 
secrets is “nat worth a rake-stele” (WBT 905, 946-948). To further prove that “wommen 
konne no thyng hele” and “kan no conseil hyde”—a theme already developed in her 
prologue—Alison retells a story from Ovid about the betrayal of King Midas’ secret 
(WBT 950, 980). In Ovid’s version, Midas’ male barber takes care to bury the king’s 
secret in a hole, though it is ultimately unearthed by the wind. But the Wife of Bath 
recasts the barber as Midas’ wife and exposes her in the act of her repeating the secret 
verbally (Benson 873). At first, having learned of her husband’s “two asses eres,” 
Midas’ wife is determined not to “biwrey” the secret (948, 954, 974):102  
   [F]or al this world to wynne,  
 She nolde do that vileynye or synne,  
 To make hir housbonde han so foul a name.  
 She nolde nat tell it for hir owene shame. (961-964)  
When she betrays Midas’ secret to a marsh, Midas’ wife begs of the water not to betray 
her in turn: “Biwreye me nat, thou water, with thy soun” (970, 974). Just as Alison’s 
“conseil” or “pryvetee” overlaps with or subsumes her husband’s, Midas’ wife’s 
                                                            
102 Phillips, too, notes that the verb “biwreye” appears in both the prologue’s  




“owene shame” is bound up in considerations of her husband’s reputation and secret 
life. Thus, in taking on his secret, the wife has also taken on his susceptibility to 
betrayal. When she unburdens herself to the water, she closely reenacts her husband’s 
confession to her (“save his wyf, ther wiste of it namo;” “to thee I telle it and namo”), 
so that the acts of harboring and divulging the same secret become a shared experience 
(957, 975). Midas’ wife is betraying her husband at the same time she is internalizing 
and replicating his thoughts and actions, so that, paradoxically, the wife’s act of gossip 
is both a betrayal and way of reinforcing the identity she shares with her husband. Thus 
Chaucer’s portrayal of gossip in the Wife of Bath texts reflects his broader interest in 
the ways that both marriage and gossip can alter one’s identity or sense of selfhood and 
separateness. Alison’s conflation of pronouns, the marsh-whispering wife’s 
internationalization of Midas’ shame, Dame Prudence’s collaborative ethic in The Tale 
of Melibee, and Griselda’s wholesale replacement of her own will with Walter's all 
suggest that Chaucer finds women particularly susceptible to an alteration in self-
consciousness after marriage. That this phenomenon signifies integrity, commitment, 
and fidelity to contract in Griselda and Prudence suggests that there is also some ethical 
value in Alison's gossip, since it reinforces her sense of a shared identity in marriage.  
Even if Alison’s gossip shames her husband, it has positive ethical value for her 
audiences, insofar as it teaches us about the “wo that is in mariage” (3). To the pilgrims 
and her readers, in talking about her acts of gossip, the Wife of Bath tells a confessional 
story about marriage that has qualities of both gossip-counsel and guidance-counsel. 
The story is gossip because it reiterates the same kinds of intimate secrets Alison used 
to reveal to her friend of the same name—the examples of her husband “pyss[ing] on a 
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wal” and putting his own life at risk. But it is also guidance-counsel insofar as it forms 
part of Alison’s larger discussion on marriage—her presentation of marriage as a space 
for two people to “imprint upon” and challenge one another.103 The upshot of Alison’s 
story about gossip, as she tells it, is that her behavior was hurtful and wreaked havoc on 
her husband’s emotions, as well as compromised his trust in her. The narrative doesn’t 
explicitly moralize, but it does provide a simple lesson in cause and effect, in the 
immediate consequentiality of one’s behavior in marriage: betraying your spouse’s 
trust, which may be terrifically fun in the moment, can result in damage to both of you.  
The story of Midas’ wife and the passage in Alison’s prologue about her own 
proclivity to gossip are usually read as reflecting a facile misogynistic bias (525-542). 
Patterson calls the Midas passage “an image of feminine speaking that suggests both 
obscurity and uncleanness” (287). Likewise, Treharne reads Alison’s speech as that of 
“a woman who is undermined by her own prolixity and hyperbole” (111), and Desmond 
attributes Chaucer’s revision of Ovid to a “discourse on wives and secrets” involving 
“the erotic volubility of a wife’s body,” which prevents married women from 
“physically keep[ing] a secret” (142). Although Desmond makes a valid argument about 
secret-keeping and gossip as bodily experiences, readings that focus on the problems of 
stereotyping and misogyny in the texts tend to obscure the moral complexity of 
Chaucer’s take on gossip. Susan Phillips offers a useful perspective by focusing on the 
important social roles that gossip can play in later Middle English works, reminding us 
that narrative depictions of gossip necessarily participate in the act of “janglyng” by 
                                                            




relaying “gossip’s idle words” to a reader. Whereas Treharne reads Alison’s speech and 
gossip as reflective of her rhetorical and moral deficiencies, Phillips spotlights the 
rhetorical density and sophistication of gossip (3).104 Though she acknowledges the 
issue of misogyny, she would probably caution against the knee-jerk assumption that 
any depiction of women’s gossip is antifeminist.105 I would go even further than 
Phillips: the value of Alison’s gossip is not only social and rhetorical but in some ways 
deeply ethical in character. It is Alison's enthusiasm for gossip-“conseil”—her 
pervasive reliance on anecdotes and experiential wisdom to support her arguments—
that makes all of her guidance-“conseil” possible. Any morally valid teaching to be 
found in her prologue must therefore reflect positively on gossip’s potential to effect 
ethical transformation.106 In an instructional context, good gossip can be integral to good 
counsel. 
                                                            
104 In her analysis of The Manciple’s Tale, Phillips writes, “Both the narrative and  
its moral participate in the ‘janglyng’ they condemn, as the Manciple’s exemplum 
functions less as a cautionary tale than as an illustration of idle talk’s talent for 
discursive appropriation” (3).  
 
105 “[T]o reduce all idle talk to women’s work is both to miss the complicated ways  
in which Middle English writers represented women’s gossip and to 
underestimate its power […] [T]o focus exclusively on the idea of [gossip as] 
transgression ignores the discursive appropriations that make idle talk both so 
problematic and so productive in late medieval England” (Phillips 6).  
 
106 In her discussion of gossip as confession, Phillips explains that “intimate  
confessional exchanges,” like Alison’s exchange with her gossip, “transform 
relationships,” since “the characters who engage in them forge kinship through 





III. Interactivity and symbiotic transformation 
 
So far I have stressed the ways in which Alison’s counsel and persuasive 
strategies—in particular, her all-encompassing irreverence, her insistence on source 
critique, and even some aspects of her gossip—can be said to have inherent ethical 
value. I have also alluded briefly to the transformative effects of her counsel. In this 
concluding section, I will more closely examine the household consequences of 
Alison’s wifely counsel. In her fifth marriage, especially, Alison's counsel facilitates a 
radical interactivity between spouses that transforms both of them into more ethical 
communicators. By seeking out opportunities to practice counsel, Alison also 
transforms herself into an exemplary wife-counselor over the course of five marriages.  
Several examples of affection between the Wife of Bath and her husbands 
suggest that her marriages, for all her talk of “wynnyng,” are characterized by some 
degree of mutuality and cooperation.107 Alison introduces all five spouses as “worthy 
men in hir degree” and—when she is not roasting them—recalls her fourth and fifth 
husbands with particular clarity, suggesting that these marriages remain especially 
meaningful to her (6-8). Of her fifth husband, Jankyn, Alison recalls, “I trowe I loved 
hym best, for that he / Was of his love daungerous to me”; she later draws him in erotic 
detail at the scene of his predecessor’s funeral (513-514, 592-602). Even her fourth 
husband, who “hadde a paramour” and caused Alison “greet despit / That he of any 
                                                            




oother had delit,” receives a forgiving enough send-off: “Lat hym fare wel; God yeve 
his soule reste!” (454, 481-482, 501). Alison’s confession to having been this husband’s 
“purgatorie” (489) strongly implies that her difficult behavior towards him had positive 
instructive value, but she elects rather graciously in the passage to provide a self-
deprecating account of her challenges to him rather than to focus on his developmental 
need for these challenges (489, 483-494). These indications of respect, affection, and 
attachment suggest that instances of Alison’s dishonest and exploitive behavior—at 
least towards her fourth and fifth husbands—result more from her self-interest and 
habitual irreverence than from enmity, and that a sense of partnership might coexist 
with rivalry in these marriages.   
Of course, Alison’s interest in partnership or cooperation can be hard to see. Her 
emphasis on the issue of mastery, along with her fondness for alluding to stereotypical 
oppositions between male and female behavior, have led many critics to understand her 
marital relationships as essentially antagonistic, or at least as weaker and less valuable 
than her homosocial bonds.108 Even Lochrie’s masterful discussion of secrecy and 
gossip, for example, reflects this somewhat misleading perspective. Her study focuses 
on gossip as “a kind of insurrectionary discourse on the part of women,” positioned 
“alongside—but also in resistance to—a variety of institutionalized, written discourses,” 
but Lochrie falls short of fully examining the implications of Alison’s gossip for her 
                                                            
108 See Tara Williams’ “The Host, His Wife, and Their Communities” (The  
Chaucer Review 42.4 [2008]), Lochrie’s Covert Operations, Mari Pakkala-
Weckström’s The Dialogue of Love, Marriage and Maistrie in Chaucer’s Canterbury 
Tales (dissertation, University of Helsinki, 2005) and Elizabeth Scala’s “Desire in the 





marriages (56-57). Likewise, Tara Williams’ 2008 article on Harry Bailey and his wife 
exemplifies a broader tendency among critics to overlook depictions of partnership, 
collaboration, and instruction in Alison’s and other marriages. The article names 
“marital identity” as an important social determinant for the Canterbury pilgrims and 
argues that the Tales’ exploration of “personal communities based on marital identity” 
is crucial to Chaucer’s critique of antifeminism (385). Although Williams’ perceptive 
work brings much-needed scholarly attention to the thematic centrality of wifehood in 
the Tales, her understanding of “sexual desire and suspicion” as “the twin hallmarks of 
[Chaucerian] marriage” limits her reading to rather exhausted questions about identity 
groupings, gender, and sexual difference (403). Like Phillips and Lochrie, Williams 
seems to internalize Harry Bailey’s assumption that (in Williams’ paraphrase) “wives 
have a reciprocal loyalty that supercedes their loyalty to men, even […] their own 
husbands” (387). The article glosses over Alison’s many expressions of fondness 
towards and interest in her husbands, as well as her unsparing critiques of women. 
Williams’ account treats (and reads Chaucer as treating) the sexes as fundamentally 
separate, focuses on tensions rather cooperation or mutual influence among spouses, 
and obscures the ways in which wives teach, mold, discipline, and change their 
husbands in the Tales.  
The Wife of Bath’s Prologue does not present the sexes, however different they 
may be, as socially cordoned off from one another; nor does it imply that homosocial 
relationships are necessarily more valuable or collaborative than marital relationships. 
Alison speaks with more affection and fairness about some of her husbands than about 
her own sex. Whereas she often makes sweeping negative generalizations about all 
 
 138 
women, she specifies a clear distinction between her three “goode” and two “badde” 
husbands, and, as I have discussed, she goes on to reveal some positive feelings about 
the “badde” ones (195). Although she betrays a certain fondness for women in 
encouraging them to persist in mischief of “ber[ing] [their husbands] wrong on honde” 
she seems more interested in pursuing confrontational, intellectually challenging 
engagements with men—both in the past, during her marriages, and on the pilgrimage 
to Canterbury—than in seeking solidarity with women (226).109  
The purpose of my intervention is not to devalue homosocial relationships in the 
Wife of Bath texts, but to point out that Alison exhibits an impressive level of comfort, 
expressivity, and intellectual engagement in her relationships with men, including her 
marriages. In overlooking this accomplishment, we risk missing the full scope of 
Alison’s work as a thinker, storyteller, and counselor in her texts, as well as Chaucer’s 
appreciation for the intellectual opportunities and ethical training that marriage can 
offer. The Wife of Bath embraces these opportunities with unforgettable zeal. Her 
counsel is not only irreverent and festive in quality but also highly interactive. By 
Alison’s account, any marriage is an opportunity for “scoleiying,” for both parties to 
learn and change. As I will argue, it is ultimately Alison’s self-cultivation as a counselor 
that makes it possible for her husbands to change along with her (441).  
                                                            
109 “Now herkneth hou I baar me properly, / Ye wise wyves, that kan understonde. /  
Thus shulde ye speke and bere hem wrong on honed, / Fo half so boldely kan ther no 
man / Swere and lyen, as a woman kan. / I sey nat this by wyves that been wyse, / But if 
it be whan they hem mysavyse. / A wys wyf, if that she kan hir good, / Shal beren hym 





Examining the prologue’s structural intricacies in more detail reveals the 
narrative events, transitions, and resonances that are most crucial to Alison’s 
development as a counselor and to the transformations she effects in others. By the time 
of her pilgrimage to Canterbury, Alison’s affinity for her fourth and fifth husbands 
shows itself in a pronounced concern for their departed souls. To draw a connection 
between her two most memorable spouses, she uses a chiastic structure whose fulcrum 
is the issue of their souls’ repose: lines 452-502 recount the “jolitee” (l. 470), “angre,” 
and “verray jalousye” (l. 488) of her tumultuous years with husband four, ending with 
description of his tomb and the short prayer that God grant “his soule rest”; lines 502-
503 seal the coffin on husband four (“He is now in his grave and in his cheste”) and 
introduce his successor (“Now of my fifthe housbonde wol I telle”); line 504 expresses 
worry over the fate of his (the fifth husband’s) soul (“God lete his soule nevere come in 
helle!”), and the remainder of the poem fans out again into a narrative of that marriage’s 
ups and downs (505-828).  
In some ways, Alison’s fourth marriage thus serves as a preview to her fifth. But 
it is also significant for containing Alison’s sophisticated counsel on beauty and age 
(discussed earlier in this chapter), as well as for delivering the first moment in which 
Alison recounts making a sincere emotional investment and suffering serious 
consequences. In recalling her previous three marriages, all to old men, she admits to 
having affected and experienced a number of emotions, as well as to having 
manipulated her husbands on several occasions. But the line “I hadde in herte greet 
despit,” in reference to husband four, marks a point of departure, after which events in 
her married life become more emotionally and intellectually consequential (481). 
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Though she responds to his infidelity with her usual, ethically dubious game-playing—
taking revenge, making him jealous and miserable (“Ther was no wight, save God and 
he, that wiste, / In many wise, how soore I hym twiste”)—she is not, this time, reacting 
out of caprice (493-494). Her pain is sincere and results from her fourth husband’s 
violation of the marriage contract, and though her vengeful behavior is misguided, it 
reflects a new depth in Alison’s concern for the marital bond.  
After that, in her fifth marriage, Alison betrays a greater awareness of 
marriage’s emotional hazards for both spouses. Although, during the marriage, she may 
not sufficiently appreciate Jankyn’s keen sense of betrayal when she “[tells] his conseil 
every deel,” the fact that she recounts his reaction to the Canterbury pilgrims in intimate 
detail suggests that she certainly registered having caused her husband pain (538-542). 
Likewise, it is her own hurt feelings at Jankyn’s absorption in misogynistic literature 
that seem to motivate the series of violent events at the end of the Prologue: “Who 
wolde wene, or who wolde suppose,” she asks, “The wo that in myn herte was, and 
pyne?” (786-787). Though her fury is raw, it has deep intellectual roots in her sustained 
critical engagement with her husband’s beloved reading material. By this point, Alison 
has achieved a greater level of focus and intimacy in marriage than we have yet seen. 
The Wife of Bath's “wo […] and pyne” gives way to a fast-paced sequence of 
climactic action that results in the most memorable and salient example of symbiotic 
transformation in her prologue. In a heated battle with Jankyn, Alison tears pages from 
his “cursed book” (798-791); strikes his cheek, sending him into the fire (792-793); 
receives a blow “on the heed” and collapses into a pretend swoon (795-799); elicits an 
apology (803-807); hits him again on the cheek (l. 800); calls him a theef; and exclaims 
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that she is dying (809-810). Finally, Jankyn surrenders all authority into Alison's hands 
(“Myn owene trewe wyf, / Do as thee lust the terme of al thy lyf”), and the couple 
reconciles, living peacefully together until his death:  
And whan that I hadde geten unto me,  
By maistrie, al the soveraynetee,  
. . . . .  
After that day we hadden never debaat.   
God helpe me so, I was to hym as kynde  
As any wyf from Denmark unto Ynde,  
And also trewe, and so was he to me.  
I prey to God, that sit in magestee, 
So blesse his soule for his mercy deere. (811-828) 
Once the reins are in Alison’s hands, the “care and wo” that previously plagued the 
marriage are dispelled, and there are no signs that she abuses her power. Alison and 
Jankyn have enabled each other’s simultaneous transformations into a benevolent 
sovereign and her affectionate consort. But we must credit Alison, who has struggled to 
educate and transform herself over the course of five marriages, for having set the 
symbiosis into motion with her trademark provocative style.  
Like The Clerk’s Tale, Alison’s prologue has a problem-solution structure. That 
her fourth and fifth husbands are introduced as young and “badde” at the time of their 
marriages suggests their need for reform or counsel (196); Alison’s special affinity for 
the two men suggests that she has a similar need; and her peaceful assumption of 
sovereignty, coinciding as it does with what I would call her “graduation” as a 
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counselor, assures us that the text’s implicit call for reform has been satisfied. Although, 
as Crane argues, there is something “patently illusory” in this happy ending, its illusory 
quality only adds to the prologue’s crucial resonance with The Clerk’s Tale. These 
counsel narratives, along with The Tale of Melibee, come to pat conclusions that are not 
necessarily satisfying by modern standards of naturalism. But their endings are well-
suited to complete the texts’ argumentative structures, and one of their effects is to drive 
home Chaucer’s argument for the small- and large-scale benefits of wifely counsel in 
three very different forms.  
But the prologue is not just a straight-forward counsel narrative; it is also a story 
about the making of a wife-counselor. The narrative traces Alison’s journey from the 
relatively frivolous, self-inflicted drama of her first three marriages, through the 
transitional interlude of her fourth, more serious and scarring marriage and into the 
battles of her most challenging and consequential marriage. It is this marriage, Alison’s 
fifth, that entails what I would consider to be the most formative events in her unique 
development as a counselor: her provocative experiments with gossip and source 
critique, her participation in intellectual debates so intense they devolve into combat, 
and her victory in gaining household “sovereignty”—which by this point seems a more 
desirable status than the “auctoritee” that is out-of-reach for her at the beginning of the 
prologue (530-542). Once Alison graduates from the “tribulacion[s] in mariage” of her 
“five husbondes scoleiyng,” she assumes an authority that stabilizes her household and 
makes cooperation possible (173, 44f).  
The new dynamic that Alison’s counsel effects may seem at first to replicate an 
autocratic or oppressive structure of power. But reading the Wife of Bath as a counselor 
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allows us to understand her “sovereignty” as Chaucer’s dramatization of the political 
power that ought to be afforded seasoned counselors. On a more literal level, as a 
marital dynamic, the Wife’s sovereignty is also perfectly in keeping with the couple’s 
twenty-year age difference, with Alison’s greater experience in marriage and with 
Jankyn’s as-yet-unsophisticated intellectual tastes, which reflect the intellectual 
complacency or premature ossification that Chaucer seems to associate with 
institutional wisdom (600-602). It is a testament to Alison’s counsel—namely, her 
model of rejecting intellectual vanity, her uncompromising and cold but respectful 
rebuff of Jankyn’s “olde sawe,” and her critique of his reading material—that Jankyn 
ultimately recognizes his own need for schooling and surrenders his authority to her.  
Positioned as we are in Alison’s audience, we readers, along with her later 
husbands and with Chaucer’s pilgrims, can appreciate the significance of Alison’s 
extraordinary developmental arc from a wife obsessed with “wynnyng” to a 
conscientious wife-counselor (413-418). But our access to The Canterbury Tales in 
written form allows us to shuffle, revisit, and recontextualize the stories in illuminating 
ways, treating us to what is arguably the richest possible perspective on Alison’s 
accomplishments as a wife-counselor. Intertextual cross-references show the Wife of 
Bath in her most flattering light: the Friar’s and Summoner’s crass, dead-end rivalry, for 
example, entertaining as it is, shows Alison’s competitive relationships with men and 
even her stereotypical boisterousness to be intellectually fruitful and socially beneficial 
by comparison. Furthermore, Chaucer’s conventionalized depictions of Prudence, 
Griselda, Pertelote, and the Sultaness, whose moral identities are complex but 
ultimately static, make the Wife of Bath, with her rougher textual artifice and dramatic 
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moral transformation, an essential part of his study. Her imperfections and 
inconsistencies assure us that powerful examples of wifely counsel can be found beyond 















Disport, Quest, and Multiplicity in The Wife of Bath’s Tale 
 
 
Like The Tale of Melibee and The Clerk’s Tale, The Wife of Bath’s Tale 
diagnoses flaws in patriarchal leadership and promotes wifely counsel as a means of 
reforming both household and polity. But The Wife of Bath's Prologue shows Alison to 
be more or less uninterested in the antidotal values—stability, restraint, and devotion—
that are cornerstones of wifely counsel and reform in the other tales. At the root of her 
divergent strategy is an unorthodox understanding of marriage. Unlike the steadfast 
Prudence and Griselda, the Wife of Bath embraces marriage as a fundamentally 
unstable institution (Woods 122). While it lasts, a marriage can foster strife among 
spouses and changes in each of them; after it ends, with the death of a spouse, one 
marriage can be “refresshed” by, or changed out for, a brand new one (WBP 38). Alison 
depicts both forms of marital instability with fondness and appreciation, as part of her 
“scoleiyng” (44f). She does not imagine marriage as a haven from the chaos of public 
life; for Alison, wifely counsel partakes in chaos and makes it instructive.  
The theme of instability as a mode of education is one of the boldest threads 
connecting Alison’s prologue to her fantastical “loathly lady” tale. Susan Crane has 
written about the “poetic instability” of Alison's texts, arguing that the “clerical 
mixture” of “antifeminist tracts, marital satire, [and] biblical exegesis” that forms the 
foundation of The Wife of Bath's Prologue is also integral to the shifting narrative and 
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thematic structure of The Wife of Bath's Tale. Crane analyzes issues of aesthetic 
instability—mainly, shifts between the romance genre and tropes of antifeminist 
nonnarrative genres—in order to unearth the ideological or conceptual instability of 
Alison’s politics. She concludes that Alison’s definitions of “sovereignty” in the tale 
tend to contradict one another, “in part because she confronts generic and ideological 
differences on the issue” (21). Crane's reading bears out that the structural instability of 
Alison's tale is deeply related to its political themes.  
In my reading, Alison’s very incoherence is what renders her performance so 
crucial to Chaucer's intertextual conversation on wifely counsel. Her disorienting 
vacillations between misandry and misogyny, religion and irreverence, accuracy and 
error, distinguish the Wife of Bath from idealized wife-counselors, who exemplify more 
coherent values but set inimitable standards for rhetorical and moral consistency. 
Alison's eclectic rhetorical experiments in her prologue make us more likely to imagine 
her separately from the literary discourses that she juggles, and to consider her 
campaign for female sovereignty in relation to a lived context.110 By depicting multiple 
wife-counselors, both of whom draw on diverse, often unconventional strategies, The 
Wife of Bath's Tale accomplishes a similar feat. Like her prologue, Alison's tale shows 
                                                            
110 In A Companion to Romance (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), Saunders calls her  
“perhaps the most three-dimensional character in the Canterbury Tales (94). In Ovid's 
Art and the Wife of Bath, Desmond writes, “The didactic confidence of the Wife of 
Bath's Prologue gives the Wife of Bath unusual stature as a literary character; she is the 
only pilgrim in the Canterbury Tales to compete with Chaucer for the authority of 
authorship. Mistaken for an author, Chaucer's Wife of Bath appears to be a female 
speaker whose subjectivity is compellingly accessible. [...] Such readerly transference 




us that rhetorically eclectic, chaotic, inconsistent, contradictory, and disruptive wifely 
counsel can still be efficacious and vital to social reform.   
This chapter explains how the women in Alison's tale reform a wayward knight 
using a program designed around both literal and rhetorical instability. The first section 
deals with representations of literal instability in the form of relocation or mobility. In 
my study of the knight's movements, I examine a dichotomy between two different 
kinds of “disport” in the Tales and argue that Alison's initial account of the knight 
resonates with a problematic form of male disport that Chaucer critiques in other texts. 
The second section of this chapter explains how Alison aligns Queen Guinevere with 
the knight in a dynamic of wifely counsel, by which the queen uproots the knight from 
Arthur's court and transforms his criminal disport into a disorienting but morally 
purposeful quest. The third section of this chapter explores another source of instability 
in Alison's tale: the trope of multiplicity. I argue that Alison invokes multiple voices of 
counsel not only in the course of the knight's wanderings but also in the person of the 
loathly lady, whom he eventually marries.  As a shape-shifter, the loathly lady is not 
only radically unstable at her core but also furnishes the most rhetorically eclectic 
performance of wifely counsel in the Tales. I examine how her contractual, rhetorical, 
and corporeal prestidigitations finally dismantle the knight’s sense of authority, 
completing his transformation from bachelor-rapist to respectable husband.  Ultimately, 
I aim to show how The Wife of Bath's Tale reconciles the prologue's argument for 
marital instability with the more conventional ideals of wifely counsel we have seen in 






I. Mobility, social exchange, and the problem of male “disport” 
 
The theme of transformative relocation or travel, especially as it relates to 
gender, marriage, and marital status, emerges repeatedly in Chaucer’s tales of wifely 
counsel. Being both a consummate pilgrim—a lover of “visitaciouns,” “vigilies,” 
“processiouns,” “prechyng,” “pilgrimages,” “pleyes of myracles” and “mariages” (WBP 
543-559)—and an expert on married life (WBP 1-8), the Wife of Bath is particularly 
interested in the relationship between travel and the hearth,111 or in what Sarah Rees 
Jones calls “the cyclical movement of human bodies between household, street, and 
city” (246).112 Leigh Ann Craig provides a thorough reading of Alison's “Wanderlust” 
and “enjoyment of mobility” in The Wife of Bath's Prologue; Craig observes that Alison 
“categorize[s] all sorts of travel as essentially the same,” so that “whether going to meet 
with a friend or going on a pilgrimage, all of her wandering [is] an expression of the 
same habit” (40-41). Although Craig's reluctance to “revolutionize interpretation of the 
Wife of Bath” results in a timid argument, her analysis draws crucial attention to the 
                                                            
111 The General Prologue lists Alison’s travel credentials: “And thries hadde she  
been at Jerusalem; / At Rome she hadde been, and at Boloigne, / In Galice at Seint-
Jame, and at Coloigne. / She koude muchel of wandrynge by the weye” (463-467).  
 
112 Here, Jones is discussing Giles of Rome, but her description of medieval  
European “space” as an arena for this kind of “cyclical movement” applies to Alison’s 




trenchant issue of “mobility” and supplies this useful term as a catch-all for the morally 
and politically charged relocations at the heart of Alison's texts.113  
The Wife of Bath's moral lapses and inconsistencies in her prologue certainly 
reflect medieval anxieties about the supposed “sexual and materialistic ill-conduct” of 
“mobile women” (30, 23). At the same time, however, The Wife of Bath's Prologue and 
Tale deconstruct the traditional “castigation of mobile women” by acknowledging the 
obstacles that make it difficult for women to leave their homes in the first place (23). 
The texts also explore the social, economic, and intellectual work that women can 
accomplish when they overcome or circumvent these obstacles. Alison's consummate 
appreciation for and mastery of mobility are among her assets as a wife-counselor. 
William F. Woods argues that the Wife of Bath's “walking abroad, traveling,” and 
“restless moving about—call it drifting” helps her maintain spiritual strength and 
economic viability “over the years of her many marriages” and reflects a deep-seated 
“prudence,” that hallmark of Chaucerian wifely counsel (122).  
 Like Craig, Woods is naturally interested in the travels Alison recounts in her 
prologue. His analysis suggests that Alison maintains an active itinerary and social life 
in order to protect herself, financially and spiritually, from being “foresaken” or 
                                                            
113 In Wandering Women and Holy Matrons (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2009),  
Craig writes: “In sum, Alison is endlessly fascinating, and as Arthur Lindley has 
pointed out, straightforward explanations of her attitudes and presentation are 
impossible and therefore undesirable. In the discussion which follows, I do not propose 
to revolutionize interpretation of the Wife of Bath; indeed, my examination of the 
surface use of a stereotype does not particularly challenge any of these viewpoints [on 
how to interpret her]. My sole purpose is to show that fears of women's mobility were 
central to the way in which she is represented, and it is my hope that reading her in that 
context may help provide nuance to other critical approaches and also to the reading of 




widowed, and that her prudence, mobility, and “diligent vitality” result from an abiding 
“need for safety” (122). Though I agree with Woods that Alison's travels sustain her 
with material and spiritual benefits across marriages, Alison also seems to enjoy travel 
and socializing for their own sake, and she does not betray the deep-rooted fear of loss 
or abandonment that Woods' reading rather implies.114 I propose that safety emerges as 
a major theme, not so much in Alison's prologue, but in her tale, in the form of a 
practical concern with male criminality.  
 From the very beginning of the tale, a panorama of “halles, chambres, kichenes, 
boures, / Citees, burghes, castels, hye toures, / Thropes, bernes, shipnes, dayeryes” sets 
us up for a narrative in which physical movement, travel, navigation, and discovery are 
major values (868-871). Yet Alison's description is not entirely rhapsodic: danger is 
embedded in the landscape, in the form of men's mobility. The driving problem in The 
Wife of Bath's Tale is that the undisciplined movements of men, whether knights errant 
or “lymytours and othere hooly freres,” can pose a threat to women's mobility and 
autonomy (866). Prevailing authorities either perpetuate this problem or prove impotent 
to solve it. Just as the church, which claims to impose boundaries or limits on 
mendicant “limiters,” fails to prevent the incubus-like “lymytour hymelf” from doing 
                                                            
114 Alison's memories of her adventures in drinking and sex (“likerous mouth” and  
“likerous tayl” [458-468]) transition into a more general reverie on the worldliness and 
“jolitee” of her youth:  “But—Lord Crist!—whan that it remembreth me / Upon my 
yowthe, and on my jolitee,  / It tikleth me aboute myn herte roote. / Unto this day it 




women “dishonour,” Arthurian law and ethics fail to prevent Alison's knight from 
raping a maiden (874-888).115  
The men in Chaucer's tales of wifely counsel tend to travel or “mobilize” for the 
purpose of “disport.”  Parsing the different meanings of this term helps to clarify 
Alison's arguments about the relationship between gender, mobility, and public life in 
The Wife of Bath's Tale. The Middle English word “disport” can denote entertainment, 
recreation, and the pleasure taken in such.116 In the Tales, disport is often but not always 
mobile in nature, and it almost always takes place outside of the household. The term 
tends to refer either to the leisure of a physical excursion or to the more stationary yet 
social activity of lively conversation.  
When The Clerk’s Tale and The Wife of Bath’s Tale depict a bachelor pursing 
his “lust present” (ClT 80) on a hunting trip, they conjure the former definition of 
disport (ClT 78-84; WBT 882-885). The Tale of Melibee invokes “disport” explicitly, 
furnishing the term as a way to conceptualize this type of outing: “Upon a day bifel that 
he for his desport is went into the feeldes hym to pleye” (Mel 958).117 There is nothing 
                                                            
115 Alison's remark that now “Wommen may go saufly up and doun” appears  
deeply ironic, even sarcastic, in the context of her portrait of the modern limiter (888), 
whose corrupt habits strongly resonate with those of the Summoner and the Friar in 
Alison's audience. In keeping with the Clerk's implication that husbands have not 
improved since Griselda's time (ClT 1177-1200), the Wife of Bath positions her account 
of the rape directly after her critique of contemporary friars, suggesting that the 
Arthurian bachelor's crime is feasible in a modern context. 
 
116 The Middle English Dictionary offers several different uses for “disport,”  
including: “an activity that offers amusement, pleasure, or relaxation,” “a pastime, 
sport, or game,” “the game of love, flirtation,” “consolation, solace,” “deportment, 
conduct; customary behavior,” or an example of such. The fifteenth-century denotation 
of “disport” as “departure” post-dates Chaucer.  
 
117 The Man of Law's Tale, as I mentioned in my introduction, also begins by  
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deliberately vicious in either Walter's or Melibee's excursions, but the benefits of these 
outings do not extend beyond the individual men themselves to serve any sort of 
collective or cooperative end.  
An alternative form of disport, which we might define as lively social 
conversation, has a higher moral status in the tale. In the General Prologue, the Host 
contrasts the pleasures of conversation and storytelling with the dullness of silent 
locomotion. For the Host, a pilgrim in isolation, riding “by the weye,” might as well be 
a rolling stone:  
  For trewely, confort ne myrthe is noon  
  To ride by the weye doumb as a stoon;  
  And therfore wol I maken yow disport,  
  As I said erst, and doon yow som confort. (773-776)  
The Host’s use of “disport” in contradistinction to antisocial travel suggests that not all 
excursions or departures are beneficial or even particularly gratifying. Regardless of 
how much he socializes, a pilgrim on horseback may well be undertaking a kind of 
disport, insofar as riding “offers amusement, pleasure, or relaxation” (MED). But the 
Host’s somewhat paradoxical simile between a solitary or socially withdrawn traveler 
and an inanimate “stoon” suggests that the mobility of disport can sometimes coincide 
with a certain kind of social or intellectual inertia. By contrast, the passage associates 
                                                                                                                                                                              
evoking “disport.” The Man of Law describes a group of “masitres” who leave Syria for 
Rome “for chapmanhod or for disport, / Noon oother message wolde they thider sende, 
/ But comen hemself to Rome; this is the ende” (141-145). The ambiguity surrounding 
“disport” in this passage coincides with the extreme ambiguity of the Man of Law's take 




“confort” and “myrthe” with the disport of social engagement and conversation. The 
latter form of disport is a motivating force behind The Canterbury Tales, including its 
most pious and didactic texts.  
The Wife of Bath is associated with both physical and conversational disport. 
The word surfaces twice in her prologue, and the shift from one meaning to another 
marks her transformation into a wife-counselor. In the first instance, as Alison recalls 
her retorts to possessive husbands, she quotes her former self using the term: “Thou 
sholdest seye, ‘Wyf go wher thee liste, / Taak youre disport; I wol nat leve no talys; / I 
knowe yow for a trewe wyf, Dame Alys’” (318-320). Here, Alison refers to disport in 
the sense of leisure or pleasure taken outside of the household. Her remark suggests that 
disport is a privilege, a desirable opportunity to be earned with good and “trewe” 
behavior.  
But the kind of disport she remembers desiring is morally ambiguous at best: 
Alison later concedes that her defensive remarks to former husbands were “fals” or 
disingenuous, so that her use of “disport” connotes dishonesty and deviance (380-383). 
In some instances, she took her disport not only in “walkynge out by nyghte” but in 
claiming that the purpose of her walks was “for t'espye wenches that [her husband] 
dighte”; Alison recalls, “Under that colour hadde I many a myrthe” (397-399). The kind 
of disport Alison invokes would not endanger public safety in the way that the knight's 
does in her tale. But her deceptive speech, as she remembers it, suggests that her mode 
of disport in earlier marriages was not inherently superior, morally speaking, to the 
activities that take Melibee away from his household, Walter away from his duties, and 
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the Man of Law's merchants away from their homeland for an undisclosed purpose 
(MLT 141-145).  
However, a later passage in The Wife of Bath's Prologue associates Alison with 
the positive, social disport that the Host promises the pilgrims in the General Prologue 
(773-776). This present-tense passage, an interjection from the Summoner, occurs at the 
time of Alison's pilgrimage to Canterbury and therefore well after her five husbands' 
schooling. When the Friar remarks on Alison’s “long preamble of a tale” (831), the 
Summoner verbally attacks him:    
a flye and eek a frere 
Wol falle in every dyssh and eek mateere. 
What spekestow of preambulacioun? 
What! amble, or trotte, or pees, or go sit doun! 
Thou lettest oure disport in this manere. (835-839)  
In his defense of Alison’s performance, the Summoner, like the Host in the General 
Prologue, evokes an opposition between two different kinds of disport. On the one 
hand, he uses imagery we might normally associate with independent, recreational 
disport—namely riding, as in the Host’s passage—to propose that the uncooperative 
Friar leave the group. On the other hand, the Summoner invokes the term “disport” 
explicitly to describe how the group experiences Alison's storytelling. For the 
Summoner, listening to Alison’s long preamble is more vital and engaging—more 
worthy of the term “disport”—than the antisocial activity of riding away from the 
group, or of indulging one's impulses at the expense of the group's concentration.  
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 Real disport, the Summoner implies, lies in the training Alison provides for 
young men. His comments to the Friar echo the Pardoner's earlier call for Alison to 
“Telle forth youre tale, spareth for no man / And teche us yonge men of youre praktike" 
(186-187).118 To be sure, the General Prologue accords the Summoner, the Pardoner, 
and the Friar little to no moral credibility, and some readers might interpret their direct 
engagement with Alison in the course of her “disport” and “practike” as a hint at her 
own moral failings. But the possibility of an automatic moral affinity between Alison 
and these men does not pan out.119 Alison's foibles rather pale in comparison to those of 
the corrupt male pilgrims, and she receives a comparatively flattering treatment in the 
General Prologue.120 Furthermore, although the Pardoner and Summoner enjoy her 
performance, her prologue does not immediately resonate with the Friar, who, like a 
slacking pupil or a reader of The Tale of Melibee, complains of its length. Like any 
public pedagogical performance, her prologue appeals to some listeners and leaves 
others cold. In any case, the complex, somewhat ambiguous, but ultimately good-
                                                            
118 Leaving the group, as the Summoner proposes, would provide the Friar with  
physical freedom and mobility, allowing him to practice a conventional kind of disport 
on his own, or to continue in the corrupt “daliaunce” that characterizes his round-the-
clock professional efforts as a mendicant (GP 208-211). But a return to the status quo of 
exploiting “yonge wommen” and shoeless widows would result in the Friar’s 
intellectual stagnation and a missed opportunity to partake in the more edifying disport 
of Alison’s female-dominated “praktike” (GP 213, 253-255; WBP 187).  
 
119 Compare Chaucer's portraits of the Friar (GP 208-269), the Summoner (623- 
668), and the Pardoner (669-714) to his far more flattering portrait of the Wife of Bath 
(445-476).  
 
120 James Keller describes the Friar and Summoner as “two damned souls” and  
suggests that “the poet's portrayal of the Summoner is intended to be socially 
productive, inspiring a reformation of the apparitor's office and an end of abuse” (“A 
Sumonour Was Ther With Us In That Place,” Chaucer’s Pilgrims, eds. Laura C. 




humored and well-crafted response it elicits from the Clerk suggests that Alison's 
teachings are of interest to pilgrims on a wide moral spectrum (ClT 1170-1176).  
 Regardless of whether the Summoner, the Friar, and the Pardoner are sincerely 
interested in moral education, Alison's teachings have instructive value for these men. 
Like the knight in Alison's tale, the men in this trio rely on the mobility their positions 
afford them in order to exploit other people, often “ful many” “younge wommen” and 
“young girles” (GP 212-213, 664). They are therefore the target audience of The Wife of 
Bath's Tale, which argues that men fare best when they abandon the pursuit of empty 
pleasure and surrender to women's control. Alison's rhetoric succeeds with at least two 
of the men: the Summoner and the Pardoner sense that her storytelling offers an 
engaging, social alternative to whatever leisure they might pursue in the absence of the 
group.121  
Whereas the General Prologue and other framing materials establish social, co-
educational disport as a value in the Tales, the narratives of wifely counsel that I have 
so far discussed depict antisocial male disport as a careless and potentially disastrous 
enterprise.122 The Tale of Melibee, The Clerk's Tale, and The Wife of Bath's Tale each 
betray a deep concern with various local and global consequences of leaving men to 
their own devices outside of the household, whether they are holding summits or 
                                                            
121 One symptom of the Summoner's need for ethical counsel is his own  
performance as a counselor, which the text implies to be exploitative or lecherous in 
nature: “In daunger hadde he at his owene gise / The yonge girles of the diocise, / And 
knew hir conseil, and was al hir reed” (GP 663-665).  
 
122 The Man of Law's Tale and The Cook's Tale include examples of male disport- 
as-excursion involving companions or groups, but the male-dominated activities in 
these tales are antisocial in their mysteriousness and criminality, respectively (MLT 




hunting for waterfowl. Considered together, these tales launch a multifaceted critique 
the male privilege to roam. 
The first section of The Clerk’s Tale and the first few lines of The Tale of 
Melibee associate male disport with neglect, a secondary cause of hypothetical or real 
disaster. Walter’s disport or aimless recreation in bachelorhood leaves Saluzzo feeling 
vulnerable to “a straunge successour” (ClT 78-84, 136-139), and Melibee’s quotidian 
disport leaves his wife and daughter vulnerable to attackers who invade their home (Mel 
967-972). In these tales, the patriarch taking his disport is not a criminal himself (at 
least, in Walter’s case, not yet). Rather, he inadvertently makes it possible for 
aggressors—usurpers, attackers—to injure the people ostensibly in his care. Alison's 
tale betrays even greater anxiety about male disport and suggests that it poses a more 
direct sort of danger than we see in the other tales of wifely counsel.123  Somewhat like 
The Cook's Tale, which links male disport directly to “gambling and theft” (CkT 85, l. 
4382), prostitution (86, l. 4420), and “lower-class criminality” (Patterson 278), The Wife 
of Bath's Tale depicts male disport as the immediate precondition for sexual assault:124  
                                                            
123 The Middle English Dictionary defines “danger” as both “unaccomodating;  
haughty, aloof; reserved, reluctant” and “Fraught with danger; hazardous, risky, 
dangerous.” Both sets of synonyms apply to Alison’s knight. Other definitions include 
“Domineering, overbearing” and “Niggardly, chary,” both of which are qualities 
associated with bad husbands in the Tales.  
 
124 Female disport or wandering, though not always innocuous, is far less dangerous  
to public safety by comparison. In The Wife of Bath’s Tale, there is little to no moral 
anxiety around the prospect of a wife’s infidelity; male criminality and entitlement are 
far greater sources of concern. When the loathly lady proposes turning herself “yong 
and fair,” so that the knight would have to “take [his] aventure of the repair / That shal 
be to [his] house by cause of [her], / Or in some oother place,” cuckoldry appears in the 
crone's formulation as an equitable trade-off for the pleasures of having a beautiful wife  
(1223-1226). Both Alison and the crone imply that men's privileges are more dangerous 
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And so bifel that this kyng Arthour  
Hadde in his hous a lusty bacheler,  
That on a day cam ridynge fro ryver,  
And happed that, allone as he was born,  
He saugh a mayde walkynge hym biforn,  
Of which mayde anon, maugree hir heed,  
By verray force, he rafte hire maydenhed. (882-888)   
The theme of patriarchal negligence that we see in The Clerk's Tale and The Tale of 
Melibee still inheres in this passage, insofar as we sense that Arthur should have 
commanded better behavior from his lieges. Alison's account implicates the court in the 
maiden’s rape in much the same indirect way that The Tale of Melibee implicates 
Melibee in the neglect of his household. But Alison is also concerned with the knight's 
antisocial disport. By leaving the court and partaking in the solitary leisure of hawking 
“allone as he was born,” the knight in the passage alienates himself from the bonds of 
civil society and the civilizing impulses those bonds engender.  
 The Wife of Bath's Tale represents patriarchal negligence in the person of “kyng 
Arthour” and patriarchal “oppressioun” (889) in the person of the “lusty bacheler” 
riding out from Arthur’s house. Alison's narrative of the maiden's rape thus joins a 
general critique of the Arthurian power structure to a more localized indictment of male 
criminality. As a “bacheler,” the knight is a “novice in arms” as well as “a young 
                                                                                                                                                                              
to public order and more inimical to Christian virtue than any of the stereotypical vices 




unmarried man;” his identity and ethics are not yet fully formed, and his conduct 
betrays his need for moral guidance that the feudal system has not provided (MED).  
The bachelor's perversion of disport at the beginning of the tale is a symptom 
both of his own failings and of systematic flaws in Arthur’s rule, which fails to protect 
public order. As in The Clerk’s Tale, when a representative of Saluzzo pleads for Walter 
to marry (ClT 92-140), the people in Alison’s tale vent their anxiety about untamed 
bachelorhood through appropriate channels of power: “For which oppressioun was 
swich clamour / And swich pursute unto the kyng Arthour / That dampned was this 
knyght for to be deed” (889-892). But for Alison, the existing power structure is 
insufficient to remedy the very problem it allowed to happen in the first place. In her 
study of “supernatural rape” in medieval romance, Corinne Saunders notes that the 
maiden’s rape in The Wife of Bath’s Tale “contravenes generic expectation, that rape is 
not explicitly enacted except by otherworldly or monstrous figures. The morality of the 
Arthurian world is immediately thrown into question” (Rape and Ravishment 301).125 
But even a reader without much knowledge of the romance genre would sense the tale’s 
critique of the Arthurian tradition, of undisciplined knights, and of the lecherous (if less 
dangerous) “lymytours and othere hooly freres” that descend from the same British 
stock (866, 873-881). In keeping with the General Prologue's critique of male 
corruption, as well as her own prologue’s irreverence towards institutional authority, 
Alison’s tale takes as its very premise the failure of patriarchy to educate “yonge men” 
and civilize their disport (WBP 186-187). It also shows women deploying a program of 
                                                            




destabilizing but ultimately curative counsel to correct for these failings and promote 
public safety.  
In The Wife of Bath's Tale, the wayward knight's transformation begins to 
manifest in a shift between two different phases of mobility: a self-directed phase of 
mindless disport, and a female-dominated, intellectually purposeful phase of quest. 
Helen Cooper observes that the quest the queen crafts for the knight facilitates his 
“mental traveling, to distance himself from his former violent and misogynist self” (53). 
But in keeping with Alison's ethic of mobility, the knight's traveling is not entirely 
figurative or “mental.” His physical quest takes him to every “coost” of Britain (918-
922), and the literal dimension of his journey is inextricable from the metaphorical. By 
merging travel with social engagement, Guinevere exploits both forms of disport for 
their pedagogical value and transmutes them into a fruitfully disorienting education.126  
 
 
II. The queen and her quest 
 
As I will argue, we can read Queen Guinevere's address to the knight and the 
riddle-and-quest she designs for him as examples of good counsel. Both are rhetorically 
                                                            
126 In a reading that is in some ways similar to my own, Elizabeth M. Biebel 
interprets The Wife of Bath's Tale as involving a “treatment program” whereby women 
“set out to rehabilitate the knight.” But Biebel reads the old hag as the knight's “primary 
counselor,” who “mak[es] the assailant fully aware of the role of victim when he 
himself is placed in a situation of victimization” (“A Wife, a Batterer, and a Rapist,” 
Masculinities in Chaucer, 73-74). However, I contend that Guinevere and the loathly 
lady are equally important to the knight's rehabilitation, as well as to Alison's 




sophisticated acts of instruction, intended to make the knight more accountable. But 
how does the queen's performance qualify as wifely, and why does the issue of 
wifehood matter to her role as a counselor? Alison never shows Guinevere dispensing 
counsel to King Arthur, and certain hallmarks of wifely counsel are necessarily absent 
from the queen's interactions with the unmarried knight. Nonetheless, the text's 
emphasis on her literal marriage to Arthur, on her radical access to and influence over 
the knight, and on the role of wives in her court invites us to read Guinevere's 
performance as another example of “wifely” counse1 or instruction in the Tales.  
The queen's literal wifehood is logistically crucial to her performance of 
counsel, insofar as her marriage to the king allows her to commandeer his public role 
and to exercise royal sovereignty over the knight. As Arthur's wife, the queen 
commands access to the knight that any other woman might only gain through kinship 
or marriage, as the loathly lady demonstrates when she marries the knight in order to 
counsel him. But, in a figurative sense, she also plays a “wifely” role in relation to the 
knight himself. Moreover, certain ethical and rhetorical principles of wifely counsel 
inhere in the structure and proceedings of the queen's court, where wives are well-
represented.  
 Alison's description of the queen's court—“Ful many a noble wyf, and many a 
mayde, / And many a wydwe, for that they been wise”—accords a certain precedence to 
married women (1026-1029). Of all the women in attendance, “Mayde[s]” have the 
most in common with the knight's victim and the most at stake in his reform. But 
beginning the roster with maids would imply that the trial is primarily about obtaining 
justice for the knight's victim, when actually it is almost entirely about educating and 
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rehabilitating the knight (Biebel 73-74). By starting with “Ful many a noble wyf” and 
ending with wise widows, Alison bookends the court roster with women who have been 
married, because these experienced women are best equipped to reform young men. Her 
gentle emphasis on the role of wives in Guinevere's court bolsters the authoritative 
status of married women in the tale, signals the court's reformational aims, and thus 
establishes the tale, at least in part, as a narrative of wifely counsel. 
 Furthermore, there are ways in which the queen's court resembles domestic 
environments in other tales of wifely counsel.127 Although Guinevere’s relationship to 
the knight is not one of partnership or interdependency, her court, like Prudence's home, 
is free of the ruthless social competition that creates distrust, confusion, and cacophony 
in public settings. Furthermore, the queen's court is also characterized by control and 
unity of purpose. The environment allows for open communication and even a kind of 
intimacy or at least direct access between the knight and the queen: 
And afterward this knyght was bode appeere;  
To every wight comanded was silence,  
And that the knyght sholde telle in audience  
What thyng that wordly wommen loven best. (1030-1033) 
Here, Alison depicts the female-dominated court as conducive to active listening (“his 
answere for to heere”) and clear, concise self-expression. The passage also stresses the 
queen's power: the knight shows up because he is “bode appeere,” and everyone in the 
                                                            
127 At the end of the knight's quest, Alison conflates the esoteric, female-dominated  
environment that is Guinevere’s court with the knight’s home: “But hoom he  





court is “comanded” to be silent. If other wife-counselors gain a certain measure of 
access to and influence over their husbands by virtue of their physical proximity and 
spousal interdependence in marriage, the queen commands a comparable—or, 
theoretically, even greater—level of access and control by virtue of her status as 
Arthur's wife: she can command the knight's presence at her will. Thus her marriage to 
Arthur provides her with something like marital access to the knight's person. Like 
Prudence and Alison, the queen can dispense counsel to the knight over an extended 
period of time, in a space she appears at least partly to control. 
Alison's shifts between naming and anonymity in the tale reinforce Guinevere's 
literal wifehood as Arthur's queen as well as a figurative dimension of wifeliness in her 
relation to the knight. As in the Melibee, issues of naming at the beginning of the tale 
are loaded with implications for how to read the key relationships within it. Critics, 
however, have paid less attention to Guinevere’s namelessness in The Wife of Bath’s 
Tale than one would expect, and some seem not to have noticed.128 In any case, there is 
a tendency in some scholarship to represent Arthur’s queen in such a way that obscures 
the detail of her namelessness.129 Scholars who do remark on Guinevere's anonymity 
                                                            
128 Arthur Lindley notes that all the women are nameless in Alison’s tale, arguing  
that “The nameless women show a remarkable tendency to flow into one another: “We 
cannot avoid seeing the women as aspects of one personality, avatars of one goddess, 
nor seeing that all the aspects are ‘defined’ by their relation to the knight. They are his 
victim, his judge, his salvation, his desire.[...] [T]he women remain impenetrably 
mysterious even while playing their roles to (with? upon?) the knight” (Hyperion and 
the Hobby Horse [Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1996], 58-59). 
But the women in the tale are more individualized and distinct than Lindley’s reading 
acknowledges. As I hope my analysis shows, they are also not very mysterious.  
 
129 Kathleen E. Kennedy, for example, writes, “A nameless knight rapes a nameless  
maiden while riding along one day,” yet goes on to mention “Guinevere” by name and 
“Guinevere’s court of ladies” (Maintenance, Meed, and Marriage [New York: Palgrave 
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have not yet posed a satisfying explanation, although some of their readings furnish 
useful insights.130 Jane Bliss’ Naming and Namelessness in Medieval Romance 
comments briefly on The Wife of Bath's Tale, arguing  that Alison’s choice to name 
only Arthur and Midas “serves to emphasize the women’s voices” and to establish the 
tale as a sort of exemplum (53).131  The queen's namelessness, in particular, underscores 
the exemplary tropes that Bliss detects. But Alison's rhetorical maneuvers with naming 
are more surgical than Bliss' reading suggests. Like her take on the Midas story and her 
comments on scripture, Alison's approach to naming manifests the “scholastic skill” of 
quoting selectively to accommodate specific rhetorical goals related to wifehood and 
marriage (Minnis 248). 
Alison sets off the queen and the knight as partners in a counsel narrative by 
withholding their names and supplying Arthur's as a counterpoint. The absence of the 
queen's name also minimizes the potential for moral ambiguity in her relationship with 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Macmillan, 2009], 54). Samantha J. Rayner refers to her accurately, as  “Arthur’s 
queen,” but saves the epithet “nameless” for the knight alone (Images of Kingship 
[Rochester, New York: D. S. Brewer, 2008], 128).  
 
130 Esther Casier notes Guinevere's namelessness in order to argue that “beneficent  
and/or powerful women” in Chaucer’s work are “more or less disguised” versions of 
women in his memory (“not only Queen Philippa and Queen Anne, but the Duchess 
Blanche, the Princess Joan, and Constance of Castile”) (Geoffrey Chaucer and the 
Poetics of Disguise [Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2008] 16). 
Quinn’s reading draws attention to Guinevere’s moral importance in the narrative, but 
her emphasis on extratextual models rather obscures the queen’s complex relationship 
to several other figures in The Canterbury Tales and especially in Alison's texts. 
  
131 Mentions of the Wife of Bath's texts appear on pages 9, 53-54, 68, 74, 102, and  
106. But Bliss largely brackets The Wife of Bath's Tale because, in her reading, it holds 
up “less as romance than as exemplum” (Naming and Namelessness [Rochester, New 
York: D. S. Brewer, 2008] 53). She reserves thorough analysis for more typical 




Arthur’s knight. Abstracted and idealized into a queen with no name, Arthur's wife 
emerges as the knight’s unequivocal moral superior—in other words, as something like 
the kind of wife-counselor we see in Griselda and Prudence. At the same time, drawing 
focus from the extratextual tradition of “Guinevere’s” adultery allows Alison to redirect 
critical focus onto Arthur.  Just as the tale's depiction of rape inverts the traditional 
scrutiny of mobile women to spotlight the criminality of a mobile man, invocations of 
the king's name make us more likely to scrutinize him than to question the moral 
standing of his wife. Whereas Arthur’s name is loaded with moral ambiguity in the tale, 
Guinevere clearly operates on the side of innocence, to represent the interest of the 
blameless maiden and to reform the rapist.132 The victim’s anonymity as an unnamed 
“mayde” also serves to reinforce the knight’s unequivocal guilt, by spotlighting her 
virginity before the crime (Saunders, Rape and Ravishment 301-302).133 
                                                            
132 Furthermore, while readers might be able to forget about or bracket Guinevere’s  
adultery while they read The Wife of Bath’s Tale, they might also leave the  
tale prepared to reevaluate her traditional portrayal by the “Britons” who “speken greet 
honour” of Arthur (857-858). Why should the tradition emphasize the criminality of 
consensual adultery, without fully dealing with the crime of rape? Why should it 
emphasize Guinevere as an erotic figure rather than a  philosophical or political figure? 
Guinevere’s association with adultery will always complicate her moral status to some 
degree, but Alison’s defiant omission of this tradition from her tale forces readers to 
consider these destabilizing questions about wifehood, virtue, patriarchy, and British  
culture. Just as Guinevere sends the knight off on a quest to learn more about  
women, the Wife of Bath sends readers forth to learn more about Guinevere. For a time 
we are allowed to inhabit a lush and nostalgic Arthurian landscape, but not to remain 
complacent in our feelings or beliefs about that landscape. 
 
133 Saunders mentions that “theft of virginity” constitutes “the gravest category” of  
rape in medieval romance. That Alison offers only one piece of information about the 
victim—the fact of her maidenhood or virginity—underscores the severity of the 




Another tension related to naming in the tale is the glaring contrast between 
Guinevere’s anonymity and her instrumental role in propelling the narrative. This 
imbalance casts the patriarchal status quo “Of which that Britons speken greet honour” 
in an ironic light (858). Arthur gets credited by name four times but is largely and 
conspicuously absent in the narrative, and his unnamed wife appears all the more active, 
vocal, and essential by comparison (Rayner 127-128).134 Even before surrendering the 
knight's case to the queen, Arthur's judicial role is rather passive: he moves to execute 
the people's will, but only after their “clamour” and “pursute unto” him. As in The Tale 
of Melibee, which depicts Melibee's intent to “maken werre” on his family's attackers as 
a rash and potentially disastrous concession to public opinion, the queen's response to 
the rapist's crime is more rational, constructive, and proactive than her husband's is (Mel 
1049-1051). Like Griselda in her administrative mode, Alison’s queen accomplishes 
political work not alongside or in the service of her husband, as a consort, but rather in 
place of him (ClT 428-441). As a result of this irony, Arthur's name, like Midas', marks 
him out as vestigial to the plot of the knight's conversion. The almost comically unequal 
division of political labor in The Wife of Bath's Tale, as well as in The Clerk's Tale and 
The Tale of Melibee, reflects these texts' shared interest in the tension between women's 
civic capabilities and the extent to which their work and talents are acknowledged.  
                                                            
134 See bibliography for citation of eChaucer concordance. The three references to  
“Arthur,” all made by Alison, appear in line 857 (“In th’old dayes of the Kyng Arthour, 
[/ Of which that Britons speken greet honour]”), line 882 (“And so bifel that this kyng 
Arthour [/ Hadde in his hous a lusty bacheler]”), and line 890 (“And swich pursute unto 
the kyng Arthour [/ That dampned was this knyght for to be deed]”); “Arthures hous” 
appears in line 1089 as part of the loathly lady’s dialogue (“Is this the lawe of kyng 




Alison's discretionary use of names also forces readers to understand the queen's 
wifely counsel in relation to a specific polity. Her tale accomplishes a rhetorical feat 
that neither the Melibee narrator nor the Clerk undertake, except in framing materials: 
to situate wifely counsel in a British cultural context, on the home turf of Chaucer’s 
readers.135 Thus, in disclosing certain names and withholding others, the Wife of Bath 
achieves a sophisticated rhetorical balance: reminding us of Arthur and the weak British 
patriarchy he represents, while locking out the tradition of “Guinevere's” adultery in 
order to idealize and authenticate the queen. 
The queen's high moral status in the tale, along with her salvation of the knight, 
have led many critics to read her within the tradition of queenly intercession for judicial 
lenience. Directly after the rape, Guinevere leads a group of women who plead on the 
knight's behalf: “the queene and other ladyes mo / So longe preyeden the kyng of grace 
/ Til he his lyf hym graunted in the place” (894-896). This moment resonates with other 
late-medieval depictions of “queens or high-ranking women who successfully intercede 
for men under royal sentence” (Watkins 33).136 In a salient overview of queenly 
intercessors in Chaucer's works, Stephen Rigby links Guinevere to Alceste in The 
                                                            
135 See Christopher Fee, Gods, Heroes and Kings (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 2001). Fee argues,“The Arthurian setting and the commonplace magic  
suggest the popular oral traditions of the times, and this [Alison’s] may be Chaucer’s 
most populist tale” (209-210).  
 
136 The Prologue to the Legend of Good Women has attracted ample critical  
attention for its depiction of Alceste as a queenly intercessor on behalf of Chaucer. See 
John Watkins’ “Wrastling for this world’: Wyatt and the Tudor Canonization of 
Chaucer” (Refiguring Chaucer in the Renaissance, ed. Theresa M. Krier [Gainesville: 
University of Flrida Press, 1998], 32-33), Strohm (“Queens as Intercessors,” Hochon’s 
Arrow [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992]), John Carmi Parsons’ Eleanor of 




Legend of Good Women, to Mary in the invocation to Mary in the Second Nun's 
Prologue, and to Hippolyta in The Knight's Tale.   
But the paradigm of queenly intercession, which involves what Rigby calls a 
“characteristically feminine mercy,” misreads the affective dynamic between Guinevere 
and the men in the tale and does not fully account for the work that she and her court 
accomplish. Arthur exhibits none of the “vengeful wrath” that usually provokes a queen 
to intercede (Rigby 142), and neither Guinevere nor her ladies express the “pite” or 
charity we see in intercessors like Alceste (Frandenburg 144-145). Nor does Guinevere 
particularly humble herself before Arthur—who, appropriately enough, surrenders total 
sovereignty over the knight's case to the queen “al at hir wille, / To chese wheither she 
wolde hym save or spille.”137 Rather than intercede, Guinevere supersedes, entirely 
supplanting Arthur's judiciary and shifting the court's focus from punishment to 
rehabilitation through counsel. If narratives of queenly intercession stress “the power of 
certain privileged women to assuage rather than to suffer tyrannical wrath” (Watkins 
32-33), Chaucer's tales of wifely counsel stress that women can offer a constructive 
alternative to inadequate forms of justice.  
 Viewing The Wife of Bath's Tale as a story about counsel and reform rather than 
mercy allows us to honor the women of Guinevere's court as political agents and reveals 
the scope and complexity of Alison's political argument. In The Wife of Bath's Tale, the 
citizenry and legal system have decent intentions. Saunders notes that both the public 
                                                            
137 After the queen thanks Arthur “with al hir myght” (896-899), he disappears  
from the story, except for the loathly lady’s brief, unflattering allusion to “the lawe of 




and the court respond to the rape “with a legal realism unique in Arthurian romance”: 
the public's pursuit of justice from the king “recalls the possibility of presentment and 
indictment at the time,” and the court's cooperation reflects a progressive strain of 
thirteenth-century legal theory that was sympathetic to rape victims (Rape and 
Ravishment 303-304).138 But the prevailing order does not necessarily promote the 
general welfare. As in The Tale of Melibee, when Melibee's “woodness” is justified but 
counterproductive, the people's “clamor” for the knight's execution registers that his 
crime is detrimental to public order but does not offer a constructive solution to the 
problem of unruly noblemen. “[K]yng Arthour” and “cours of lawe” (890-892) would 
only punish and dispose of the criminal, thus maintaining the status quo that made the 
rape possible. The ladies’ determination to prevent this outcome, coupled with the 
queen’s constructive tone and style of address, reflects a collective imperative to reform 
that is in keeping with political themes in other tales of wifely counsel. 
Guinevere's rhetoric especially resonates with that of idealized wife-counselors 
in its emphasis on measurement, awareness, and accountability. Like Prudence and 
Griselda, she assumes the responsibility of speaking reason to a man who has nearly 
been undone—made “lyk a fool” (Mel 980), or “lyk a man had lost his wit”  (WBT 
1095), or “as he were wood” (GP 636)—by his own violent and self-serving impulses:
  And after this thus spak she to the knyght, 
Whan that she saugh hir tyme, upon a day: 
                                                            
138 Saunders argues that the public's outcry and pursuance of justice “echo the  
emphasis [on victims' rights] of legal theorists such as Bracton.” On Bracton and the 




“Thou standest yet,” quod she, “in swich array 
That of thy lyf yet hastow no suretee.  
I grante thee lyf, if thou kanst tellen me  
What thyng is it that wommen moost desiren.  
Be war, and keep thy nekke-boon from iren!  
And if thou kanst nat tellen it anon,  
Yet wol I yeve thee leve for to gon  
A twelf-month and a day, to seche and leere 
An answere suffisant in this mateere;  
And suretee wol I han, er that thou pace,  
Thy body for to yelden in this place.” (900-912) 
Direct, deliberate, and emotionally controlled, the queen's counsel stresses caution—“of 
thy lyf yet hastow no suretee”; “ Be war, and keep thy nekke-boon from iren!”—and 
prioritizes the imperative to “leere.”139 Like the other wives' counsel, Guinevere’s 
speech is pragmatically generous: her plan anticipates and allows for the knight’s initial 
ignorance of the answer to her riddle. With a sensitivity to timing that contrasts with the 
“clamour” and reactivity of the public (889), the queen waits, just like Prudence, until 
“she saugh hir tyme, upon a day” to prescribe a course of action (WBT 901, Mel 980). 
Guinevere also uses formal rhetoric to reinforce a pre-existing bond with the knight, 
ensuring that he remains somehow accountable to her. After his failure to uphold the 
                                                            
139 By the time the knight departs from court, he understands learning to be his  
primary objective: “he hopeth for to fynde grace / To lerne what thyng wommen loven 




most basic chivalric values, the queen requests a fresh and explicit vow—“And suretee 
wol I han” (911)—that reflects the ethos of contractualism that we see in The Clerk's 
Tale and The Tale of Melibee, as well as “evoke[s] the language of mercantile and 
political contracts” (Gastle 190). Although the Wife of Bath avoids measured language 
and emotional restraint when she counsels her husbands in her prologue, she 
acknowledges the usefulness of these strategies in her tale by including the idealized 
queen in a multifaceted program to reform the knight. 
In Alison's vision, the queen's rhetorical formality reinforces her legal authority. 
Bruce Holsinger credits Guinevere with establishing “a queenly jurisprudence” that 
stands out in contrast to Arthur's judiciary, or “the legal embodiment of the 'auctoritee' 
that [Alison] invokes in the first line of her Prologue” (159):  
The Tale thus defines its own sphere of legal knowing by 
opposing a queenly jurisprudence to the normative form 
of legal authority promulgated in and through 'statut.' […] 
One of the points of the Wife of Bath's Tale (and, for that 
matter, of the medieval 'courts of love' more generally) is 
to suspend imaginatively the authority of the royal courts 
in favor of a provisional, experimental, and fleeting form 
of legal power—a power that here achieves much of its 
resonance from the experiential vernacular of the Wife 
herself. In this case, then, written 'statut' yields to ad hoc 
tribunal just as royal apparatus makes way for female 
jurisdiction. (159)  
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The “provisional, experimental” nature of Guinevere's court reflects the Wife of Bath's 
taste for ethical or ideological flexibility: the queen does not claim to set any precedents 
for the future treatment of rapists; nor does she articulate any steadfast principles of 
justice or morality. Instead, she tailors her response to the knight's particular case, 
devising a way to maximize his exposure to women's counsel over the course of a year. 
But Holsinger's term “ad hoc” somewhat belies the formality of Guinevere's 
performance and the highly coordinated and unified nature of her court. Saunders 
remarks on the organization of the women at the beginning of the tale, reading the 
maiden's silence “as a mark of the efficacy of the women of the court who plead on her 
behalf” (302), and Alison emphasizes the court's total agreement on the knight's answer 
after his return: “In al the court ne was ther wyf, ne mayde, / Ne wydwe that contraried 
that he sayde, / But seyden he was worthy han his lyf” (1143-1145). The queen's 
legalism is experimental or flexible at the same time that it embraces conventional 
forms and contractual rhetoric, establishing the idealized and artificially unified court as 
a symbolic site of women's sovereignty. 
 But the queen's rhetoric emphasizes the knight's agency and options rather than 
her own undeniable authority over him, thus positioning her as more of a counselor than 
a unilateral enforcer. What is “fleeting” about the queen's jurisprudence is not, as 
Holsinger contends, her “legal power”—Arthur's power, in this tale, appears fleeting by 
comparison—but her emphasis on judgment. The focus of her entire judicial process is 
rehabilitation, which takes mostly outside of the court, and judgment of the knight's 
heinous crime plays little to no role in the year's events. Guinevere's aim is not to isolate 
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the knight in a static stew of guilt and remorse but, in sovereign fashion, to control his 
movements and reshape his relationship to women.  
  That the knight perceives Guinevere’s language as prescriptive rather than 
compulsory allows him to maintain a sense of autonomy—at least temporarily—as he 
embarks on his quest. Even though he must answer the riddle on pain of his life, the 
knight understands himself to be making an unpleasant but ultimately autonomous 
choice to embark on the journey:  
 Wo was this knyght, and sorwefully he siketh;  
 But what! He may nat do al as hym liketh. 
 At the laste he chees hym for to wende  
And come agayn, right at the yeres ende,  
With swich answere as God wolde hym purveye; 
And taketh his leve, and wendeth forth his weye.  
He seketh every hous and every place 
Where as he hopeth for to fynde grace 
To lerne what thyng wommen loven moost[.] (913-917) 
The word “chees” indicates the knight’s (so-far) enduring sense of independence, in 
spite of public's call for his execution. Alison makes clear that the queen objectively 
possesses freedom of choice; given Arthur’s mandate, the knight’s fate is “al at hir 
wille, / To chese wheither she wolde hym save or spille” (897-898). But whether the 
knight is truly “choosing” to embark on the quest that his survival depends on is a 
matter of perception. He has just narrowly escaped decapitation, yet he understands the 
quest as an opportunity that might be turned down. In Alison's paraphrase, his pouty 
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logic for accepting the challenge— “But what! He may nat do al as hym liketh” —
betrays a lack of humility and of self-awareness that infuses the tale with irony. “The 
queene and other ladyes mo” (894) have undertaken to speak up for the knight and save 
his life; whatever chance at salvation they offer ought to liketh him a lot.   
 That same line links Alison’s knight to Walter the marquis, who uses similar 
language and deeply covets the autonomy of his choices. When the people beg Walter 
to marry, he stipulates with pedantic thoroughness that he must be allowed to “chese” a 
wife of his “free wyl” and that the people must respect the autonomy of his “choys” 
(143-175). Walter’s later claims that the people have pressed him to kill Griselda’s 
children and find a new wife are so egregiously false as to underscore the total 
autonomy of his secret choice to set this charade in motion.140 And even at the very end 
of the tale, Walter insists on clarifying that his actions were voluntary, when he publicly 
explains the entire narrative in terms of his choice to test or “assaye” Griselda (1072-
1078). Alison’s knight displays a similar if less self-conscious attachment to the notion 
of free choice. The ultimate moral victory in The Wife of Bath’s Tale happens when he 
agrees to let his wife do all the choosing: by the time the “loathly lady” offers him a 
choice—“Chese now [...] / To han me foul and old” or “yong and fair” (1219-1223)—
the knight responds, “Cheseth yourself” (1232-1233). His answer suggests that the 
                                                            
140 “I moot doon with thy doghter for the beste, / Nat as I wolde, but as my peple  
leste” (ClT 489-490); “I may nat doon as every plowman may” (779). Of course, the 
reverse of his tremendously ironic formation is true: it is “plowmen” or peasants like 
Griselda and her father who are constrained to obey, whereas Walter has the power to 




barrage of women's counsel he has encountered throughout the tale has progressively 
weakened his sense of authority to choose. 
Guinevere's contribution to this process is to design a riddle and quest that 
expose the knight to his own ignorance and intellectual frailty. In the course of his 
travels to “every hous and every place / [...] / To lerne what thyng wommen loven 
moost,” the knight faces an onslaught of contradictory, often misogynistic counsel 
about women's desires. Until the end of his journey, “he ne koude arryven in no coost / 
Wher as he myghte fynde in this mateere / Two creatures accordynge in feere” (919-
924). Strangers offer him diverse answers: “richesse,” “jolynesse,” “lust abedde,” “to be 
wydwe and wedde,” to be “yflatered and yplesed,” “attendance and [...] bisynesse,” “to 
be free and do right as us lest,” and to “been holden wise and clene of synne” and 
“stable, and eek secree, / And in o purpos” (924-949). Even Alison herself weighs in on 
the riddle for the pilgrims, arguing against the stranger who claims that women want to 
be trusted with secrets; in an antifeminist digression, as noted earlier, she recounts 
Ovid’s tale of King Midas’ wife, who is so anxious to betray the secret of her husband’s 
“two asses eres” that she leans over a marsh and tells it to the water (949-982).  
The sheer number of stereotypes in Alison's account of the quest diffuses each 
one's rhetorical weight. Collectively, the antifeminist stereotypes create more confusion 
than meaning in the text and are profoundly unhelpful to the knight. His resignation and 
sense of failure at the end of his journey suggest that the queen's quest serves to weaken 
his sense of authority, making him more accountable in the process:   
  Whan that he saugh he myghte nat come therby—  
  This is to seye, what wommen love moost—  
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  Withinne his brest ful sorweful was the goost.  
  But hoom he gooth; he myghte nat sojourne;  
  The day was come that homward moste he tourne. (984-988)  
Heidi Breuer observes that by the end of his quest, the knight “has given up […] and 
admitted that he does not know what women want, can not [sic] name it and thus assert 
control over it” (80). At the same time the knight gives up on his capacity to understand 
and control women, he ceases to profess control over his own movements. Keeping on 
the move—“he myghte nat sojourne”—and turning “homward” to the Guinevere's court 
are not things he chooses to do but things he “moste” do, in fulfillment of his contract. 
When he chances upon the loathly lady, the knight finally articulates the severity of his 
need for a woman's expertise:  “My leeve mooder,” says the knight, “certeyn / I nam but 
deed but if that I kan seyn / What thyng it is that wommen moost desire. / Koude ye me 
wisse, I wolde wel quite youre hire” (1005-1008). Over the course of his quest, he has 
had to accept his legal subordination to Guinevere; to acknowledge his own ignorance 
of the riddle's answer; to seek counsel from a diverse multitude of strangers; to 
acknowledge his inability to manage and synthesize this counsel; to humble himself 
before a “foul, and oold, and poore” woman (1063); and to bind himself to this woman 
as a debtor.  
 But male surrender is not the only ethical imperative in The Wife of Bath's Tale; 
Alison's ethic of vitality and mobility remains at play and informs the denouement of 
the first half of the tale. At first, the knight's self-presentation at court after his quest 
exemplifies a “manly” style of surrender that is in keeping with this ethic. He articulates 
his answer to the riddle with a dignified combination of humility and self-possession, 
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deference and confidence, resignation and readiness, that can be read as a bolder 
version of the male rhetoric of surrender in Chaucer's other tales of wifely counsel. In 
the queen’s presence, the knight “ne stood nat stille as doth a best, / But to his questioun 
anon answerde / With manly voys, that al the court it herde:”   
  “My lige lady, generally,” quod he,  
  “Wommen desiren to have sovereynetee  
  As wel over hir housbond as hir love, 
  And for to been in maistrie hym above.  
  This is youre mooste desir, thogh ye me kille.  
  Dooth as yow list; I am heer at youre wille.” (1034-1042)  
Here, Alison depicts a new degree of animation in the knight’s comportment and directs 
us to read this development as a sign of his progress. The strange but crucial 
observation that the knight “ne stood nat stille as doth a best” links stillness to animal 
fear and muteness, and perhaps to the moral stagnation that gives way to the knight’s 
beastly act of rape at the beginning of the tale. We can imagine that, in the context of 
the silent court, the knight is physically composed when he addresses the queen. But at 
this early yet pivotal moment in his moral development, Alison chooses to emphasize 
the knight’s activity in engaging with the court. Whereas Arthurian justice would have 
required the knight to passively submit, Alison and Guinevere require him to participate 
in his own rehabilitation, and the loathly lady empowers him to do so with “no fere” 
(1022).  
Thus, by “send[ing] the thoughtless young knight into an aporia of women's 
desires,” the queen—in partnership with her court, her subjects, and the loathly lady—
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have succeeded at keeping the knight mobile while making him more accountable 
(Woods 122). But like The Wife of Bath’s Prologue, Alison’s tale grapples with the 
challenges and limits of wifely counsel at several stages. When, in payment for her 
answer to the riddle, the loathly lady demands the knight's hand in marriage, he 
undergoes an ethical relapse, indulging in a tour de force of unmanly behavior that 
suggests he remains unfit for public life. The knight’s fruitless desperation to retract his 
“trouthe”—“For Goddes love, as chees a newe requeste! / Taak al my good and lat my 
body go” (1060-1061)—not only reflects poorly on “Arthures hous,” as the loathly lady 
herself observes (1087-1097), but bodes ominously for public safety, suggesting that the 
knight is not, after all, fully prepared to meet Arthurian codes.  
In a complete reversal of his admirable and “fere”-less public performance 
(1022-1025), the knight becomes comically antisocial, arranging to marry the loathly 
lady “prively” to avoid the exposure of a public feast, and hiding “as an owle” from his 
“foule” wife once they are married (1077-1082). When he deigns to speak to her, both 
before and after the wedding, his exclamations reflect a profound shallowness, 
pusillanimity, cruelty, and an un-Christian and unchivalrous classism: “‘My love?” 
quod he, “nay, my dampnacioun! / Allas, that any of my nacioun / Sholde evere so foule 
disparaged be” (1067-1069); “Thou art so loothly, and so oold also, / And therto comen 
of so lough a kynde, / That litel wonder is thogh I walwe and wynde” (1100-1102). The 
knight's cruelty to the crone does not negate the educational value of his quest, but it 
does define the limits of his education so far. He has learned to understand women as 
self-possessed agents, as aspirants to sovereignty, but he has not learned to speak to all 
women respectfully, and he has retained a harmful sense of socioeconomic entitlement.  
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That Alison's idealized queen only partially succeeds at reforming her charge is 
in keeping with the prologue's argument for the value of “Divers scoles” and “diverse 
practyk” (WBP 44c-44e). Fortunately, mobility is a cornerstone of Guinevere's counsel, 
and mobility can beget diversity. The knight's quest introduces him to counselors 
beyond his geographic and social ken and culminates in his marriage to the loathly lady, 
a consummate counselor who is multiple and diverse unto herself.  
 
 
III. Multiplicity and the loathly lady 
 
Even though the Wife of Bath does not live out the Old-Testament imperative 
“to wexe and multiplye” in its traditional sense, she nonetheless espouses multiplicity—
of sources, destinations, rhetorical strategies, social perspectives, marriages, and 
counselors—as a key value (WBP 28). Alison is no more interested in a monolithic style 
of counsel than she is in the monolithic authority of clerical wisdom, and the explicit 
arguments for diversity in her prologue  are born out in her tale of two very different 
wife-counselors (44c-44e, 95-104). In The Wife of Bath's Tale, Alison's zeal for variety 
leads her to explore collaborative models of wifely counsel, wherein multiple wife-
figures mobilize to reform an individual bachelor, in addition to a more traditional and 
intimate model of counsel involving two spouses.141  
                                                            
141 Male-to-male counsel in The Tale of Melibee and other Canterbury texts also  
tends to take on either an individual or a collaborative format, but the Tales depict 
heterosexual marriage as a distinct context for one-on-one counsel, and Alison imagines 
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We have already seen that multiplicity plays a major role in Queen Guinevere's 
counsel: her court is comprised of women with diverse marital backgrounds (1043-
1045), and her own performance can be said to subsume all of the ideas the knight 
collects from her subjects on his quest (919-982). Although none of these ideas are 
sufficient to answer the queen's riddle, they are collectively valuable for their dizzying 
variety, and not just because they discombobulate the knight. Having previously 
encountered only conventional or idealized examples of women in the tale—the 
nameless victim and the idealized queen—the reader must, over the course of the quest, 
acknowledge women's diversity and imperfections. We partake in the knight's confusion 
amid the clashing ideas that emerge during his journey, and that confusion forces us to 
reflect critically on conclusions we might have drawn earlier in the tale regarding 
women as types and paragons. Without undermining Alison's critique of male 
criminality or the admiration that the queen's court commands, the litany of 
misogynistic stereotypes destabilizes the moral paradigm of the tale, reminding us that, 
outside of Guinevere's unified, idealized court, there is a world of women who are 
fallible, ideologically diverse, and as difficult to categorize as the Wife of Bath herself.  
That one of these unconventional women completes the knight's transformation 
speaks to Alison's faith in an eclectic, collaborative model of wifely counsel. As the 
second major wife-counselor to work closely with the knight, as a purveyor of counsel 
in radically diverse forms, and as a shape-shifting trickster who contains more than one 
woman in one body, the loathly lady is a symbol and a generator of multiplicity in The 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the tradition of “fictional love courts” as a distinct context for collective counsel (Crane, 




Wife of Bath's Tale. The rest of this chapter will parse the multiple strategies that make 
up the loathly lady's chimerical performance of wifely counsel: contracts, homily, 
spouse-testing, and shape-shifting. By focusing mainly on contracts and homily, I aim 
to show how the lady maximizes the destabilizing power of these conventional 
strategies of wifely counsel in order to reform the knight and shake up the Arthurian 
social order.   
 The loathly lady's socioeconomic inferiority to the knight necessitates her 
innovative use of diverse rhetorical strategies. Whereas the queen's power over the 
knight is institutional, automatic, and unchanging, the loathly lady, being “foul, and 
oold, and poore,” must draw on a repertoire of trickery to gain long-term access to the 
knight through marriage (1063).  Thus Alison prioritizes the old hag's legal 
transformation from generic “wyf” to married woman as the all-important first step in 
her performance of counsel. In her introduction to the loathly lady, the Wife of Bath 
draws attention to issues of wifehood, power, and identity by evoking the term “wyf” 
while maintaining an intriguing aura of ambiguity around the lady's marital status:  
  [...] on the grene he saugh sittynge a wyf— 
  A fouler wight ther may no man devyse.  
  Agayn the knyght this olde wyf gan ryse,  
  And seyde, “Sire knyght, heer forth ne lith no wey.  
  Tel me what that ye seken, by youre fey!  
  This olde folk kan muchel thyng,” quod she.  
  “My leeve mooder,” quod this knyght, “certeyn  
  I nam but deed but if that I kan seyn  
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  What thyng it is that wommen most desire.” (989-1007)  
Alison does not fully negate the lady's potential for wifehood; her repetition of “wyf” as 
a generic marker of gender foreshadows other definitions of wifehood—“The female 
partner in a sanctioned union,” “the mistress of a household,” “a woman who has had 
sexual experience” (MED)—that the lady comes to represent later in the tale. But in the 
above passage, stripped of contextual resonances, the word “wyf” simply denotes the 
loathly lady as “a human biological female” (MED). We might assume from the lady's 
advanced age and from the absence of a husband that she is unmarried or widowed, but 
the passage does not specify her marital status or history. In order to underplay the 
lady's current eligibility or potential for marriage, Alison—in this early moment—
desexualizes her, stressing the hag's ugliness and androgyny. She invokes the phrase 
“olde wyf,” sometimes used as “a term of disparagement” since the thirteenth century, 
and calls the hag the foulest of “wight[s],” an androgynous word that can refer to any 
living creature, including animals and monsters (MED). The lady also refers to herself 
with the androgynous term “old folk,” misdirecting the knight so that he does not read 
her as a peer or heterosexual match (MED). In turn, the knight calls her “mooder,” 
signaling his obliviousness to the lady's sexuality and to her potential as a mate. The 
knight's inability to recognize her as a prospective wife allows the crone to trap him in a 
marriage contract he cannot see coming. 
  The loathly lady designs this trap by combining multiple strategies associated 
with traditional wifely counsel—a lesson and a contract—into an economic transaction, 
leveraging her life-saving wisdom in exchange for radically unlimited power over the 
knight's “body” and “good” (1061). When the loathly lady intercepts the knight near the 
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end of his quest, she “teche[s]” him the answer to the queen's riddle—“What thyng it is 
that wommen moost desire”—in exchange for his rash promise to do whatever “nexte 
thyng” she might require of him (1007, 1010, 1019-1022). The striking formality with 
which the lady executes her first contract with the knight underscores its narrative and 
thematic importance. Both steps in the transaction involve what theorist Walter Beale 
would call “instructive performative rhetoric,” which serves “to interpret and reinforce 
the value, importance, or true significance of a thing” (146). Richard Firth Green notes 
the lady's formality in demanding that the knight “plight his troth 'heere in myn hand'” 
(1009), which obliges him to carry out a “ritual confirmation” of his promise involving 
the customary practice of “shaking or slapping [...] hands” (Green 13). The loathly lady 
also creates an aura of ceremony around her disclosure of the riddle's answer, by 
whispering it as “a pistel in his ere.” In its intimacy, this gesture prefigures her marriage 
to the knight and binds them together with shared knowledge that will not be disclosed 
to the reader or to the court for another sixteen lines (1021-1022, 1038).142 Like the 
knight's “ritual confirmation” of his troth, the lady's whispering has a symbolic or 
performative dimension. We know there is no risk of someone overhearing them: the 
“ladyes foure and twenty, and yet mo,” whose dancing first lured the knight to green, 
have all “Vannyshed,” leaving behind “No creature […] that bar lyf” except the loathly 
lady and the knight himself (991-998). In the absence of other people, the hag's 
performance of secrecy thus serves to formalize her disclosure of the “pistel” and to 
                                                            
142 The hag's whispering also echoes the scene in which Midas’ wife traitorously  
whispers the king's “conseil” or secret into the mire (969-980). The rhyming image of 
whispered counsel is comically foreboding for the knight's sexual fate but nonetheless 




underscore that she is fulfilling her half of their first contract. The knight's hasty pledge 
to fulfill his end of this contract—“‘Have heer my trouthe,’ quod the knyght, ‘I grante’” 
(1009-1013)—sets in motion a succession of further agreements that structure the rest 
of the tale: the marriage contract that the lady demands as payment for her life-saving 
wisdom, and the couple's agreement that the lady should exercise “maistrie” in their 
married life (1070-1072, 1230-1238).  
 The strategic importance of contracts to the loathly lady's counsel is in keeping 
with the emphasis on contracts in The Tale of Melibee and The Clerk's Tale. The old 
hag's particular brand of contractualism echoes the Wife of Bath's distinct and 
unconventional understanding of  marriage: like Alison's multiple marriages, the loathly 
lady's multiple contracts have a temporary quality, insofar as each contract is 
“refreshed” by another until the end of the tale. Whereas Griselda and Prudence invoke 
the concept of marriage or a marriage contract in order to protect a constant set of terms 
or values, the loathly lady devises multiple contracts to deconstruct, and eventually 
reconstruct, the terms of her initial relationship to the knight. 
 The Wife of Bath's Tale depicts at least three kinds of multiplicity that contracts 
can foster. First, the loathly lady demonstrates how one contract can multiply itself, to 
amplify the destabilizing effects of its original terms. In its strategic vagueness, the 
hag's demand for an unspecified “next thing” makes her marriage contract possible, and 
her marriage contract makes possible the knight's explicit surrender to her “governance” 
in marriage. Thus the loathly lady designs her initial contract to “wax and multiply,” so 
that it begets other contracts of increasing specificity, usefulness, and iconoclastic 
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power. As a result, the generative power of contracts becomes a major engine of the 
narrative and a source of the tale's most subversive themes. 
 Second, the class disparity between the hag and the other major players in the 
tale indicates that contracts can facilitate live interaction between people from multiple 
backgrounds. The loathly lady's command of contracts opens up channels of access not 
only to the nobleman she seeks to reform but also to the queen and the women at court 
who are empowered to support her efforts. The hag's in-person collaboration with 
Guinevere's court, carried out in the knight's presence, represents a convergence of 
disparate social classes brought together by contracts (911-912, 1009-1013).  
 Third, The Wife of Bath's Tale shows how diverse contractual agreements can 
reinforce each other's terms and effects over time. The queen's demand for surety and 
the hag's extraction of a rash promise have very different effects on the knight: 
Guinevere's quest is restorative in its broad outline, saving the knight's “lyf,” protecting 
his body or “nekke-boon,” and redeeming his public image by allowing him to show he 
is “worthy” of pardon (903, 906, 1023-1045); by contrast, the knight's “biheste” to the 
loathly lady spawns a socially and economically disadvantageous marriage contract that 
dismantles his self-command and social identity—so much so that, like an “owle,” he 
goes into hiding after the wedding (1059, 1073-1082). But the compatibility between 
the hag's mission and the mission of the queen's court allows both parties to operate 
symbiotically in a common effort to reform the knight. By extracting a rash promise, the 
loathly lady not only enables the knight to fulfill his contract with the queen but also 
compounds the vulnerability and subordination that the queen designed her contract to 
bring out in him. The hag's first contract initiates a period during which the knight is in 
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thrall to two female authorities at once (1013-1045); it also perpetuates the power 
structure inherent in the court's temporary relation to the knight well after he is released.   
 In addition to her shrewd use of contracts, the loathly lady's command of 
litigious rhetoric further empowers her to engage the queen and her court as 
collaborators. Even after the knight clears himself by answering the queen's riddle, the 
hag invokes the authority of her “sovereign lady queene” for support in holding the 
knight to his vow: 
  Er that youre court departe, do me right.  
  I taughte this answere unto the knyght;  
  For which he plighte me his trouthe there,  
  The firste thyng that I wolde hym requere  
  He wolde it do, if it lay in his myghte.  
  Before the court thanne preye I thee, sir knyght,  
  […] that thou me take unto thy wyf,  
  For wel thou woost that I have kept thy lyf.  
  If I seye fals, sey nay, upon thy fey! (1048-1057)  
The lady's two invocations of the court itself bookend her explanation of the initial 
contract with the knight and reflect her emphasis on the legal dimension of their 
agreement. Although her plea has the abrupt tenor of a comic outburst, Joseph Allan 
Hornsby notes that it conforms to legal practice. In offering the knight a chance to 
refute any “fals” allegations, the hag is reminding him of his right to “deny [the vow] 
word for word and wage his law, that is, swear to the truth of his counterassertions” 
(88). The knight responds by begging the old hag to “chees a newe requeste,” but he 
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nonetheless acknowledges the terms of his initial contract —“I woot right wel that 
swich was my biheste”—and resists the temptation to fabricate “counterassertions” 
(1059-1060). Thus, right after the knight demonstrates a new accountability to royal 
leadership, the loathly lady's legal performance enables him to demonstrate a new 
respect for the law. 
 The destabilizing effects of the hag's contracts and legal performance extend 
beyond the knight himself. By marrying the knight, she alters his public status and 
identity in a way that threatens to affect the status of people in his social, economic, and 
kinship networks. The knight experiences his marriage contract not only as his own 
“dampnacioun” but also as the undoing of his whole “nacioun” (1067-1069). Benson 
glosses “nacioun” as “family,” but the term could also refer to the knight's social 
class—or, given the emphatically British setting of this Arthurian tale, to his race or his 
country (MED). The knight's exclamation that he and his “nacioun” are damned forever 
demonstrates the scope of the loathly lady's destabilizing contracts, rhetoric, and 
marriage politics.  
 In response to the knight's dismay, the loathly lady delivers a homily on 
“gentilesse” that dismantles his classist logic and shores up her moral and 
epistemological status in the tale. The sermon synthesizes literary, religious, 
experiential, and even scientific teachings into a coherent argument that is, compared to 
the rest of her performance, uncharacteristically lucid in its logic and rhetorical aim. 
The lady contends that the knight should not “repreve” her “poverte” (1205-1206), 
because true nobility derives from Christian virtue, not material wealth: “Crist wole we 
clayme of hym oure gentillesse, / Nat of oure eldres for hire old richesse” (1117-1118). 
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Her assertion that all human virtues come “fro God allone” distinguishes the hag as the 
figure most clearly aligned with Christianity and sound moral education in both of 
Alison's texts (1162). 
To this end, the loathly lady's lecture exhibits the transparency, directness, 
citationality, and Christian orthodoxy of traditional good counsel. Although many 
scholars have oversimplified the hag's role in the tale by stressing the event of her 
shape-shifting, others have perceptively emphasized the striking rhetorical orthodoxy of 
her sermon.143 Elizabeth Passmore links women's counsel in English and Irish loathly-
lady narratives to the mirrors-for-princes genre, and A. C. Spearing remarks that “The 
Loathly Lady's lecture makes The Wife of Bath's Tale one of Chaucer's most rhetorically 
directed poems” (Passmore 3, Spearing 246). Comparing the lecture to Prudence's 
speeches in The Tale of Melibee, which are to some extent similar in style and content, 
                                                            
143  Interpretations of The Wife of Bath's Tale that focus on the loathly lady's shape- 
shifting tend to overlook the clerkly themes and arguments of her sermon and to 
obscure her role as a counselor. Angela Jane Weisel reads the lady as a purveyor of “a 
natural magic, tied to generation and the green mede,” in contradistinction to “The 
clerk's magic, or 'science,'” which prioritizes “control over nature” (Conquering the 
Reign of Femeny [Rochester, New York: D. S. Brewer, 1995], 112; see also Lindeboom 
208). Susan P. Starke cites Alison's loathly lady to argue that “In medieval romance, 
[…] the recurrent figure of the shape-shifter,” with “her alliance [to] the unpredictable 
and 'uncanny' operations of the mysterious natural world,” embodies “Women's 
uncertain epistemological status” (The Heronies of English Pastoral Romance 
[Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2007], 30). Manuel Aguirre claims that Chaucer's old hag 
partakes in a tradition wherein a shape-shifting woman represents “Earth, the cycle of 
the seasons, the process of life and death” and plays a symbolic rather than a “moral” 
role (“The Roots of the Symbolic Role of Woman in Gothic Literature,” Exhibited by 
Candlelight, eds. Valeria Tinkler-Villani and Peter Davidson, with Jane Stevenson 
[Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1996], 62). Aguirre and Starke are comparativists 
arguments that both reflect and reinforce a generalized perception of women in 
medieval English literature “as fickle, as variable, as subject to irrational moods and 
changes” (Aguirre 62). All five readings of the old hag's performance ignore crucial 
arguments in her lengthy monologue on nobility, poverty, and age (WBT 1109-1212), as 




reveals the masterful conventionality of the lady's performance during this extended 
moment in the tale. Like Prudence, the loathly lady deals with her husband's resistance 
by successfully integrating a case for her own credibility into broader arguments about 
virtue. Just as Prudence defends her wisdom and intentions by deconstructing Melibee's 
distrust of women, the old hag defends her authority by mounting a theologically expert 
critique of the knight's contempt for her low birth (Mel 1055-1111). More generally, her 
sermon bears out that she is capable of rational, ethically consistent counsel, and that 
she is versed in multiple wisdom traditions. The loathly lady demonstrates an 
impressive breadth of knowledge when she invokes the classical authorities Seneca and 
Valerius, the Christian Boethius, and the poets Dante and Juvenal (1125-1132, 1165-
1170, 1183-1184, 1191-1194), in addition to the experiential wisdom of her own social 
observations (1150-1158, 1207-1212). Ultimately, the speech illuminates a 
synchronicity between the eclectic citationality of traditional “counsel poems” and the 
loathly lady's subversive interest in diverse discourses (Steiner 3).  
In its Christian orthodoxy and conventional argumentation, the sermon serves to 
authenticate the crone's intellectual and theological credentials and to authenticate the 
diverse and unconventional strategies that characterize the rest of her counsel. To seal 
the knight's command of her teachings, the lady completes her performance with three 
such unorthodox strategies: a test, another contract, and an act of shape-shifting. All 
three moves are rhetorically destabilizing, insofar as each comes as a surprise; they are 
also socially destabilizing, insofar as each move further alienates the knight from his 
initial assumptions about class and gender. But this final sequence in the narrative is 
thematically “stabilizing,” at least temporarily, insofar as it helps the knight and the 
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reader to synthesize an argument from the tale's diverse themes, concerns, and 
implications.  
The test is designed to determine whether the knight has internalized both the 
answer to the queen's riddle, which is that women desire to be sovereign, and the old 
hag's sermon, which argues for honoring the virtuous over the rich. After the loathly 
lady demonstrates her own exceeding wisdom and virtue in her homily, she offers the 
knight a choice between having her “foul and old” and “trew [and] humble,” or “yong 
and fair” but unfaithful (1219-1235). The knight successfully synthesizes an answer that 
honors the hag's superior virtue precisely by granting her the sovereignty she desires: 
“I put me in youre wise governance; / Cheseth youreself which may be moost pleasance 
/ And moost honour to yow and me also.”144 The knight's response to the hag's bedroom 
sermon reflects his intellectual progress by demonstrating his ability to synthesize 
diverse ideas. His response provides a model of interpretation for the reader, showing 
how multiple arguments—the hag's seemingly unrelated claims about women's desires 
on the one hand and the social construction of class on the other—might be reconciled 
and applied in the service of social reform.  
The remainder of the tale galvanizes the loathly lady's status as paragon of 
multiplicity, subversive contractualism, and female power. After the knight passes his 
test, his wife shifts back to a contractual mode, pressing him to formalize his 
commitment to her sovereignty: “Thanne have I gete of yow maistrie […] / Syn I my 
chese and governe as me lest?,” she asks; “Yes, certes, wyf,” says the knight, ‘I hold it 
                                                            
144 That the lessons of both the riddle and the lecture inhere in the knight's answer,  
and that he perceives his wife's “honour” as correlational to his own, suggest that the 
knight has sincerely assimilated the wifely counsel of both the queen and the hag. 
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best’” (1237-1238). In return for this vow, the lady pledges her own “trouthe,” on pain 
of her “lyf,” to satisfy his “delit” and to obey him “in every thyng / That myghte doon 
hym plesance or likyng”  (1217, 1255-1266). To fulfill this contract, she uses her magic 
to transcend the grim binary opposition between fidelity and youthful beauty by 
morphing herself to embody both traits, “This is to seyn, [...] bothe fair and good.” The 
lady's shape-shifting adds a new degree of mutuality to her third contract with the 
knight at the same time that it demonstrates her superior prowess: earlier in the tale, the 
knight complains that his misery in marriage “wol nat been amended nevere mo,” and 
the lady accepts this grievance as a challenge: “I koude amend al this, / If that me liste”  
(1098-1102, 1105-1108). By transforming herself, she simultaneously makes good on 
this boastful claim and disproves the misogynistic stereotype that claims multiple 
virtues cannot reside in the same woman.   
In light of the knight's crime at the beginning of the tale, the loathly lady's 
pledge of devotion may strike readers as distasteful or even dangerous. But it is 
nonetheless compatible with the logic of the tale and with the imperative of 
rehabilitation that tends to structure narratives of wifely counsel. The (formerly) loathly 
lady's wifely generosity and exemplarity are predicated on the knight's vow to let her be 
sovereign; Alison stresses that her devotion is an autonomous choice, and the exceeding 
pride the lady takes in her ability to satisfy the abject knight implies that she maintains a 
will that is separate from his. Furthermore, details in the tale imply that her “obedience” 
is primarily nominal: it is easy to obey your husband's wishes after he has sworn to 
make you master of the house. The knight himself suggests that the loathly lady knows 
what’s good for him and that he has come to understand their best interests as 
 
 192 
equivalent: “For as yow liketh, it suffiseth me” (1232-1233, 1235). Immediately after 
the knight’s felicitous transformation, Alison includes “meeknes” in her summing up of 
what makes an ideal husband, implying that the knight himself has become a meek 
man:  
 And thus they lyve unto hir lyves ende  
 In parfit joye; and Jhesu Crist us sende  
 Housbondes meeke, yonge, and fressh abedde,  
 And grace t’overbyde hem that we wedde;  
 And eek I praye Jesu shorte hir lyves 
 That noght wol be governed by hir wyves;  
 And olde and angry nygardes of dispence,  
 Go send hem soone verray pestilence! (1257-1261)  
That there is no line break or sentence break between the ending of the knight’s story 
(“In parfit joye”) and the list of husbandly virtues in Alison's prayer suggests that the 
knight now possesses these virtues. “Meekness” would imply that the knight is more 
obedient than his wife, who maintains her boastful, assertive style even as she swears 
her devotion. Although the rapist’s “parfit joye” in marriage might, at first glance, 
appear as a concession to patriarchal mores, Alison’s prayer in the very same sentence, 
in which she pleads for Jesus to shorten married men’s lives, deeply and hilariously 
undercuts the sentimentality of the tale’s resolution. It also ends the tale on a 
destabilizing note in keeping with The Wife of Bath's Prologue, reminding us that no 
marriage is eternal, and that an uncooperative husband might expire at any moment.  
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 The lady's boastful profession at the end of the tale exemplifies a vital, dynamic, 
public-minded manner of wifely devotion that reflects Alison's values. When the lady 
identifies herself among an international roster of powerful women, she concludes The 
Wife of Bath's Tale with an image of multiplicity and female power, as well as the 
suggestion of mobility. In her words of assurance to the knight, the lady promises to 
style herself “as fair to seene / As any lady, emperice, or queene, / That is bitwixe the 
est and eke the west.” Her confident, expansive language recalls Alison's ending to the 
The Wife of Bath's Prologue, as well as the loathly lady's initial act of counsel to the 
knight in The Wife of Bath's Tale: 
  God helpe me so, I was to hym as kynde  
  As any wyf from Denmark unto Ynde,  
  And also trewe, and so was he to me. (WBP 823-825) 
  . . . . . . .  
  Lat se which is the proudeste of hem alle  
  That wereth on a coverchief or a calle  
  That dar seye nay of that I shal thee teche. (WBT 1014-1022) 
All three of the above passages either describe or exemplify a dynamic of devotion, 
collaboration, or counsel among spouses. But perhaps more important, each reflects the 
speaker's self-identification with a diverse range of other women. (The two passages 
that conclude Alison's prologue and tale suggest geographical diversity in particular, by 
evoking images of travel “from Denmark unto Ynde” and “bitwixe the est and eke the 
west.”) The speaker in each of these passages—Alison narrating her own life (WBP), 
Alison narrating the hag's life (WBT), and the hag professing her intellectual prowess 
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(WBT)—uses a deceptively boastful tone to stress her parity or agreement with the other 
women and wives she imagines. In turn, she espouses a collaborative model of 
wifehood, whereby diverse women mobilize across social and geographic lines to share 








Reading the The Tale of Melibee, The Clerk's Tale, The Wife of Bath's Prologue, 
and The Wife of Bath's Tale with special attention to plot and character reveals in each 
of these texts a bold narrative of male transformation through wifely counsel. I hope my 
analysis of Dame Prudence, Griselda, the Wife of Bath, Arthur’s Queen, and the loathly 
lady as counselor-figures will inspire further research into the rhetorical and political 
accomplishments of influential women in The Canterbury Tales and other late medieval 
texts.  
The narratives of wifely counsel that I have studied call for new ways of 
thinking about counsel and about marriage in the Tales. An expanded definition of 
political counsel that incorporates female voices and domestic settings can help open up 
the circumscribed conversation on Ricardian counsel to more diverse depictions of 
political influence. Likewise, recognizing narratives of wifely counsel across a wide 
range of genres can help complicate our understanding of marriage in the Tales, which 
portray domestic life as a site of collaboration and reform more often than the current 
scholarship would suggest.   
I want to conclude by pointing out a few thematic commonalities among my 







The unequal benefits of marriage 
The tales in my study consistently celebrate marriage as a venue for educating 
and reforming husbands. The men in these texts tend to emerge from their wives' 
tutelege as more respectful, accountable, and cooperative husbands or leaders, and the 
changes they undergo bode well for the insitutions they represent. At the same time, the 
tales reflect considerable anxiety about the challenges, disadvantages, and even abuses 
that women can face in marriage. In The Clerk’s Tale, Griselda is a sacrificial figure: 
she subjects herself to Walter's cruelty as a strategy for effecting incremental changes in 
his attitude towards the polity. Despite the benefits of her counsel, the Clerk treats her 
suffering in marriage as a huge moral problem. In The Tale of Melibee, one cannot help 
but notice the unequal division of labor in Prudence’s marriage. Melibee reaps all the 
benefits of Prudence’s intelligence and patience, but what does Prudence reap from 
Melibee? What does it mean for her to suffer a physical assault while her husband plays 
in the fields, and then to have to coach him through the aftermath of that assault? The 
Wife of Bath’s Tale also portrays a woman as a victim of assault and provokes us to 
wonder if the social benefits of reforming a rapist through marriage outweigh the 
injustice of his happy fate and the risks he might pose to his wife.  
 
Christianity and wifely counsel 
Although I have more or less bracketed issues of religion and theology in this 
dissertation, the principal texts in my study are emphatically Christian. Prudence in The 
Tale of Melibee relies heavily on biblical wisdom to construct her arguments against 
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vengeance-taking; The Clerk's Tale and The Wife of Bath's Tale are deeply Christian in 
their critiques of classism; and The Wife of Bath's Prologue shows Alison to be 
enthusiastically invested in Christian literature and practice.  
In some ways, the relationship between Christianity and wifely counsel in these 
tales is exciting. The wife-counselors I have studied challenge patriarchal biases in 
Christian institutions by espousing and embodying more inclusive ideas about Christan 
wisdom and viritue. But the centrality of religion in these texts also raises questions. Is 
good wifely counsel possible outside of Christian marriage practices? Must women be 
Christian in order to be good counselors in the Tales? What does the Man of Law’s 
damning yet complex portrait of a Muslim woman’s counsel say about the relationship 
between gender, religion, authority, and wisdom?  
 
Male transformation as a romance trope 
In her book Counsel and Strategy in Middle English Romance, Geraldine Barnes 
argues that romances situate a hero within a predominately masculine network of 
counselors: “The hero of Middle English romance operates within clearly defined 
spheres of counselling resources: parental, feudal, and divine,” writes Barnes; 
“Throughout his life he is bonded by blood, love, and loyalty to a network of friends, 
family, and lord, who provide him with counsel, strategy, and when possible, armed 
support” (15). Although “family” might include wives, women in the romances Barnes 
studies are often “ignored altogether,” “blamed by the heroes themselves for instances 
of knightly misconduct, […] or reduced to a subordinate role” (16). The tales in my 
study, by contrast, portray women and wives as the most effective “counselling 
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resources” available, both to young men and to established patriarchs. Far from blaming 
women for men's misconduct, the male “heroes” of my counsel narratives eventually 
come to appreciate their wives' superior intelligence.  
If, as these tales suggest, wifely counsel is the engine behind male 
transformation, might we read wifely counsel plots as behind-the-scenes romances? To 
what extent do these narratives participate in and innovate on the romance genre? What 
other formal and generic qualities do Chacuer’s diverse tales of wifely counsel have in 
common? The structural consistency of the tales in my study, all of which narrate a 
man’s ethical transformation and subsequent acknowledgement of his wife’s wisdom 
and virtue, suggests that we can read Chaucher’s tales of wifely counsel as partaking in 
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